"Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit." -President Woodrow Wilson
IT APPEARS several others have stumbled on my formula for a European containment of America. In his International Herald-Tribune column, William Pfaff enumerates means by which "Europe can gently check America," including outmaneouvring the US diplomatically to act as a civilian "global citizen," much in the way the US seeks to constantly interdict militarily. A Le Mondeanalysis sees French intervention in the Côte d'Ivoire as a model for how such military action should be handled- by UN mandate rather than unilateral decision. The article argues that the UN lacks the means to administer or employ sufficient military force, and that the world model should be one of national military forces sanctioned by the United Nations engaging in such operations. It sees the Côte d'Ivoire situation as France's "petit Irak," i.e., as an example of a potential European model for international order contrary to that of the United States. In that this analysis is relatively conservative and feasible it provides a strong basis upon which to rest a potential European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Such compromises should be the basis for the CFSP's construction, as there already powerful issues around which the Union can coordinate its policies and force concessions on Washington with- namely, the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq, and a "central role" for Iraq's administration for the UN. Applying concerted economic and political pressure on the United States should not only gain the acceptance of such relatively modest, yet powerful goals on the part of the US, but should provide a powerful message both within and without Europe: that of the irrefutable power of a confederated European foreign policy. Eventually, this could become a catalyst for further developments in the formulation of CFSP and the appearance of a European "counterpole" within existing Western economic and security constructs with which to wield European strength against American domination.
Ultimately, the United States seeks to exploit the divisions among nation-states within Europe to its advantage- but nevertheless the leaders of the so-called "New Europe" still hold opinions contrary to the policies of the United States, currently consisting of the aforementioned issues around which a European CFSP might unite. The problems with reliance on such "New European" states are aptly illustrated by William Pfaff's IHTcolumn, "Abusing Old Allies Doesn't Pay," an exhortation to the United States to be a willing partner with Germany and France, which can provide, of all the European states save Britain, the greatest material support. Pfaff argues that the "New European" states are fundamentally too weak- the invitation extended to Poland to police a sector of Iraq was greeted warmly in Warsaw, but the US was asked to make up for the shortfall in Poland's ailing budget, and Poland had considerable concerns about UN authentication. Furthermore, Poland could only make a force of 1,500 troops available, requesting assistance from Denmark and Germany. Denmark, Pfaff explains, has a military strength barely larger than Poland's earmarked Iraq stablisation force, and, for reasons of political consistency, Germany politely refused the offer. Other "New European" allies, like Romania, pledged troops, but of a negligible amount. Public opinion in the region generally runs more contrary to US interests than American planners might like to admit. The US has proposed to move much of its military assets in Germany to the Czech Republic, where it presupposed it would be welcome. The Czech president, however, compared a US troop presence to Soviet occupation, and consequently the issue of American basing rights in the Czech Republic will be put to a referendum, in which initial estimates show support for a US presence lies with the minority. A BBC analysis finds that Poland is unmistakably a "big country" within Europe, but not necessarily a "big power.
The more influential nation-states under the influence of the US include Britain, Spain, and Italy. Nevertheless, considerable political opposition in each country has made it increasingly difficult for the US to rely on London, Madrid, or Rome for unequivocal support without some degree of reciprocation. In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi faces multifarious corruption charges and faces both a court system and electorate hostile to his policies and leadership. In Spain, Prime Minister Aznar is beset with such considerable opposition to his foreign policy that the Spanish legislature has actually attempted to draft legislation forbidding public protest of Spanish military actions. Similar ridiculous measures have been taken in the supposed democracy of the United Kingdom, in which antiwar leader George Galloway has been suspended from the Labour Party over allegations he accepted bribes from Saddam Hussein. Such activities have the pungency of governments run by tabloids, and, indeed, such is the extent such governments must go to in order to conceal and suppress the popular sentiment for policies affirming their national identities, and, indeed, European sovereignty, vis-a-vis the current vasselage to the United States.
The belief that the anti-war EU states (I shall henceforth dub them La Résistance) will fall in line after being "isolated" from the rest of Europe, or, indeed, the world, is equally fallacious for US policymakers. Germany recently indicated it might vote along with the UK and US on a UN draft resolution authorising the occupation of Iraq by the United States and Britain and giving the US (essentially) control of Iraqi oil supplies, in order to patch relations with the United States (such a resolution was made in order for the US to join OPEC and gain sway over global oil supplies, one EU commissioner asserted.) However, a significant degree of evidence suggests this is a measure meant to placate conservative political pressure to return to the Atlantic partnership while the Schroeder government pursues a long-term policy of engaging in confrontationalism and counterpolar maneovres. In an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer affirmed that the Schroeder government was committed to a policy of European opposition to US policy, especially in the Mideast, and prescribed the same "global citizen" priorities outlined by Pfaff in outmaneouvring the US diplomatically. Fischer said that the American government was altogether uncompromising and that the Atlantic relationship's well being depended on the evolution of a power at least as strong as the United States on the opposite side of the pond. "Europa ist eine echte Macht," he said, "Europe is a genuine power." Furthermore, Diplomatica has obtained, thanks to the generosity of reader Toshka in Belgrade, a Strategic Forecasting document from 1999 explicating the consequences of the Kosovo war on NATO. It poignantly illustrates the frustrations of the Schroeder government in the handling of the crisis, and the potential for the schism which erupted over the Iraq situation:
NATO's greatest price will be paid in NATO itself. Gerhard Schroeder has tried to put a good face on it, but the Germans were and remain appalled by the risks the Anglo-Americans forced Germany to accept in relation to the Russians. Schroeder insisted on Friday that Russia should be treated with "respect," a code word for avoiding another such confrontation. Germany cannot afford another episode of Anglo-American diplomatic brilliance. Thus, when Schroeder said last week that: "Human rights are and should be inviolable," but that "we have to look at issues very closely and in fact differentiate between different situations," he was announcing that it would be a long time before Germany tried this again. He went on to say that NATO action should be "confined to its own territory and that should continue to be its way." After Kosovo, a compliant Germany within NATO simply should not be taken for granted any longer.
Ergo, one can assume that Germany, at least under Social Democratic leadership, will continue to work toward the permanence of an American multilateralism via the construction of a counterpolar entity. Schroeder's concerns over Anglo-American manoeuvres, Fischer's remarks, and assertions by the German finance ministry that the Bundesrepublik will accept nothing less than all its debts held by Iraq repayed in full seem to suggest that Berlin's policies will generally gravitate closer to the Paris-Moscow axis than to Washington, or it will at least seek to engage in such flexibility arrangements within the EU which provide for a deepening of such integration policies as CSFP. Such was illustrated in Germany's participation in the summit on the creation of the European Security and Defence Union.
Even if the EU was able to coordinate its policies around a common pillar, and even if the "New European" states relent to popular sentiment and acknowledge their own fundamental positions of opposition to foreign domination, the question remains as to how Europe would be able to pressure the United States. The recommendations made in my initial explorations of a European containment strategy called for a key strategic element revolving around the establishment of diplomatic relations with states which would allow the EU to both gain credibility as a power with the world's best interests in mind as well as encircle the US. Such ideas were generally affirmed by the strategies espoused by Pfaff and Fischer. Nevertheless, by far the most crucial element is a strategy meant to exert pressure on the US economically. Commanding some 40% of the global economy (Le Monde statistic), the EU is in a primary position to challenge the US in this regard. As the "New European" states become further integrated into the European economy, moreover, they will have a greater proclivity toward supporting policies designed to bolster the EU's economic prominence, perhaps at the expense of the US if necessary (ideally, this would make such states more amenable to political balancing as well.)
The barons of Wall Street snicker that an overreliance on social welfare programmes in European states has created a "sclerosis" which has ground the German and French economies to a halt. While this may be true to a degree, the fact that Europe's economy is so seemlessly integrated into that of the rest of the world, especially the United States', is telling: that the economic malaise currently being experienced by the globalised economy is not a phenomenon brought about by an individual state. The US was, in fact, forced to acknowledge this when it backed down from trade policies designed to harm France (as such a policy would have inevitably backlashed to injure the US economy as well.) Furthermore, disparities in both statistical analysis and cultural activities account for misunderstanding of the economic situation in both Europe and North America. Especially the fact that American workers have a propensity toward low-income "filler" jobs while "unemployed" dilutes its real economic character: in Germany, unemployment benefits provide for greater living standards than one receives in the US "employed" at a filler position at minimum wages, and hence more funds are injected into the German economy. Indeed, the European economy is in the least poor shape of any of the three primary industrial regions (also including the Pacific Rim and North America), explaining why the Euro is hitting fresh highs against the dollar. The 2004 EU expansion and potential integration of the new member states of the Eurozone, not to mention Schroeder's ambitious Agenda 2010 policy for the German economy, should bolster the European economy and reverse any trend toward stagnation alleged by US investors.
Already, the US has been forced to accede to Europe on trade practises. When the EU exterted pressure on the World Trade Organisation to ask the US to comply with regulations against the administration of tax breaks to exporters, the US had no choice but to relent to European demands.
Most intriguing are the possibilities envisioned by Hans Martens in his European Policy Centre paper "The Falling Dollar- New Responsibilities for the Euro." Martens points out the dangers of the US trade imbalance to the American economy, and its ultimate vulnerability to European pressure. The US administration, Martens notes, feels invulnerable to such reliance on foreign investment as represented by the trade imbalance. The administration's policies advocate tax cuts leading, purportedly, to greater levels of consumer spending, rather than the savings needed to finance American investments abroad (to redress the trade imbalance). As Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, stated (in a speech which coincided with the inception of the Euro's rapid value acceleration):
Countries that have gone down this path invariably run into trouble, and so would we. Eventually, the current account deficit will have to be restrained. Boosting savings is essential even though it does not affect the number of people in the workforce. But it surely affects capital investment, which it finances, and the productivity that it engenders.
Myths that the decline of the dollar will bolster the US economy are thoroughlly dispelled by Martens:
A declining dollar should help the US out of its economic problems, insofar as it will make it easier for the Americans to export. However, this automatic regulator does not really work for several reasons. Firstly US export volume is relatively limited, and has been further reduced through the transfer of output because of international investments. The sales of daughter companies if US enterprises based in Europe for example is much bigger that the exports from the US to Europe. Secondly the Balance of Payments problem is no longer just a trade issue. Servicing the external debt, which is of the order of $3 trillion (or around 30% of the US GDP) is a much more important factor. Even if the debt is dollar-denominated, investors might not in the long run accept to be paid in ever devalued dollars.
The problems of the dollar can no longer be ignored- the "benign neglect" with which the currency's slip has been treated in the past, claims Martens, because the deficit has reached the dangerous level of 5% of the GDP, low capital influx is unsatisfied by low interest rates, and the euro has emerged as a competitor- a currency with a domestic base larger than the US' (and with the inclusion of the accession states will be almost twice the US' population). The euro could also be used in the future as the currency of choice for investors in China and Japan looking for a stable and high-value currency, as the dollar once was. Indeed, speculation is rampant one of the motives for the US invasion of Iraq was that it was planning to convert its oil valuation to euros, a dangerous precedent for the dollar, as it would begin the process of cementing the euro as the primary currency of international exchange.
Nevertheless, in order to achieve this level of prestige, it is necessary for the European states to embark on such initiatives as the "Lisbon objectives" (designed to create a European knowledge-based economy) as well as structural modifications and modernisations of the unified European currency apparatus. Furthermore, increased direct European investments abroad are needed to supplement the declining export share Europe will face as the result of a strong currency. This can be achieved in relation to the "global citizen" priorities, namely, by opening exclusive markets like MerCoSur and various "closed" Chinese regions to more open trade with the EU. The building of a political relationship with Russia also increases the possibilities for cooperation in Siberian mineral extraction, heightened by Russian interest in moving toward the European economic aggregation. Revising the Growth and Stability Pact (restricting deficit levels) is also essential for both avoiding economic stagnation, promoting social justice, and providing for effective economic competition with the US. Allowing for deficit spending on investments (as opposed to mere pork-barrel projects, the so-called "Golden Rule" in use in the UK) is an effective solution to such problems and should be explored by the European Central Bank more extensively.
With the dollar subsumed by the euro the European Union can enjoy the type of economic superiority Japan could have only dreamed of attaining during the 1980s, with even more considerable influence over US policy. Without deep deficit spending, the US cannot maintain its vast array of military forces, and thus cannot impress its will upon the world. The rather benign-sounding "soft balancing" becomes a euphemism for undermining the foundation upon which the instrument of American power-projection is built. No military confrontation is created as a result of such policies, and the EU can quietly exert pressure within the structures of the NATO alliance and within the UN, forcing the US to take both seriously as institutions which are the sole arbiters of the application abroad of its military might.
THE QUESTION of whether the United States should pursue a foreign policy based upon unilateral interventionism rather than one of consultation and internationalist concession continues to provide the backdrop for much debate in international affairs. Previously, I have discussed the need and methods by which the United Nations could be reformed and strengthened into a body embracing a multipolar balance and enforcing this equilibrium through an intolerance of aggression, a system I called the Concert of Earth. The likelihood of such a reform producing tangible results within the next few decades, however, are few. The concept requires much detailed refining, and most of all requires a model of international order not reflective of the current reality. The hegemonist-imperialists in the United States are correct to observe their country has a preponderance of military strength. Though that does not grant it the legitimacy to rule the planet via fiat, it does permit a certain freedom of action outside the international consensus.
Despite the protestations of billions worldwide and the concerted efforts of many world governments, the United States acted of its own volition against Iraq. The best hope, then, in the short term, is to convince the citizens of the United States that this latest affair with Pax Americana ideology is contrary to their nation's interests. Despite outward appearance of such, the people of the United States did not enthusiastically support such an impetuous military exploit. Opinion was divided until the moment of the war's inception, at which most of its citizens were implored to support their armed forces. The motivational impulses acting upon the American populace were multivariant, but both before, during, and after the war they amounted to one consistent theme: the suppression of dissent against the government through proxy verbal attacks and non sequitur invocations of the 11 September terrorist attacks as justification for any intrusion upon one's erstwhile respected liberties. Control of the American media by large corporations currying favours from the right-wing sector contributed to pro-war mindsets. Every attack on the opposition was cloaked in the archaic virtue of patriotism- a perverted form of which currently manifests itself as acrid jingoism. The fact that, through all such manipulations, roughly half the American population failed to support the idea of a war on Iraq.
Like the red scare stirred up by McCarthyist anti-communist witch-hunters in the 1950s, it would appear the new jingoist impulse is receding due to popular discontent with its unrelenting agenda and utter irreverance. Even the most old-line conservative American legislators are attacked as "unpatriotic." A kind of disillusionment is gradually setting in over the whole affair, leaving the surge of nationalist gloating to its traditional core constituency, the audience of radio talk show demagogues. Even the Bush administration's political advisers are convinced public opinion would not support another war so soon after the Iraq venture, and ergo ordered the cessation of plans to immediately assault Syria. Public support that was catalysed by a wounded public psyche, following the devastating attacks of 11 September, has waned the farther the United States moves from that tragedy. The great awakening that the US' national security policy is not designed to provide security, but to spread empire, may yet emerge.
Still, discontent with the current Bush foreign policy does not translate immediately into support for an international order centred on the United Nations. The neoimperialists are a relatively small faction of the American populace. The primary threat to the international order, in fact, comes from the liberal interventionists, who seek to identify, unilaterally, the abridgement of human rights and to utilise the savagery of military force to suppress it, whatever the consequences. The liberal interventionists are disciples of Clinton and Madeleine Albright; they point to Bosnia and Kosovo as primary examples of the "good" the United States has managed to do for the world, and to Rwanda not only as an example of the ineffectiveness of the UN, but of the results of inaction. Previously I expounded clearly on why the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions were failures and why Rwanda would have been colossally so.
To illustrate why this supposed great alternative to internationalism, arbitrarily dictated human rights abuses being suppressed by the full spectrum dominance of an American hyperpower, is fallacious, I will illustrate with a chronic human rights situation emerging in the heart of Africa. Peter Canellos, writing in his Boston Globe column, condemns the United States for acting against a weakened, contained, and stable Iraq while millions are being slaughtered in a brutal regional war in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today the question was posed to me: wouldn't I support immediate action being taken to end the quasi-genocidal horrors of this war? Isn't this Rwanda on a grand scale?
Let us examine, then, a hypothetical situation in which the American military intervenes in the Congo. The eastern Congo is essentially a power void, with no authority able to be imposed by the weak government in Kinshasa. Therefore, it has been the stage set for two regional rivals' ambitions: Uganda and Rwanda. This hotbed of ethnic fervent has acquired its own bizarre stew of ethnic loyalties, in some cases contradicting themselves and leading (due to poor communications, among other things) to confused slaughters. The few American media sources covering the Congo conflict cannot even begin to fathom how to translate the situation into the traditional good v. evil mantra of liberal interventionist wars. In other words, it makes the wildly misunderstood Balkan melee look like a simple arithmetic problem. It is inconceivable exactly how badly an American intervention would go there. The last time American troops engaged what they considered petty guerilla forces in a dense jungle, they began the long saga of the Vietnam War. In fact, it is a situation very much like Mogadishu with the setting of Vietnam and a panoply of combatants more diverse than those in the Balkans. Who would the US be fighting on the behalf of? Rwanda? Uganda? Congo? Hutu minorities? Tutsi minorities? The fact is that there are no innocents to protect in the eastern Congo bloodbath- there are no moral absolutes to uphold in this infinitely tragic anarchy.
Let us then say the US, hypothetically, succeeds in somehow "pacifying" the eastern Congo. How would it stabilise the situation and, more importantly, prevent it from coming about again? What region would it seek to administer? Would it attempt to restore power to Kinshasa, or create a new regional structure? Would it carve out an American pupil-state beneath the Congolese canopies and invite intrepid Ivy Leaguers to contribute their skills to "reconstruct" what was always a haphazard product of the last time Western powers attempted to intervene on the behalf of Africans? How would the United States handle the backlash to such attempts among those who feel it patronising to be occupied and condescended to by American "instructors" supported by bayonet tips? Would the American administrators prawl the Ubangi River like Conrad's characters in Heart of Darkness?
In situations in which the chaos seems constrained to one state, the liberal interventionists seem to provide more answers. The liberal interventionists look at failed, rather than powerful states as the chief problems posed to American security. Ergo, the United States, they conclude, was right to engage in Somalia, though such an operation was an ostensible failure. Such states, they believe, need to be overtaken and administered properly in order to form the basis of a stable nation whose citizenry would not be inclined to pose challenges to the United States. This process is referred to as "nation-building," and is not far from neoimperialism, though its distinguishing factors seem to be a willingness to tolerate governments with popular support, rather than those which would most readily supplicate themselves to the US, and that the nation-builders have a ready willingness to accept an international effort. Bill Clinton was intelligent enough to cover his mistakes in Bosnia with the UN and in Kosovo with NATO, though they have manage to bring about stabilisation only very slowly and cautiously in the wake of rash American wartime decisions. The infiltration of Macedonia by the US-backed Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, has posed peacekeeping challenges. American propaganda during the Kosovo War depicted the KLA as freedom-fighting guerillas heroically opposing Serbian "aggression." In reality they were far from such idealised rebels, clinging instead to the ideology of "Greater Albania" and perpetrating their own war crimes.
Such an effort would therefore be necessary in each situation in which human rights violations were being committed and sustained American troop presence was required in order to bring about stabilisation and reconstruction, not to mention the reorganisation of societies into entities incapable of committing atrocities. The liberal interventionists admit the United Nations and other international and nongovernmental organisations have central roles in such operations, and therefore the necessity of the UN as a political organisation is unearthed in one regard. Nevertheless, as the Americans would inevitably provide the majority of the military forces required, one can estimate this would require significant commitments on the part of the American military, going beyond mere imperial overreach, and such a maintenance of presence has always been anathema to Americans. Even if only one state is "liberated" at a time, it creates a significant drain on American forces. About half the US military's combat strength was engaged against Iraq- while being drained in other such crucial regions as Afghanistan. How is there any guarantee this doctrine of "flexible response," furthermore, will lend itself to patient and routine applications of intervention. Furthermore, one's motives are questionable when only "freeing" strategic, resource-rich, centralised states tailor-made for armoured combat.
What of the possibility of a combination of American forces providing the initial combat thrust, while international troops and agencies constitute the rebuilding effort? It would seem, at the outset, to be more effective. Nevertheless, the absence of international consensus in the decision-making by the United States will ultimately alienate members of the international community and make them less enthusiastic about supporting efforts by the United States to provoke some sort of global risorgimento. Furthermore, the very act of such warfare provokes untold consequences- inevitable terrorist responses against the United States being one, and complications for the reconstruction agencies, like those in the Balkans, being another. Moreover, it is always more preferable for a society to reorganise itself than to go under the receivership of the United Nations. Tutelage is patronising even under international organisations, and is often seen only a step above vigilante imperialism. The UN has its own limits of power, and cannot be managing trusteeships worldwide- it has expended significant resources alone on tiny Bosnia and East Timor. Such "nation-building" as a consequence of attack and occupation should be as last-resort an option as war itself.
To truly do justice to their cause, the liberal interventionists must recognise that intervention comes in many forms, and that military action is usually far from the preferable solution. The insurmountable infeasibility of applying the formula of aggressive warfare and neocolonialist nation-building operations is a necessary realisation. For the United States must recognise that the force which molds the world is not truly violent in nature- it is the force of ideas. By circumventing even a nominal representation of international opinion like the United Nations, the United States commits itself to turning thoughts- and ideas- against itself, and fomenting the type of instability and anti-American sentiment it claims only brute intervention can suppress. It also ruins any potential chance of true preventive action- changing the underlying socioeconomic currents upon which such strife-torn regions are agitated. If the United States was willing to work through international institutions to bring about a concerted solution to the poverty so chronically gripping places like central Africa, it will have taken a giant step forward toward global stability simply not being achieved through the application of its hegemonistic armed strength. It can start at once by recognising the economic vasselage by which it trammels the Third World with neoliberalism is untenable. Significant resources must be invested immediately- a palfry small amount has been pledged (and, ironically, with great fanfare) toward alleviating AIDS, which pales in comparison to the ludicrous percentage of the GDP (and substantial debt accumulated) by military expenditure. Most of all the US must realise that most human rights violations come about as an expression of popular sentiment and not as "evil" perpetrated by dictatorial cabals which can be paraded before the courts of victors' justice when most opportune. Curbing such abuses requires internal reform, an external tolerance and patience for such reform to take place. Such reform can only be facilitated, not imposed. This is why Iran, I believe, has been the most successful state in the Mideast in terms of moving gradually toward modernisation.
While the humanitarian interventionists must recognise the UN is an organisation designed to provide security, not a world coerced into accepting Western conceptions of morality, the internationalist camp must also recognise that some extreme situations do require the authorisation of military force, though these situations are far more rare than one is led to believe by the American media. In these cases, the system of international order must be allowed to study alternative means to addressing the crisis, provide a proper timeframe for their attempted implementation, and to work out a detailed means by which such action will be carried out and followed through with reconstruction efforts. Hopefully providing a global forum with such varied opinions would allow it to synthesise ideas, objections, facts, and analyses into strategies which are infinitely more successful than the intervention scenarios so far pursued by the United States.
The internationalist must acknowledge his system is imperfect. At the same time, however, the UN and internationalism, flawed as they may be in their current states, provide the most promising frameworks upon which to discuss policy. The dangers of an anarchic world dominated by the rule of might and characterised by preventive warfare and a race for the acquisition of deterrant materials is the reality otherwise. In short, internationalism is a terribly imperfect system, but reliance on hegemony has been a consistent failure throughout history. Those few necessary interventions have slight chance of even minimal success without international approval and support. Even if one cannot have a modicum of hope in an ideal international system, it is entirely evident the flaws of the current one surpass the disasters inherent in the alternative.
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Notes on the Global Condition-
-THE OCCUPATION of Iraq continues to present the United States with unique and increasingly difficult problems. Australia's The Agereports on American failure to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq's population. The BBC alleges US troops were complicit in the looting of an Iraqi university, despite the pleas of its faculty. The Boston Globe discovers that the anarchy following the war has been a bonanza for weapons salesmen, and that the much-tooted return of Baghdad's police force has been marred by its officers skipping duty to loot. A Newsweek article on the US' lack of "nation-building" capabilities recounts techniques intended to subjugate Iraqi dissent. Not to mention, according to Russia's ITAR-TASS news agency, the US is hiring Ba'athist officials to suppress potential protests against its presence in Iraq.
-ISRAEL has rejected any potential peace talks with Syria, according to the Daily Telegraph. Israeli officials explained they were waiting to Syria's position to "become clear" in the fallout from the Iraq war. Coupled with the cool reception Syria gave the demands of US Secretary of State Colin Powell over ending its involvement with Palestinian militant groups, such developments do not auger well for the implementation of the heavily-promoted new Israeli-Palestinian peace plan.
-INDIA AND PAKISTAN are beginning to normalise relations following a long nuclear standoff which had provoked worldwide fear of potential nuclear war. Rather than jump directly into a summit, the two countries' leaders have decided to seek a more gradual process of easing tensions by opening borders and trade and engaging in other reciprocal actions. Pakistan has even proposed mutual denuclearisation. Many analysts see a US hand in this new détente, as both Islamabad and New Delhi are seen as critical US allies. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage will stop in both capitals after a trip to Afghanistan in order to exert pressure on their respective governments. The détente may be tenuous, however, as Pakistan has little control of militant groups operating in Kashmir, though it claims to be fighting them, and Pakistan's military government has a feeble hold on its restive population, which is gradually embracing Islamic fundamentalism.
MUCH ado has been made about Michael Glennon's article in Foreign Affairs, "The UN vs. US Power: Why the Security Council Failed." One could go into exquisite detail refuting the arguments presented by Glennon, but it is sufficient to attack the premise entirely. Did the Security Council, per se, fail? Glennon is correct in essentially saying the Security Council is useless in the face of current US power. The council did manage to avoid granting the United States the international legitimacy of rubber-stamping its atrocious policy on Iraq. In this sense, it succeeded. But to the extent of upholding its charter, and other documents of international law? The UN has no means by which to effectively check US power, to contain the hegemon.
Perhaps, however, it would be a step to far to say the UN should be authorised to make law, or, in its case, resolutions, at all. It is ostensibly an agency of collective security, and gradually acquired the accoutrements, to many of the world's citizens, of a sort of government. One should, therefore, begin with the argument that while it is acknowledged the United Nations may be incapacitated as an instrument of lawmaking, it is infinitely necessary as a forum in which to attempt to forge consensus and compromise- a vital alternative to military posturing, ephemeral coalitions, and all the other odious features which characterised the pre-First World War era- such realities Woodrow Wilson sought to avoid in the future through his Fourteen Points.
With this in mind, one must concede the United Nations cannot be abandoned, wholesale, to the fate of an insignificant humanitarian aid agency or a symbolic "debating society," as its detractors wish to pigeonhole it. Nevertheless, the ideal of the United Nations is not merely one of providing a centre for diplomatic manoeuvre. The United Nations still requires a means by which to enforce its statutes- particularly on hegemons like the United States or the lackeys- like Israel- it habitually defends. Glennon characterises such laws, particularly the UN Charter, as a revived Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 1928 treaty purporting to outlaw war as an instrument of policy. He presents a non sequitur argument: that the United Nations is powerless in the face of American military strength and preponderance, and that therefore the world should rely solely on this Pax Americana to guarantee its security. Nevermind the fact that claiming the UN is ineffective because it cannot contain the US requires instead a reliance on America is entirely, inherently self contradictory. The fact of American military supremacy does not make it the premiere option for the enforcement of global security or the promotion of successful societies, even in the short term.
The typical arguments put forth by proponents of American hegemony and unilateral interventionism in this regard are that the United Nations is not fully representative nor is it effective. The representation argument is easily countered; the UN may not be perfectly accountable for the opinions of the world's citizens or of nations' statures as world powers or not, but it represents the only means to even a limited consensus. The choice is therefore between adequate representation and none whatsoever. World opinion, whether fully represented in the Security Council or not, is most usually more placated should the Council decide matters rather than one individual state. The very fact competing interests have reached a necessary compromise represents a progressive step on the road to a fully representative UN. Reform (discussed below) should bring this about to the greatest allowable extent.
The second argument promoted by anti-internationalist Americans is the United Nations' ineffectiveness. The primary flaw of the United Nations, this journal would observe, is its incapacity to enforce fundamental rules such as the nonagression clause of the UN Charter upon such indignant "participants" in the UN as the United States. Nevertheless, the neoconservatives and liberal interventionists argue the United Nations should do more to promote humanitarian goals- intervening where "crimes against humanity" take place. They point at situations in which the UN has failed to do so- in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. One might indeed conclude that UN "failure to intervene" caused a great deal of suffering in each of these locations. However, examining alternatives to the Rwanda situation, would the United States really be willing to deploy its military deep into the African jungle, following Vietnam and Mogadishu? American imperialism, potent as it could be, still has significant limits due to the diverging philosophical foundations of the American republic, not to mention the traditional hazards of empire- overreach, rebellion, etc. Ergo, one sees, the decision of Kofi Annan not to engage UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda was not necessarily far from that of American military commanders' judgments.
In the Balkans, where US intervention did take place, it was extraordinarily clumsy and eventually complicated the situation to an even greater degree. As the various ex-Yugoslav republics seceded, Slobodan Milosevic was in fact motivated at first to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia, and secondly by a desire to preserve the safety of ethnic Serbian minorities in the splinter states. However, the splinter states were almost all run by ethnic nationalist extremists. In each case Yugoslavia involved itself in a struggle for the preservation of Serb minorities, it is entirely unclear (due to the vast array of sources referencing the subject) from which side interethnic conflict originated, but due to the ferocity of the Balkan nationalist leaders' affinity for pure nation-states, the probability lies with their commitment of initial acts of ethnic cleansing, causing the Serbs to respond in turn. In Bosnia, especially, the case was far from clear. Assertions that a multiethnic state had flourished under President Izbegovic were self-refuting propaganda claims. Izbegovic was an avowed Islamic purist seeking to eradicate "foreign influences" from Bosnia, and received significant assistance from Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda. The United States waded into the situation blaming any and all "agression" and "genocide" on Yugoslavia and Milosevic. This is not to say Milosevic did not commit such crimes, but that in taking such an artificially imposed dualist overview of the Balkan situation, the United States managed to intervene in what was a conflict characterised by equally brutal tactics perpetrated by either side and propelled by centuries of ethnic tension and hatred. Its "timely intervention" has been nothing short of disastrous for its reputation in the Balkans, as especially evidenced by the assassination of the latest of its puppet prime ministers in Belgrade, a continuingly revolving regime set up after another disastrous action by the United States, intervention in Kosovo, which had the effect of supporting not the Islamic fundamentalist Izbegovicites, but the rabidly expansionist apostles of Greater Albania, the Kosovo Liberation Army, perpetrator of far worse crimes than ever dreamed of by the Yugoslav military. Nevertheless, the Balkans can rest calmly now, with Bosnia under tenuous UN administration, Kosovo the perpetual ward of NATO, Serbia an American puppet with a tentative lid on mounting dissent, and KLA troops infiltrating Macedonia. What a glorious victory for rapid intervention and flexibile response!
Americans point to the Kosovo incident and state that the Security Council was deliberately avoided for good reason; Russia would have vetoed action, being a historical ally of Serbia. But does not the argument that the UN is unrepresentative and ineffective contradict, if tthe interests of Serbia and Russia were dismissed as merely blocking the inevitable advance of "righteousness"? The American programme should be exposed for what it is: the attempt to force the rest of the world to fit a rigid mold: conformity with the United States. The opinions expressed so far have been those of the American left. On the right, Americans feel the United Nations is ineffective so long as it does not advance their agenda of promoting Western (read, American) civilisation worldwide through the application of punishing force to those who challenge it. The idea that all should be represented is anathema to them; they believe the UN should either become, itself, a "coalition" to fight for an Americanised globe or be consigned to oblivion.
The infinite dangers of unipolar hegemony, not reliance on internationalism, were exposed by the circumstances surrounding the Iraq war. It is evident, yes, that the United Nations could and should increase its legitimacy, but that is not a primary issue, as it provides an institution far more legitimate than any one in which a world accedes to one global hyperpuissance. What the United Nations really needs to do is formulate a way by which it can uphold its laws equally: to checkmate the hyperpower and regain its status as the preeminent global body. This will ultimately only be achieved through the reformation of its institutions and the subsequent reorganisation of the world into a multipolar balance of power state, a stabilisation essential for effective partnership and compromise rather than railroaded dissent giving way to unilateralist mantra.
The first aspect of this reform should allow the UN to become more legitimate via the creation of a tricameral decision-making apparatus. As it is previously, the General Assembly would represent each member state with one representative and one vote. However, a popularly-elected assembly would include representatives based upon population; guaranteeing China more leeway than tiny Luxembourg. Finally, a form of the Security Council is maintained, with much broader representation, a lack of veto power, and the ability to dissolve and regenerate in order to reflect the realities of global power. Some formula of economic, military, populational, and other strengths would endow a nation or supranational organisation the capacity for status within this council. With such a capacity for democratic representation, without the encumberment of veto power, the United States is arrayed against, theoretically, the five billion plus world citizens opposing its policies. The neoconservative factionaries, of course, would argue a significant number of the delegates were appointed by "undemocratic regimes." Nevertheless, a large majority would have to be legitimate in their eyes. Furthermore, that minority of appointees, one may argue, is necessary to maintain for the sake of representing states which would otherwise be isolated from the global governance system and could inevitably pose a threat to regional or world security.
Ultimately, however, the United States may choose to act even in contravention of the decisions of such a representative body. Though the world has self-correcting mechanisms for such action (such as the collapse of all empires, inevitably) one would not prefer to witness the cycle of violence preceeding the US' apogee and demarcating its decline. Once again the problem of containing the United States emerges, and once again the imperialists gloat ironically that the lack of such capability indicates the superiority of the American system. However, this journal most famously postulated the means by which the US could be contained solely by the influence of European balance. The US' concentration on the blunt power of military strength has led it to ignore the socioeconomic perils of such a decision. As such, Europe, and, indeed, the rest of the world in concert is in a position to engage in "soft balancing" against the United States. Consider- within the reformed UN described above, directly elected representatives from, say, Australia, would be able to oppose American action in contradiction to its government's position. The ability for such undermining undercuts the US ability to threaten governments, and extends the principle of more direct democracy to much of the earth. Hence, the sovereignty of the nation-state is obsolete- there is no "national interest," in the case of those participants which allow their citizens the privelege, but the "sovereignty of the individual" is upheld. Nevertheless, even at the level of national sovereignty, one cannot argue mere "national interest" keeps the UN ineffective. Parties and representatives in every legislature present differing interests. Even the most limited form of real action by the UN, remember, represents a truer form of global democracy than one in which the citizens of the United States form a sort of aristocracy, able to decide the world's fate by their votes alone. If such a system were to be hypothetically applied to the Iraq war, the tricameral United Nations would have decided overwhelmingly against action.
However, let us consider how the US and UK skirted around even seeking direct UN approval for the use of force- the invocation of another resolution, 1441, seemingly authorising "consequences," vaguely. This type of misapprehension cries out for a body to interpret international law. The world needs a sort of constitutional court, in which such application can be debated. Ergo, no nation would be able to seize upon a law and mold it to fit its explicit purposes.
This, moreover, is the most difficult point to make, the United Nations needs inevitably to back its voice with an enforcement mechanism. And, inevitably, this will mean military engagement to some degree. Shortly before the Second Gulf War, UN forces were stationed along the Iraq-Kuwait border, and were promptly removed by Kofi Annan, much to the consternation of some. In the future, in order to guard against such aggressive action, in order to ensure its will is heard, the UN will need to present a literal barrier to expansionism. One can only hope it is considered a deterrant to military action and not a component of national defence for an aggressor to annihalate. The UN must slowly apprehend the right to be the global policeman, in order to make more subtle reactions and more nuanced decisions to effectively improve situations rather than inflame them as in the US "shock and awe" methodological framework.
In the long term, containing the United States requires a balanced world. Though the US might inevitably realise that dangers are posed to it not merely out of irrational blind hatred, jealousy, or pure "evil," but rather thoughts, opinions, and ideas which result from its willingness to continually ignore the power of international popular conception of it, it will never fully engage such an international system without the pressure of influential nonmilitary rivals. It requires a strongly united Europe with an expanded sphere of interest encompassing Turkey, the southern Mediterranean, and Russia. It needs a pact of Latin American nations resisting attempts to be colonised by neoliberal economics. It needs unity among East Asian states sick of being pawns in a new strategic chess between the US, China, and North Korea. Such superblocs pave the way for subordination of the national interest, as the American hegemonists so smugly claim is impossible- the European Union is already the model of a future world system based upon such supranational-subsidiary relationships.
Finally, the revived United Nations should concentrate on regulating untrammeled global trade and thus thwarting the economic institutions like the IMF and World Bank which grant the US such economic supremacy. It can then assist in building the economies of beleaguered deveoping nations, whose deficiencies become assets for a hierarchical world in which the United States reigns with supreme potency and prejudice. Extending the principles of social justice to the international theatre makes the proto-slavery around which empires are constructed impossible. Not only, though, is the political balance corrected, but much of the unrest which contributes to global security concerns is alleviated. The United Nations would then become as Europe was after the 1815 Congress of Vienna- a guarantor of the peace by maintaining an equilibrium of interests, a harmonious Concert of Earth.
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Notes on the Global Condition-
-FRANCE'S controversial Interior Minister, Nicholas Sarkozy, met with his equally controversial US counterpart, Attorney General John Ashcroft, to discuss a "thaw" on Franco-American relations regarding security and cooperation in fighting terrorism. Once again, France is being careful to make overtures on important issues, like Bush's war against terror and the ending of sanctions on Iraq, in order to not only rebuild ties with the US, but to make its principled stances on other affairs more acceptable.
-AL-QAEDA may be growing, with opinions in the Islamic world hardening against the United States in response to the war on Iraq. This represents one of the chief fears of war opponents, validated, in fact, by the Bush administration when it warns of terrorist retaliations. It is also a product of the revenge cycle, into which the United States may feel itself being sucked ala Israel due to its occupation of Iraq. Not to mention, the Boston Globe presents an interesting analysis of the concept of national revenge.
-COLOMBIAN military units, say the United States, have made gains against Colombia's three primary rebel factions, in the US' much touted failure, the war on drugs. Though this is ostensibly a success for US policy, the fact is that coca sales in Colombia cannot be halted through the simple application of swift force, nor can the popularly-supported leftist rebel groups be persuaded to quit their causes. The Colombian situation has always portended ominously as a new Vietnam, the US pursuing a vague and inscrutable goal in a jungle, and trying to suppress forces motivated by socioeconomic concerns with US-advised forces. The conflict only has potential to expand.
-ATTENDEZ, mes visiteurs francophones- Je voudrais exprimer ma gratitude pour votre appui. Je sais que les vues dans la France, le Québec, et d'autres pays de la francophonie soyez semblable à ceux exprimées sur ce journal, et j'attends avec intérêt d'augmenter le rapport de ce journal avec le lectorat du monde francophone.
On the Coattails of Power Surveying the Motives of "New Europe"
"Iraq est omnis divisa in partes tres..."
PERHAPS someday historians will pen this paraphrase of Caesar's famed opening line to De Bello Gallico. Der Spiegelreported yesterday that the United States plans to carve three occupation zones from the soils of conquered Iraq- one American, one British, and one Polish. Furthermore, a multinational "stabilisation force" composed of up to ten more participating states will be involved in the policing of Iraq. Lest one grow too excited that the United States is beginning to awaken to the idea of even nominal international cooperation, the United Nations has been specifically excluded from any activity other than the provision of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, while the Polish and British will merely be at the "spearhead" of a multinational force within their respective occupation zones, the Americans will have total control over theirs (most likely the resource-rich sectors and possibly Baghdad). Enthusiastic Poland announced its troops would be ready for deployment in Iraq by the end of this month- a nation constantly conquered had turned conqueror.
With Britain, it was difficult to see the benefits of action with the United States against Iraq. International relations experts called it bandwagoning, a process by which a country supplicates itself to the dominant superpower. It is beneficial, they note, when facing hostility from another superpower, but nonsensical when one power is able to claim global hegemony. For Britain, considered a world power, still, in its own right, the war against Iraq seemed to run contrary to the national interest. One would have to consign its reasons for joining such an adventure to Tony Blair's obsessions with the "special relationship" between the US and Britain (which, in all fairness, has haunted every Prime Minister since Sir Anthony Eden) as well as a group within Britain which has always wanted to see the return of the empire utilising American military strength and tempered British experience. For the nations of the "New Europe," (to use unfortunate Rumsfeldian newspeak) however, alignment with the United States is driven by a clear and principled objective: the rise to global prestige.
On 1 May US Secretary of State Colin Powell flew to Madrid to meet with Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. Spain has been a key ally for the Bush administration, representing the fact that obsequious gestures to the United States in Europe are alive and well. For the conservative government of José Maria Aznar, however, it has been a disaster. Spanish public opinion was wholeheartedly against the war. The situation was similar in Italy, where rainbow-coloured "Pace" signs covered every apartment house, and opposition to the war was so vocal that the corrupt, neo-fascist, pro-American Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi could only provide the most nominal material support for the United States, and could not openly announce support for the Iraq invasion. In Eastern and Central Europe support for the war was, in some cases, statistically lower than in Germany or France. However, the much-lauded spirit of Europe isn't necessarily enough to topple vehemently pro-American governments, when elections so often revolve around domestic economic issues. Of course, Gerhard Schroeder in Germany managed to be elected on a firm antiwar platform- but in the heat of the moment. When the anger simmers over the aggression in Iraq there's no reason to believe voters will turn against governments due to old foreign policy decisions. Even if the conservative governments of Rumsfeld's "New Europe" were to fall, however, there are forces propelling such nations toward the United States inherent in their respective characters which might manifest themselves in any administration.
Spain is the prime example. After joining the European Economic Community following the end of Francisco Franco's stranglehold of its politics, Spain's economy boomed wildly. Investment poured in from Brussels and the EEC capitals. Today, Spain has become a preeminent global economic power and one within Europe as well. It is the sixth largest investor in the world and the largest in Latin America. With a common linguistic and cultural community representing hundreds of millions, Spain is heavily influenced by centrifugal forces in its former colonial empire, which now promise more dazzling riches than conjoinment with a federalised Europe. Spain sees itself, like Britain, a beneficiary of both the open borders and cross-investment of Europe and the economic treasures it can cull from South and Central America. In this regard, it has been enormously successful- Madrid has become the de facto cultural capital of an emerging "Hispanosphere," and Spain has managed to both promote the virtues of and gain free trade with South America's MerCoSur trading bloc, a group the European Union hopes will be its Latin American equivalent. Nevertheless, Spain aspires to greater heights- it sees this level of economic and political power translating to world leadership, and saw close allegiance to the United States as a means of achieving these ends. Already, by aligning itself with American neoliberal trade practises, it has managed to gain its significant financial foothold in South America (much to the detriment of South Americans beset with the difficulties of uncontrolled globalisation, cf. Argentina).
One may wonder why Spain would pass up the opportunity to become part of a potential superpower like the European Union for a somewhat humbler, British-type position. The answer is twofold. One factor is that Spain feels it has the ability to achieve a significant proportion of global influence on its own, and that it does not need to become a part of Brussels. Second, and more importantly, Spain sees such a European superpower dominated by the Franco-German axis, which has been the engine for deeper European integration, historically. The worry that national sovreignty may be acceded to the Paris-Berlin consensus runs deep in Eurosceptic nations caught outside its embrace. For conservative governments especially within such states as Spain and Italy, the prospect of entrusting one's strength to a European power whose decisions are based primarily on the imput of two capitals is severely disconcerting. Moreso for Spain, which sees the achievement of "independent" global power, through the "assistance" of the United States, as entirely plausible.
Poland, too, feels it is capable of a more global role, and has therefore looked toward pairing with the United States to achieve projection of its influence. In an interview with Le Monde, President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that:
We made in all sovereignty the decision to support the United States. That was not an easy decision, but I was persuaded that it was suitable. The Poles are a nation which understand that certain moments in history it is better to be active than passive.
On the prewar diplomatic situation, Kwasniewksi said vaguely, "we thought the UN had a role to play. One knows what occurred." He is curt because he is stuck between his belief in the United Nations and multilateralism and the benefits Poland will reap from the operation in Iraq. He is unequivocal in stating:
As regards the rebuilding, it is an interesting market, with great projects which will be financed by international money. We want to take part in it.
The opportunity for Polish investments abroad is, indeed, one of Kwasniewski's goals. Like Spain, it seeks broader economic and political power, though its lack of an established cultural commonwealth leads it to try and ween these from an unprovokedly assaulted neo-colony. Furthermore, Poland's position as roughly equal in population and military size to other major European states drives it to seek a position of equal world influence. Nevertheless, Poland is driven by other concerns, as well. Its large agrarian constituency has been traditionally Eurosceptic and this sentiment, along with numerous ties with Polish relatives in the United States, leads Poland to gravitate toward Washington.
The United States, for its part, seemed to have discovered during its initiative to include the former Eastern Bloc countries in NATO that offering measurable influence to certain states in exchange for support on certain American positions was a valuable diplomatic tool. The US has similarly endeavoured to split Europe recently. Colin Powell visited Tirana Friday, where he signed the US-Adriatic Partnership Charter. Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia were all given assurances the US would assist them in their efforts to join the NATO alliance, as a seeming reward for supporting the war against Iraq. The setting of the summit in Albania was meant to indicate strong support for that country by the United States, as it pledged to not turn over any US citizens to the International Criminal Court. The US has also begun to work through disincentives. The American trade representative made threats against Germany yesterday, and multinational corporations are calling for a truce in the budding trade war with France.
Though the policies of the "New Europe" states seem poised to gain them more influence in the near future, prostrating one's nation before the United States lately is a bit like the proverbial making of a deal with the devil- one is granted untold benefits in the short-term, but in the long term, one's soul is condemned. How long are Spain, Poland, et al willing to pledge support for operations which will ultimately bring about backlash? Will angry protesters in Iraq really differentiate between a US occupation force and one composed of a small collection of its equally white, Christian "New Europe" allies? Even if a more united Europe was dominated to a significant extent by France and Germany, Spain and Poland would be accorded requisite legal representation in Brussels. Meanwhile, officials in Washington have no obligation to hear the entreaties of the Spanish or Polish ambassadors, let alone forced to consider their propositions. Washington's attitude toward the protestations of France and Germany, former close allies, were indications enough of this. Indeed, the "New European" states may gain influence over the world, but no influence over what direction that world goes in.
Le Monde also runs an interesting editorial on the influence of Europe over the next 50 years, which will apparently decline dramatically in the face of a stable United States and rapidly growing Asia. Its prescription is not only a far more closely united Europe, but a mass-immigration programme and inclusion of Russia and southern Mediterranean states within its bloc. This is, perhaps, a far-fetched solution, but the warnings over the slow disappearance of European power should disturb all European states. Even those, like Britain and Spain, staking out "cultural spheres" along the lines of their former empires will most likely be pulled into centres of gravity other than their own- Britain discovered this in its attempt to gain influence over the United States. Spain particularly should be aware the wealth which allowed it to become a leader in Latin America was provided solely by a united Europe. Certainly, representative and deep European unity remains the best option for the "New European" states.
In Europe's state of disarray, however, how could it be achieved? Though France and Germany retain their principled stances on the execution of the war, the remaining common positions of not only the European populace, but its government, is promising. The EU's pledge that the United Nations should have a "central role" in Iraq should be treated less like the tepid compromise it's been labeled as in the media and more like directed policy. Poland's president, in his Le Monde interview, stated that he does not support the neoconservative agenda, would like to see the return of UN weapons inspectors, will not stand for American energy interests raping Iraq dry of its oil, and that Poland is as interested in working with the "Berlin-Paris-Moscow line" as with the United States. Kwasniewski noted that France was the largest investor in Poland, its most ardent sponsor in its pursuit of NATO and EU membership, and that quips by Jacques Chirac would not serve as replacements for such facts in determining Poland's relationship with Paris. Poland, France, and Germany are to meet as the "Weimar Triangle" on May 9 to discuss enlargement issues. Other "New European" governments are similarly ambiguous on many issues, and in the postwar period their views are increasingly shifting toward the consensus of Paris and Berlin. Even the UK can't deny it wishes the significant presence of the UN in Iraq. Using its immense economic and diplomatic power, a united European front is capable of putting such demands before the US, and gaining significant victories against its New World Order.
