Horror in the Heart of Darkness Congo: The Situation and the Options
WHILE diplomats at the United Nations engage in final discussions on the proposed Anglo-American resolution legitimating the occupation of Iraq by forces which launched an unsanctioned, illegal blitzkrieg upon it in March, two serious humanitarian issues have flared; one in Congo, and the other in Aceh. Both situations are set to be fatally ignored, as the United States continues to distract the world with its useless aggressive invasions of Middle Eastern holdouts. The Achesonian doctrine of "flexible response," therefore, has succombed to a "cried wolf" effect, in which its ludicrous invocation toward the ends of American imperialist adventures has stiffened international opposition to the projection of any sort of armed force. Furthermore, while American troops are tied up in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Russian troops are engaged heavily in Chechnya, and, in the wake of Europe's Iraq war schisms, a European Rapid Reaction Force or even widespread support for a European Security and Defence Union nowhere to be found outside France, Germany, and Belgium, peacekeeping forces are unavailable whether or not the Security Council can agree on their deployment.
I wrote previously that the projection of peacekeeping or intervention forces cannot be achieved unilaterally, even if approved by multilateral means (i.e., a Security Council vote). France's interlocution in the Ivory Coast's civil conflict has provoked anger that it is merely acting in its own interests, promoting the current president and his government in Abidjan in order to preserve stability conducive to the success of French businesses there. Similarly, France has been prevented from deploying numerous troops to the eastern Congo regions due to its implicit support for the presidency of Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa, who is now joining regional rivals Uganda and Rwanda in playing rival ethnic factions against each other in an attempt to gain local sway. While seemingly justified, considering the area in question is Congolese territory, the means by which he has sought to achieve reconquest (active participation in enflaming quasi-genocidal rivalries) is troubling. France's past colonial history in West Africa and its power plays within it during the late 20th century have made it potentially as troublesome a lone force to inject into the continent as American troops in the Mideast.
The situation in the eastern Congo has always been complex, at least as much as the "cocktail of violence" that was the Balkans during the 1990s. In 1998, Uganda and Rwanda formed an entente intent upon the overthrow of the Congolese government in Kinshasa. This was precipitated by the attempted expulsion from the Congo of Rwandan forces which assisted the president at the time, Laurent Kabila, in his successful rebellion against former Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Nevertheless, Uganada, Rwanda, and Burundi all relied on the buffer of Rwandan forces in the eastern Congo for protection from various armed groups in the region operating outside the control of the central Congolese government. These included the Hutu Interahamwe militia, which fomented ethnic rivalries with Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government, splinter factions of the Rwandan armed forces, primarily Hutu, which had participated in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, Mai Mai local defence groups resisting the migration of Rwandans into the Congo, the Sudanese-sponsored Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), employed to fight the Ugandan government, and several Burundian Hutu groups which, much like the Rwandan Hutus, sought to engage the Tutsi-dominated government of their country. The inability of the Kinshasa government to impose order in its eastern regions had created a power vacuum from which such groups could operate against the territory of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, had Rwandan forces actually disengaged. Instead, the joint Rwanda-Uganda invasion, initially via the proxy of the Tutsi-dominated Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), followed by direct involvement of Ugandan and Rwandan troops, ensued, in order to secure a Congolese government more amenable to the security concerns of the African "Great Lakes" countries. Nevertheless, the conflict eventually embraced much of the continent, with Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe participating on the side of the Congolese government, the aforementioned primarily Hutu groups operating essentially synchronised with Kinshasa, and Rwanda and Uganda pursuing individual border security concerns- Sudan-sponsored rebels and Hutu groups, respectively. The fallout between the two regional power rivals, Uganda and Rwanda, led the two to sponsor rival factions in the DRC, notably the Hemas and Lendu groups. A superficial agreement signed in 1999 at Lusaka would supposedly guarantee regional peace, but little movement has been made toward compliance with the Lusaka accords, and the multifarious factions each accuse others of violations. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the withdrawl of Ugandan and Rwandan troops has caused the region's recent destabilisation- even without overt or direct military support, the rival factions in the eastern Congo have lanced for each other, seemingly on the same trajectory as during the wars. Kampala and Kigali, of course, continue to provide both tacit and covert military aid to Hema and Lendu groups, which have now begun to identify with ethnic rivalries within Rwanda; the Lendu feeling themselves to be as the Hutu, while the Hema seem to be compelled toward the Tutsi. Nevertheless, shifting alliances have been the rule in the region, and while the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) was previously backed by Uganda, it is now seemingly within Rwanda's sphere of influence. Similarly, both Hema and Lendu have alternately sponsored Hutu or Tutsi groups within Rwanda and Burundi. The entire situation is further complicated by the presence in the vicinity of large quantities of gold, diamond, and other precious natural resources. Canadian and British oil companies have recently launched major exploration initiatives into the area, for example. All this augments the desire for the various factions to gain the greatest control in the region and to do so by any of the most brutal means necessary.
Unlike the Balkans, however, the Security Council is unlikely to present any opposition to intervention, opening the path for a large, UN sanctioned force. The complication, as considered earlier, is both the willingness of member states to contribute and the assembly of an adequately professional as well as multinational force. Though local forces would normally be most appropriate, here they are most likely to fan the flames of old hatred, not to mention be as ineffective at pacification as any one armed faction is in itself. Imperial overreach has corralled both the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention that much United States military capacity in the future will inevitably be used in "protection" against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The Guardian's Patrick Smith suggests an acceptance of the French offer, coupled with British, Canadian, and South African forces. South Africa may be in a position to play a larger continental role, but one has concerns about the implications of Pretoria engaging in what may be seen as empire-building in the fallout of the Namibia and Angola situations. British forces are overtaxed in the new American colonies plus other UN peacekeeping ventures, and Canadian forces are dismally weak and primarily deployed to hard-pressed Afghanistan.
The irony, of course, is that those who have so long argued for humanitarian intervention, and "flexible response" are now pinioned by military reality into hopelessness over the Congo crisis. The United States, the world's most powerful military, is impotent to halt the violence, not the least because of fears over a guerilla war in densely-forested regions, which has precluded heavy involvement in both the Philippines and Colombia. The conservatives within the American government, moreover, only see use of force as legitimate when involved in protecting (or, ahem, expanding) vital American interests, which was why they vehemently opposed the actions in the Balkans, seen as an over-altruistic gesture, and promote global response to both fabricated "rogue states" (in order to demolish regimes inimical to expanding American influence) and any trace element of "fanatic terrorism." That nearly half of American land forces are currently still deployed in or near Iraq makes it further difficult for a troop contribution to the Congo. US action has also tied up traditional peacekeeping forces in cleaning up its Iraq and Afghanistan messes. The best bet may be reliance, in the end, on France, despite its purported insidious designs on Africa, coupled with a force from Germany (which is essentially free to act, given its noncompliance with the Iraq war and sponsorship of a rapid response unit for Europe), Italy, Spain (both of which are under intense domestic pressure to not actively participate in Iraq's occupation) and perhaps minor contingents from India and Pakistan (which deployed to Somalia in 1992) and even China. A role should be found for the UK, which has some forces available and experience with African guerilla wars, South American forces, which operate in similar terrain, and perhaps a tiny American unit or American logistical support (in the form of aircraft carriers and resupply vessels.) The conditions are perfect for the deployment of a European Rapid Reaction Force, as has been recently mused in Brussels, but its nonexistence due to European foreign policy disagreements and therefore reluctance over fusion of militaries precludes such an alluring option.
Nevertheless, when considering intervention, one must always bear in mind the potential consequences, without painting too rosy a picture of what the future entails. The problems which emerged from the Balkan Wars were not all the result of unilateral American (though masked by the auspices of NATO) action, but many of which would have emerged from any injection of outside force into a volatile region. The UN must have a strategy for the region's future beyond the stabilisation of borders or the obtainment of a cease-fire between rival factions. The creation of infrastructure allowing the central Congolese government to exert more control may be one option, though this may be questionable given the propensity of pro-Congolese groups within the fragile region to seize power violently. Another is the creation of an internationally-policed buffer state, the natural resources of which can be used as tools for the alleviation of underlying socioeconomic tensions. An economically prosperous eastern Congo would probably lead to a less likely propensity for ethnic clashes and greater government control overall. More secure borders for the "Great Lakes" states is a direct consequence. This effort, however, would require a massive effort by a broad spectrum of global military forces, fundamentally impossible due to the American engagement in self-destructive pursuits in the Islamic world. In any scenario, the utilisation of diplomatic means to defuse the Uganda-Rwanda rivalry is essential for regional security. Granting both states rights to mineral deposits in the eastern Congo, probably a necessary concession for Kinshasa to make, would go a long way toward preserving stability in the area, though monitors may have to remain for years in order to ensure battles do not erupt over the exact amount of resource control apportioned to each state.
American global leadership should be infinitely questioned over such a situation. Given its continual proclamations on the UN's ineffectiveness, it itself is militarily incapable of engaging in the Congo currently. Absent available or feasible local interlocutors, the problem inevitably falls upon the global community, in which the only remaining reserves of military capability lies. Inasmuch as the US has the ability to declare where and when it can intervene, outside the authority of the UN, with disastrous consequences, it can choose where and when not to, with potentially even worse results. Ergo, the global forum must be established as the primary world order so that the true crises of the time may be addressed in both a prompt and considered fashion. No doubt, given previous American intervention escapades, its capacity for forward-planning is severely diminished in the hoopla of war-time. American movies focus on the struggle, not the long and laborious aftermath. Aside from a few Nuremburg trials films, there is no feature production set during Marshall Plan Germany. This symbolises an aspect of the American mentality infinitely dangerous when its ability to engage a "Hobbesian world," to use Robert Kagan terminology, is the arbiter of the Earth's future.
Everyone agrees that some action must be taken, and taken soon. The death toll from the current conflict has been placed at somewhere near 3 million, and some suggest 120 are dying a day. MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force there, consists of about 700 embattled Uruguyans holding the airport at Bunia, helpless to even count the dead, much less intervene. Does the world have the ability to address an actual humanitarian calamity, or will it continue to seek faux military glory via the orchestration of set-piece tank battles against traditional foes?
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Notes on the Global Condition-
-CLAIMS OF ATROCITIES have already been made in the rapidly escalating Achenese rebellion. Reports indicate schools are burning across the province, as the rebels pin the blame on the ruthless Indonesian military and the army claims the fires were set by rebels seeking to damage the image and reputation of the Indonesian armed forces. Human rights groups warn of a "bloodbath" in the province, while Acehnese independence movements, spearheaded by the organisation GAM, have no international support or legal legitimacy guiding their cause, despite the widespread separatist sentiment among the local population.
-FIGHTING RETURNED to Macedonia, where armed Albanian groups are again clashing with the Macedonian army in the country's north. The feuds coincided with a visit by US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a leading, if not the leading, member of Washington's neoconservative ideological cabal. Christopher Deliso of antiwar.com has some interesting opinions on Wolfowitz's visit, including claims Wolfowitz made continued US military aid to Macedonia contingent upon becoming a signatory of a document absolving US troops from any responsibility under the International Criminal Court, a manipulative tactic used on other obedient slave-states of the "New Europe." Deliso also asserts that the US has manipulated the sporadic war between Albanian expansionists and Macedonia for years in order to shatter its ties with an increasingly independent and powerful European Union. Waning US interest due to the "war on terrorism," however, has allowed Macedonia to recover, at least until the (uncoincidental?) resumption of violence coinciding with Wolfowitz's trip to Skopje.
-TOMORROW: Analysing the final draft of the Anglo-American occupation resolution.
Iraqi Reconstruction and International Politics, Act II
INDICATIONS that Germany's so-called "reconciliation" with the United States would occur over the pending UN resolution on the lifting of sanctions on Iraq and the recognition of the US and UK as "occupying powers" may have been overoptimistic (for the US) have mounted recently. I recalled earlier signs that such a so-called reassessment of German foreign policy skirted around the deeper commitment of the Schroeder government to playing a more independent role within the Atlantic alliance. Remarks on the personal philosophy of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Schroeder's frustration with backdoor Anglo-American diplomatic deceptions during the 1999 Kosovo War, Germany's pledge to seek the entirety of its debts owed by the Iraqi state, and its participation in the European Security and Defence Union contributed to that outlook. Now it seems divisions over Iraq between Washington and Berlin are once again contributing in a breakdown in relations. On a visit to Berlin Saturday, US Secretary of State Colin Powell spent more time courting CDU opposition leader Angela Merkel than with Chancellor Schroeder, while President Bush openly courted the CDU at the White House, having invited Hesse governor Roland Koch (seen as a potential Chancellor) to Washington. Frankfurter Rundschau speculates that "In the medium term, the Bush administration is clearly putting its money on the Christian Democrats," a disturbing prospect. This represents open interference by the Bush administration in internal German politics, at least symbolically, and has disturbing implications for Europe's future if no effective opposition is mounted to the schismatic strategy of American diplomats. That, in what was meant to be a "frenzy of reconciliation" over the new Iraq resolution, Powell and Bush have decided instead to push for a German "regime change" should both demonstrate to the Schroeder government that its tangent of Franco-German obstinacy over Iraq and future issues should continue, as well as exposes the general contemptuous attitude of the current US presidential administration toward any degree of European sovereignty.
London's Times felt that Colin Powell had "failed to win the outright support of Berlin," on the occupation resolution. Powell noted his talks with Schroeder and Fischer were "candid" (i.e. rough) and that he welcomed the German position on sanctions, though Fischer later made that eminently obvious such was still uncertain, and that Germany was still functionally arguing for suspension, rather than cancellation, of the UN embargo. More importantly, perhaps, veto-wielding Russia and China announced that they had "serious questions" about the US' draft resolution and that "major changes" were necessary to secure their support within the Security Council. All powers signified a willingness to compromise, but Russia and China are unlikely to legitimise any occupation after what they regarded as an illegal war, and Germany's position is unlikely to move closer to that of the US after its behaviour over the past week. Russia, for one, has returned to its prewar ambiguity vis-a-vis relations with the United States, swearing cooperation over the issue of global terrorism (and using this declaration to launch new initiatives against Chechen independence agitators) but also holding joint naval exercises with India, in which its long-range bomber aircraft were flown for the irst time since 1992, a clear demonstration (and intimation to the Pentagon) of Russian military deployment capability. President Putin also promulgated his intentions to, in the wake of the new military paradigm developing after the Iraq war, modernise the Russian armed forces and even develop new nuclear weapons, not an entirely surprising occurrence concerning the US' intentions to do the same, a possible Iranian nuclear programme, newly-indicated possession by North Korea, and a potential Japanese acquisition of both nuclear and missile-defence technology. It is worthwhile to note that Russia and China are both signatories of the Shanghai Co-operation Pact, which pledged resistance to growing US power in the world via the concerted action of the two considerable powers, the Cold War's end notwithstanding.
The situation in Iraq itself continues to deteriorate. Paul Bremer, the newly-installed American viceroy in Baghdad, proclaimed that his Raj wanted to re-incarcerate prisoners released from Iraqi jails upon the capitualation of the former Iraqi government. Of course, it most likely will not bode well among Iraqis to incur the type of Saddamite crackdown necessary to roundup all the former political as well as legitimate criminals, all of which Bremer claims are causing, singularly, the anarchy continuing to reign on Baghdad's streets. The Independent calls this course of action a "peculiar endorsement of Saddam's judicial system." One may question whether or not Bremer is really the well-tempered diplomat-administrator his supporters in Washington claimed he was as liberal commentators gained hope the State Department had won a "victory" over Rumsfeld's brash Pentagon in deciding the country's future fate. The former administrator, choice of the Defence Department's neoconservative clique, Jay Garner, yelped at the entourage of press following him around Iraq that "we ought to be beating our chests every day. We ought to look in a mirror and get proud and stick out our chests and suck in our bellies and say: 'Damn, we're Americans!'." This was, somehow, in reference to Iraq's infrastructure, which he had claimed survived the war intact. Bremer's actions, however, speak louder than Garner's words. In addition to the aforementioned remarks regarding justice, the proconsul has decreed that all former Ba'ath Party officials would be banned from participation in the Iraqi government. Forget parallels with Saddam, the international press seemed poised to compare this move with a Stalinist purge, in which all members of a certain segment of society were immediately disqualified from any participation in even the most noninfluential compartment of the bureaucracy. This purge, of course, poses immediate problems for the restoration of any sort of order or civil society in Iraq. The Ba'athist apparatchiks represented the intelligentsia in Iraq, the intelligent individuals with the capability to run an efficient and well-organised government. The recognition that such relatively low-level civil servants are integral to the operation of governments, especially during periods of reconstruction was key to the American efforts in Germany and Japan and the reorganisation of eastern bloc states following the end to the Cold War. One might understand an American aversion toward the inclusion of such individuals as Tariq Aziz in the Iraqi government, but even advocates of de-Ba'athification would be hard pressed to understand why the US would want to expel all the experienced members of Iraq's governing apparatus when its consistently stated desire is a rapid reconstruction and withdrawl. The quickest route to Iraq's renewal, if such could be achieved, Jonathan Freedland of the Guardian and others have argued, is to hand Iraqi society to the lower-level Ba'athist bourgeois.
Of course, that Iraqi self-rule was even a goal of the current American viceregent was called into serious question recently, though Bremer's propaganda agents attempted to deny there were no such arrangements being made to indefinitely postpone self determination, as nearly every newspaper worldwide had alleged the previous day. Nevertheless, certain Iraqi factions seem to be taking independence into their own hands, as the Kurds have been said to be independently offering oil deals to Western energy companies, despite the futile efforts of Bremer's iron fist to intercede. Unfortunately the all-powerful Polish occupation force originally destined for northern Iraq was reassigned to the even more restive regions of the Sh'ite south, otherwise its few, inexperienced troops might have assisted Bremer in causing a serious international incident by ruthlessly suppressing Kurd autonomy. Of course, that may have been the plan all along, as it would certainly placate Turkey, whose government, neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz have recently insinuated, is better-off being overthrown in a pro-American military coup. If one were an administration sympathiser one would hope such an orchestration on the part of the Pentagon would be more well-played than the previous putsch, which the Bush regime had attempted Venezuela.
Another hallmark of the haphazard Bremer Reichskommisariat has been the rise of the old Iraqi dinar's value as opposed to what has become an increasingly inflated dollar. With the demise of Iraq's central bank, the dinar has become an entirely stable currency, allowing it to circulate at a fixed rate and hence gain significant value, whereas the colonial administration's distribution of dollars to Iraqis, in their attempts to bring a return to both an orderly society and to introduce the currency as the primary means of exchange in Iraq has resulted in its imminent decline. One questions the ability of the Bremer regime to effectively rebuild anything in Iraq without comprehending such simple tenets of economics as velocity of currency circulation. Nevertheless, for Iraqis, the fruits of Saddam's old patrimony now shine down in the form of the erstwhile dictator's visage on the colourful dinar notes. Of course, nothing could better indicate the ludicrous American attempt at colonialism than this descent into the insane deluge of the bizarre: the US has endeavoured to use the rock group Metallica and popular children's television programme "Barney and Friends" as tools for the pacification of its new backyard playground of festering fundamentalist resentment and armed factionary clashes. Fun!
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Notes on the Global Condition
-CANADA informed the United Nations that it would have to spurn the UN's request for international peacekeeping forces to assist in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where an uneasy truce has temporarily stalled a potentially genocidal war in the country's lawless eastern jungles. Canada claimed it simply had neither the forces or the capability to participate, a move which is expected to fuel a growing national debate on the Liberal government's commitment to the armed forces, which many say is too weak. France, meanwhile, offered to contribute forces to the region, but was rebuffed due to its implicit support for DR Congolese President Joseph Kabila. North American or Asian forces might be altogether more appropriate for peacekeeping efforts in Africa, as European forces, while praised as effective in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, have a tendency to inflame old anti-imperialist passions. Currently, a lonely contingent of Uruguayan forces under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping mission are holding an airport in the region, and little else.
-SLOVAKIA enthusiastically endorsed membership in the European Union, after similarly successful referenda in Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, and Lithuania. As in many of the former Eastern Bloc countries, concern about voter apathy was strong, but the degree of participation was sufficient for the vote to be counted as valid. Slovakia will thus join the EU along with other candidate countries in June 2004, though Brussels officials are highly concerned with socioeconomic conditions in the country, especially discrimination against Roma (gypsy) minorities, which has been dampened only slightly to to halfhearted efforts by Bratislava.
-ARGENTINA has a new president. The election of Nestor Kirchner is seen as a victory for the old-line Peronist left, which advocates a sharp break from the eager engagement in US-sponsored recommendations for trade liberalisation. Argentina's economic collapse was largely blamed on the failed policies of former president Carlos Menem, the other candidate in the recent runoff election, who bowed out ignominiously to avoid crushing defeat. Though ostensibly a leftist victory, Kirchner's ascendency was seen as a return to traditional Argentine politics, unfortunate for those who had believed the country would embrace a new spirit of government organised around what were increasingly powerful neighbourhood councils and worker-owned production facilities. The rise of neo-Peronism in Argentina is the latest in series of leftist sweeps at South and Central American polls as the American economic philosophy of neoliberalism is overwhelmingly rejected. Kirchner has promised to look to other South American economies, rather than the United States, for assistance in economic regeneration, a potential boost for the fortunes of the MerCoSur trading bloc of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina.
-THE UNITED STATES claims that al-Qaeda is directing terrorist activities from within Iran. This new revelation on the part of the US may indicate that the emphasis of the neoconservative faction had swayed from Syria to Iran, longtime source of frustration to the faction, which had been closely linked with the early years of the Reagan administration. Speculation is rampant that the US is looking for any justification (as it had in Iraq) to claim the need for a "regime change" in Tehran, including its purported attempt at the production and/or acquisition of nuclear armaments.
-INDONESIA has launched a fresh offencive against rebels in the breakaway Sumatran province of Aceh, after peace negotiations in Tokyo failed. Jakarta continued to seek some level of autonomy for Aceh while the rebel factions would agree to nothing less than full independence. The inability to compromise led to an escalation of hostilities, including an Indonesian declaration of martial law and, subsequently, the deployment of Indonesian forces as Achenese rebels indicated their "readiness for war" and their ability to "fight forever." Considering Jakarta's record with relatively peaceful independence movements, as in East Timor, the prospects of a quick and clean operation in Aceh, with a clear victory for either side any time soon, are extraordinarily dim.
-A HAWKISH FACTION has emerged within the Japanese political spectrum, similar, it seems, to the American neoconservatives. Acutely aware of the emerging North Korean threat, these Japanese hawks have been keen to engage in the revival of the missile defence concept and to radically reshape the Japanese military for a greater world role, including the obtainment of nuclear weapons. Japan's military has heretofore been a mere defencive force, and Japanese liberals, traditional pacifists, are concerned about a breach in constitutional convention proposed by the new faction. An expanded Japanese military would have extraordinary consequences for the regional security situation, especially considering China's concerns over any Japanese ability to defend Taiwan.
-THE PHILIPPINES has struck at operations of the Moro Independence Liberation Front (MILF) organisation, which Manila claims is a violent Islamic fundamentalist extremist group. Critics claim the move was merely posturing for the Filipino president's visit to the White House, at which she is expected to announce the Philippines' depletion of military assets in the "war on terror" and the need for greater US assistance. American forces, moved away from the front due to prior image concerns, have returned in the role of observers and advisers, which portends ominously for those who recall the origins of American involvement in the Vietnam War.
-FRANCE has been voted the most likely candidate for "regime change" at whichcountryisnext.com.
