EUROPE has never before had the opportunity to peacefully transform itself as it does at the crucial precipice it has reached with the completion of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the submission of the new draft constitution for the approval of EU member states. When the intergovernmental conference to decide the fate of the draft constitution first convenes in October, it will be, no doubt, the opening of a dramatic and tense occasion. States have already begun to fire ideological broadsides concerning the fate of the constitution and the Union it is to govern.
Tony Blair has declared consistently and unequivocally that the United Kingdom will tolerate nothing more integrationist than a "Europe of Nations," a vague yet often intoned statement which depending upon one's interpretation could easily be construed as a rejection of Europe completely. Despite the promises and apparent convictions of the UK's Labour government, afterall, its commitments have not lived up to any rhetoric promising either the Europeanisation of Britain or the necessity of placing Britain "at the heart of Europe." Rather, Britain is subjected to profitless doting upon its erstwhile colony across the Atlantic and the inexorable dismantling of its social safety net in order to implement "modernisation" coterminous solely with the stratified American socioeconomic model. It seems only a matter of time before the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, declares the euro unfit for British use but enthusiastically scraps the pound sterling for the dollar. It would certainly delight the Anglosphere philosophers, who view the United States merely as an advanced stage of English history to which Britain itself is yet to catch up (and thereby immerse itself in an Orwellian Oceania, apparently). Of course, that anglospherism is entirely based upon the regressive, archaic, antiquarian social model of Lockean libertarianism leads one to question whether Anglopsherism really represents "progress" in any sense of that word, save perhaps for the backpeddling antics of the Thatcher Revolution (Margaret Thatcher, ironically, was among the most heavily committed British political figures to European economic integration). Tory Europhobes in Westminster insist their intention is merely to return to the Thactherite Europe of the 1980s, i.e., unrestricted Continental markets with no corresponding political oversight. The marginalised integrationist faction within the UK note, however, that such regression is fundamentally impossible. Continental leaders will not accept a vision of Europe dictated by the minority party of one member state, and should British policy continually press for such an override of the diplomatic and political progress made concerning the Union since the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty the only possible outcome will inevitably be decreasing British involvement with the Union and consequently its economic organs, with potential catastrophic effects for UK industry.
Of course the continual insistence by the centrifugal Europsceptics that alliances can be formed among less federalist states within the Union to block motions intended to bring about a European "superstate" have borne a degree of fruit for Britain, but London has lacked the tact to play both its hegemonic ally across the Atlantic and the powers in Brussels, nor should it be employing such a strategy given that it sits at the apex of its potential world power, following the denouement of the Empire, while Spain and Poland, still recovering from the disastrous effects of fascism and authoritarian communism respectively, have yet to fulfill their potentialities. The Italian government's stance on integration is as ephemeral as Germany's; the fall of the Schroeder or Berlusconi governments could result in dramatic policy shifts with respect to both European integration and relations with the United States in either country. Most importantly, nothing close to the most radically centrifugal theories among British conservatives is embraced by any of Britain's continental "allies." Each have embraced the euro (Poland will most likely be eager to do so) and have shown little of the contempt toward integration as flagrantly and indignantly flailed by British representatives within the EU government and at each EU summit. Indeed, the relationship these Continental "allies" enjoy with Britain fails to constitute a bloc even in the tenuous sense that France and Germany's reciprocal and close relationship may- it is merely another manifestation of the bilateral opportunism pursued on many levels by these states, or especially in Italy's case of the fleeting ideological and power-groping proclivities of the Berlusconi government.
The essentially divergent interests of the Blair government and the majority of Europe was displayed poignantly at the opening to the summit in Greece, at which the British delegation was forced to withdraw a proposal for the establishment of transit camps for refugees desiring asylum in Europe after not only European leaders, but influential human rights organisations protested this plan. While other British proposals were indeed in line with concepts espoused by such human rights agencies as UNCHR, they were immediately rejected at by summit leaders. No doubt, British objections to the draft contitution will have to be fiercely quelled at the intergovernmental conference if the constitution is to survive in its current state or be expanded to allow for more necessary powers at the Union level, though this is unlikely given no mastermind like M. d'Estaing is to preside over such a conference in order to gain such the broad consensus he was able to achieve on a remarkable number of issues among the diverse spectrum of interests represented at the Convention. M. d'Estaing was only able to ruefully remark that he hoped the states would not rehash debates already aired during the Convention, though there is already a hint the dissatisfaction of the small states concerning the reduction in size and diminished influence of the Commission will persist through the intergovernmental coference.
Other major issues to be discussed at the summit include European security, relations with the United States, and expansion into the Balkans. Concerning security, European foreign policy chief Javier Solana has published a document indicating that Europe must take more "responsibility" in global affairs by integrating its defence forces and pursuing a strategy of preemption in order to undermine threats to European interests. The document comes troublingly close to rhetoric espoused by American President George W. Bush and his cabal of neoimperialists. Though the document is claimed to espouse multilateralism as the means to achieving such preemption, it nonetheless presents the same dilemmas as doctrines of preemptionism, including the National Security Strategy of the United States and documents associated with the neoconservative thinktank Project for a New American Century, especially the radical and controversial paper "Rebuilding America's Defences." Mr. Solana's foray into this ideological realm presents the troubling question of what degree of integrationism is too much for Europe to undertake. If Mr. Solana's policies are fulfilled (most likely in the far future, as they would be anathema not only to Britain but to other states reluctant to commit to a common European defence structure for any purpose, including border patrols) they would represent the decline of Europe into a statist entity, albeit one which, even under the current draft constitution, which will be watered down substantially, has far too little democratic oversight. Furthermore, it will convert Europe's vast statist capacity into resources utilised to enforce European geopolitical and economic interests in a notably Americanist neoimperial fashion. Ergo, the authoritarian "United States of Europe" will surely have been achieved. This manifestation of Europe has already become apparent among those advocating closer integration in order to achieve the effect of draconian police controls similar to those recently imposed upon the United States under the auspices of guarding against terrorist threats. Ironically, while Europe would thus represent everything (then justifiably) opposed by British conservatives, it would be a welcome development in the United States (which seems to be controlling British foreign policy anyway). Diametrically, however, Mr. Solana's policies could represent the incipience of a new Cold War, warned of by Tony Blair when questioned on the issue of collective European opposition to American policy. Indeed, Mr. Solana's proposals explicitly refuses to specifically delineate the transatlantic relationship, though many states have called for numerous overt references to an "airtight" commitment to NATO and the Atlantic relationship, most notably the UK. Mr. Solana's document has dangerous implications considering the potential orientation of Europe both toward or away from the US- the relationship will either bring about American statism detrimental to European quality of life and welfare, and a European foreign policy wedded to decisions emanating from the White House, or this same statist Europe, pursuing individual geopolitical interests militarily, harbouring a costly animosity with the US. Faced with these radical options, one must conclude it is infinitely preferential to pursue a strategy of "soft balancing" within the dual multilateral frameworks of the UN and NATO to check American expansionism, which has been a consistent historical trait of the United States derivated from its unique brand of exceptionalist ideational nationalism, and not merely a manifestation of the material, political, or ideological interests of the current presidential administration. What is necessary for Europe is no superstate- it is a suprastate capable of acting in the interests of its collective bloc while respecting its origins and continuity as a multilateral organisation and promoting the establishment of other such organisations in order to effectively balance and render operable the UN as the aegis under which superstates and suprastates alike can effectively police a consensual globe.
European policy toward the Mideast is also on the summit agenda, and at no less opportune a time than as the Roadmap for Israeli-Palestinian peace burns along with the ruins of the West Bank and Gaza. Europeans naturally sympathise with the Palestinians, and as the Roadmap is both a demonstrable failure and notably pro-Israel enough to inspire the most violent manifestation of intifada to date, European leaders would be well inclined to renounce their involvement in a supposedly multilateral achievement which has not only achieved little but was hijacked from the start by the United States. The international community today has praised Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for dismantling several Israeli settlements despite considerable opposition from settler groups. But, in fact, the disputed settlements have been abandoned for some time and the clashes are a result of settler antipathy with such policies hostile enough to mobilise to protect the empty structures. This is the extent to which the Israeli-Palestinian crisis' balance has been shifted in favour of Tel Aviv given current levels of American support. It is regrettable that the EU continues to acquiesce in languid hopes and proclamations for peace without taking action to pressure the United States to reverse its Israel policy and redrafting the Roadmap to be more naturally amenable to Palestinian militant groups and especially their large group of associated sympathisers whose support it is obviously necessary to win to ensure the achievement of any ceasefire, let alone lasting peace.
The EU is also expected to issue pro forma declarations to Iran and North Korea concerning their respective nuclear weapons programmes, in an effort to "reconstruct ties across the Atlantic," while ignoring its own specifically nonconfrontational agenda concerning such crises. The result is a European policy at odds with the actions of its member states. While the EU summit issues complacently threats to Iran at the behest of its American overlord, France arrests leaders of an Iranian opposition group it claims was planning violent activity not only in Iran but throughout Europe. Paris' policy toward Iran has always been to try and establish a relationship in order to facilitate gradual change, and therefore it seems logical to have infiltrated an organisation seeking to transform Iran's recent student demonstrations into a violent revolution. Nevertheless, the seemingly hypocritical split between the actions of the Frencg government and officials attending the EU summit is echoed in the United States, in which divergent foreign policy philosophies- those of the Pentagon and State Department- have respectively condemned and praised the French operation given their individual perspectives on the Iranian situation. The Pentagon's neoconservative cabal envisions the Iranian protests as an extention of the revolutionary exportation domino theory, whereby other Mideast states are inspired by the fall of Saddam Hussein and pursue rebellions (assisted by the US) against their own tyrannical governments. The State Department wisely sees the protests as more a parallel than a consequential development to the invasion of Iraq. Given the history of Iran's relations with the US, particularly the 1953 overthrow of the socialist Mossadegh government and its replacement with the stalwartly pro-American Shah, Iranians are likely to be wary of obvious American involvement in fomenting the protests, and indications of this would likely give the ayatollahs credible rationale for cracking down as well as alienating those Iranians who had believed the protests would bring about a genuine Iranian freedom as opposed to a Shah-like regime last imposed by the Americans, or direct administration from Washington as experienced in Iraq. Confrontationists in the Pentagon faction insist the protests' vehemence has been the result not only of the Iraq example but of propaganda broadcast on satellite channels financed by the US government and Iranian opposition groups operating in the West, but analysts and observers within Iran estimate the influence of such television programmes is marginal and minimal, and the protests' roots are in general discontent with the unwillingness of the ruling council to implement widely desired reform policies. Europe should not sacrifice, therefore, its superior stance vis-a-vis the US in Iran for the sake of restoring any petty favours bestown upon its member states by Washington.
The historic inclusion of Balkan states among the discussions will also be a hallmark of the summit. Christopher Patten, the EU's external representative, argued that inclusion of the Balkans under the European umbrella by the end of the decade was a paramount objective if Europe is to inculcate stability and democracy in the region as well as protect the security interests of its current and (guaranteed) future members. The Balkans are "the last piece in Europe's jigsaw puzzle," Patten declares with certainty. Yet two questions must be raised, whether this inclusion of the Balkan states is necessarily feasible and, more important, whether being the "last piece" negates future EU expansion. For one thing, the war-ravaged Balkans are certainly in no condition currently to enter the Union. Given the persistent concerns about the members which will be incoming in June of 2004, not even the most magnanimous outpouring of support possible for the Balkans would bring them up to standards required to meet the approval of some EU officials. Conflict raged in the region as little as four years ago, and sporadic outbursts of considerable violence still reign in Macedonia. Kosovo and Bosnia continue to be policed by international peacekeepers, while Belgrade is dominated by a de facto American puppet, a fact which led to the relatively recent assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic and the exposure of continuing regional instability. Considering Romania and Bulgaria, which have experienced no such bloodshed in recent memory, are not set to join until at least 2007, it would seem a preposterous assumption that the Balkans, some of which remain under the embarrassing "tutelage" of the UN, could be adequately prepared by 2010. Even Albania, the least bloodstained of the states in question, will have to wrestle with considerable political and economic issues before consideration is possible.
That expansion will end with Bosnia and Kosovo is apparently a given for Mr. Patten, but it will inevitably anger those states on the borders of the Union eager to reap the benefits of membership. Are Ukranians or Belarussians not Europeans, for example? The question of Turkey, most importantly, continues to hang over European leaders. It has a far larger and more dynamic economy than any of the Balkan states, has enacted considerable reforms independently over the last few years, and its recent leaders have been subjected not to war crimes tribunals but to election results. It would seem more logical to eagerly welcome Turkey into the Union before any of the Balkan states, but European leaders, Mr. Patten and M. d'Estaing of Convention fame included, seem preoccupied with the consolidation solely of those states which they consider racially and geographically acceptable. If Europe is truly to project is philosophy globally, it must act with the spirit of consensual inclusiveness toward states in its "near abroad," establishing a sphere of influence including Russia and its CIS satellites, Turkey, strategic Mideast nations, and North African states like Morocco. This will not only promote Europe's interests within such regions, but allow for European power to increase multifold on the world stage as partnerships are also built with other supranational organisations. In short, Europe must be both realistic and open minded concerning expansion if it is to ensure its favourable interaction with the greatest plurality of states possible.
Europe must seize this infinitely important moment upon which to build the foundations of a unique and unprecedented Union which, somewhere between federalist nationalism and confederalist division, provides an evident example of the triumphs of multilateralist rationalism and acts collectively to stymie any resurgence of coercive imposition by superstates, suprastates, or rogue elements with a natural commitment to the subtle employment of nonaggressive and diplomatic solutions. This European moment is therefore a critical juncture for the world and whether it will soon be delivered from the domination of a callous and ignorant empire.
