Diplomatica

2003-06-20T16:33:00.000-04:00

The European Moment

EUROPE has never before had the opportunity to peacefully transform itself as it does at the crucial precipice it has reached with the completion of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the submission of the new draft constitution for the approval of EU member states. When the intergovernmental conference to decide the fate of the draft constitution first convenes in October, it will be, no doubt, the opening of a dramatic and tense occasion. States have already begun to fire ideological broadsides concerning the fate of the constitution and the Union it is to govern.

Tony Blair has declared consistently and unequivocally that the United Kingdom will tolerate nothing more integrationist than a "Europe of Nations," a vague yet often intoned statement which depending upon one's interpretation could easily be construed as a rejection of Europe completely. Despite the promises and apparent convictions of the UK's Labour government, afterall, its commitments have not lived up to any rhetoric promising either the Europeanisation of Britain or the necessity of placing Britain "at the heart of Europe." Rather, Britain is subjected to profitless doting upon its erstwhile colony across the Atlantic and the inexorable dismantling of its social safety net in order to implement "modernisation" coterminous solely with the stratified American socioeconomic model. It seems only a matter of time before the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, declares the euro unfit for British use but enthusiastically scraps the pound sterling for the dollar. It would certainly delight the Anglosphere philosophers, who view the United States merely as an advanced stage of English history to which Britain itself is yet to catch up (and thereby immerse itself in an Orwellian Oceania, apparently). Of course, that anglospherism is entirely based upon the regressive, archaic, antiquarian social model of Lockean libertarianism leads one to question whether Anglopsherism really represents "progress" in any sense of that word, save perhaps for the backpeddling antics of the Thatcher Revolution (Margaret Thatcher, ironically, was among the most heavily committed British political figures to European economic integration). Tory Europhobes in Westminster insist their intention is merely to return to the Thactherite Europe of the 1980s, i.e., unrestricted Continental markets with no corresponding political oversight. The marginalised integrationist faction within the UK note, however, that such regression is fundamentally impossible. Continental leaders will not accept a vision of Europe dictated by the minority party of one member state, and should British policy continually press for such an override of the diplomatic and political progress made concerning the Union since the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty the only possible outcome will inevitably be decreasing British involvement with the Union and consequently its economic organs, with potential catastrophic effects for UK industry.

Of course the continual insistence by the centrifugal Europsceptics that alliances can be formed among less federalist states within the Union to block motions intended to bring about a European "superstate" have borne a degree of fruit for Britain, but London has lacked the tact to play both its hegemonic ally across the Atlantic and the powers in Brussels, nor should it be employing such a strategy given that it sits at the apex of its potential world power, following the denouement of the Empire, while Spain and Poland, still recovering from the disastrous effects of fascism and authoritarian communism respectively, have yet to fulfill their potentialities. The Italian government's stance on integration is as ephemeral as Germany's; the fall of the Schroeder or Berlusconi governments could result in dramatic policy shifts with respect to both European integration and relations with the United States in either country. Most importantly, nothing close to the most radically centrifugal theories among British conservatives is embraced by any of Britain's continental "allies." Each have embraced the euro (Poland will most likely be eager to do so) and have shown little of the contempt toward integration as flagrantly and indignantly flailed by British representatives within the EU government and at each EU summit. Indeed, the relationship these Continental "allies" enjoy with Britain fails to constitute a bloc even in the tenuous sense that France and Germany's reciprocal and close relationship may- it is merely another manifestation of the bilateral opportunism pursued on many levels by these states, or especially in Italy's case of the fleeting ideological and power-groping proclivities of the Berlusconi government.

The essentially divergent interests of the Blair government and the majority of Europe was displayed poignantly at the opening to the summit in Greece, at which the British delegation was forced to withdraw a proposal for the establishment of transit camps for refugees desiring asylum in Europe after not only European leaders, but influential human rights organisations protested this plan. While other British proposals were indeed in line with concepts espoused by such human rights agencies as UNCHR, they were immediately rejected at by summit leaders. No doubt, British objections to the draft contitution will have to be fiercely quelled at the intergovernmental conference if the constitution is to survive in its current state or be expanded to allow for more necessary powers at the Union level, though this is unlikely given no mastermind like M. d'Estaing is to preside over such a conference in order to gain such the broad consensus he was able to achieve on a remarkable number of issues among the diverse spectrum of interests represented at the Convention. M. d'Estaing was only able to ruefully remark that he hoped the states would not rehash debates already aired during the Convention, though there is already a hint the dissatisfaction of the small states concerning the reduction in size and diminished influence of the Commission will persist through the intergovernmental coference.

Other major issues to be discussed at the summit include European security, relations with the United States, and expansion into the Balkans. Concerning security, European foreign policy chief Javier Solana has published a document indicating that Europe must take more "responsibility" in global affairs by integrating its defence forces and pursuing a strategy of preemption in order to undermine threats to European interests. The document comes troublingly close to rhetoric espoused by American President George W. Bush and his cabal of neoimperialists. Though the document is claimed to espouse multilateralism as the means to achieving such preemption, it nonetheless presents the same dilemmas as doctrines of preemptionism, including the National Security Strategy of the United States and documents associated with the neoconservative thinktank Project for a New American Century, especially the radical and controversial paper "Rebuilding America's Defences." Mr. Solana's foray into this ideological realm presents the troubling question of what degree of integrationism is too much for Europe to undertake. If Mr. Solana's policies are fulfilled (most likely in the far future, as they would be anathema not only to Britain but to other states reluctant to commit to a common European defence structure for any purpose, including border patrols) they would represent the decline of Europe into a statist entity, albeit one which, even under the current draft constitution, which will be watered down substantially, has far too little democratic oversight. Furthermore, it will convert Europe's vast statist capacity into resources utilised to enforce European geopolitical and economic interests in a notably Americanist neoimperial fashion. Ergo, the authoritarian "United States of Europe" will surely have been achieved. This manifestation of Europe has already become apparent among those advocating closer integration in order to achieve the effect of draconian police controls similar to those recently imposed upon the United States under the auspices of guarding against terrorist threats. Ironically, while Europe would thus represent everything (then justifiably) opposed by British conservatives, it would be a welcome development in the United States (which seems to be controlling British foreign policy anyway). Diametrically, however, Mr. Solana's policies could represent the incipience of a new Cold War, warned of by Tony Blair when questioned on the issue of collective European opposition to American policy. Indeed, Mr. Solana's proposals explicitly refuses to specifically delineate the transatlantic relationship, though many states have called for numerous overt references to an "airtight" commitment to NATO and the Atlantic relationship, most notably the UK. Mr. Solana's document has dangerous implications considering the potential orientation of Europe both toward or away from the US- the relationship will either bring about American statism detrimental to European quality of life and welfare, and a European foreign policy wedded to decisions emanating from the White House, or this same statist Europe, pursuing individual geopolitical interests militarily, harbouring a costly animosity with the US. Faced with these radical options, one must conclude it is infinitely preferential to pursue a strategy of "soft balancing" within the dual multilateral frameworks of the UN and NATO to check American expansionism, which has been a consistent historical trait of the United States derivated from its unique brand of exceptionalist ideational nationalism, and not merely a manifestation of the material, political, or ideological interests of the current presidential administration. What is necessary for Europe is no superstate- it is a suprastate capable of acting in the interests of its collective bloc while respecting its origins and continuity as a multilateral organisation and promoting the establishment of other such organisations in order to effectively balance and render operable the UN as the aegis under which superstates and suprastates alike can effectively police a consensual globe.

European policy toward the Mideast is also on the summit agenda, and at no less opportune a time than as the Roadmap for Israeli-Palestinian peace burns along with the ruins of the West Bank and Gaza. Europeans naturally sympathise with the Palestinians, and as the Roadmap is both a demonstrable failure and notably pro-Israel enough to inspire the most violent manifestation of intifada to date, European leaders would be well inclined to renounce their involvement in a supposedly multilateral achievement which has not only achieved little but was hijacked from the start by the United States. The international community today has praised Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for dismantling several Israeli settlements despite considerable opposition from settler groups. But, in fact, the disputed settlements have been abandoned for some time and the clashes are a result of settler antipathy with such policies hostile enough to mobilise to protect the empty structures. This is the extent to which the Israeli-Palestinian crisis' balance has been shifted in favour of Tel Aviv given current levels of American support. It is regrettable that the EU continues to acquiesce in languid hopes and proclamations for peace without taking action to pressure the United States to reverse its Israel policy and redrafting the Roadmap to be more naturally amenable to Palestinian militant groups and especially their large group of associated sympathisers whose support it is obviously necessary to win to ensure the achievement of any ceasefire, let alone lasting peace.

The EU is also expected to issue pro forma declarations to Iran and North Korea concerning their respective nuclear weapons programmes, in an effort to "reconstruct ties across the Atlantic," while ignoring its own specifically nonconfrontational agenda concerning such crises. The result is a European policy at odds with the actions of its member states. While the EU summit issues complacently threats to Iran at the behest of its American overlord, France arrests leaders of an Iranian opposition group it claims was planning violent activity not only in Iran but throughout Europe. Paris' policy toward Iran has always been to try and establish a relationship in order to facilitate gradual change, and therefore it seems logical to have infiltrated an organisation seeking to transform Iran's recent student demonstrations into a violent revolution. Nevertheless, the seemingly hypocritical split between the actions of the Frencg government and officials attending the EU summit is echoed in the United States, in which divergent foreign policy philosophies- those of the Pentagon and State Department- have respectively condemned and praised the French operation given their individual perspectives on the Iranian situation. The Pentagon's neoconservative cabal envisions the Iranian protests as an extention of the revolutionary exportation domino theory, whereby other Mideast states are inspired by the fall of Saddam Hussein and pursue rebellions (assisted by the US) against their own tyrannical governments. The State Department wisely sees the protests as more a parallel than a consequential development to the invasion of Iraq. Given the history of Iran's relations with the US, particularly the 1953 overthrow of the socialist Mossadegh government and its replacement with the stalwartly pro-American Shah, Iranians are likely to be wary of obvious American involvement in fomenting the protests, and indications of this would likely give the ayatollahs credible rationale for cracking down as well as alienating those Iranians who had believed the protests would bring about a genuine Iranian freedom as opposed to a Shah-like regime last imposed by the Americans, or direct administration from Washington as experienced in Iraq. Confrontationists in the Pentagon faction insist the protests' vehemence has been the result not only of the Iraq example but of propaganda broadcast on satellite channels financed by the US government and Iranian opposition groups operating in the West, but analysts and observers within Iran estimate the influence of such television programmes is marginal and minimal, and the protests' roots are in general discontent with the unwillingness of the ruling council to implement widely desired reform policies. Europe should not sacrifice, therefore, its superior stance vis-a-vis the US in Iran for the sake of restoring any petty favours bestown upon its member states by Washington.

The historic inclusion of Balkan states among the discussions will also be a hallmark of the summit. Christopher Patten, the EU's external representative, argued that inclusion of the Balkans under the European umbrella by the end of the decade was a paramount objective if Europe is to inculcate stability and democracy in the region as well as protect the security interests of its current and (guaranteed) future members. The Balkans are "the last piece in Europe's jigsaw puzzle," Patten declares with certainty. Yet two questions must be raised, whether this inclusion of the Balkan states is necessarily feasible and, more important, whether being the "last piece" negates future EU expansion. For one thing, the war-ravaged Balkans are certainly in no condition currently to enter the Union. Given the persistent concerns about the members which will be incoming in June of 2004, not even the most magnanimous outpouring of support possible for the Balkans would bring them up to standards required to meet the approval of some EU officials. Conflict raged in the region as little as four years ago, and sporadic outbursts of considerable violence still reign in Macedonia. Kosovo and Bosnia continue to be policed by international peacekeepers, while Belgrade is dominated by a de facto American puppet, a fact which led to the relatively recent assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic and the exposure of continuing regional instability. Considering Romania and Bulgaria, which have experienced no such bloodshed in recent memory, are not set to join until at least 2007, it would seem a preposterous assumption that the Balkans, some of which remain under the embarrassing "tutelage" of the UN, could be adequately prepared by 2010. Even Albania, the least bloodstained of the states in question, will have to wrestle with considerable political and economic issues before consideration is possible.

That expansion will end with Bosnia and Kosovo is apparently a given for Mr. Patten, but it will inevitably anger those states on the borders of the Union eager to reap the benefits of membership. Are Ukranians or Belarussians not Europeans, for example? The question of Turkey, most importantly, continues to hang over European leaders. It has a far larger and more dynamic economy than any of the Balkan states, has enacted considerable reforms independently over the last few years, and its recent leaders have been subjected not to war crimes tribunals but to election results. It would seem more logical to eagerly welcome Turkey into the Union before any of the Balkan states, but European leaders, Mr. Patten and M. d'Estaing of Convention fame included, seem preoccupied with the consolidation solely of those states which they consider racially and geographically acceptable. If Europe is truly to project is philosophy globally, it must act with the spirit of consensual inclusiveness toward states in its "near abroad," establishing a sphere of influence including Russia and its CIS satellites, Turkey, strategic Mideast nations, and North African states like Morocco. This will not only promote Europe's interests within such regions, but allow for European power to increase multifold on the world stage as partnerships are also built with other supranational organisations. In short, Europe must be both realistic and open minded concerning expansion if it is to ensure its favourable interaction with the greatest plurality of states possible.

Europe must seize this infinitely important moment upon which to build the foundations of a unique and unprecedented Union which, somewhere between federalist nationalism and confederalist division, provides an evident example of the triumphs of multilateralist rationalism and acts collectively to stymie any resurgence of coercive imposition by superstates, suprastates, or rogue elements with a natural commitment to the subtle employment of nonaggressive and diplomatic solutions. This European moment is therefore a critical juncture for the world and whether it will soon be delivered from the domination of a callous and ignorant empire.

2003-06-11T01:43:00.000-04:00

Geosecurity Update: Africa

WHILE the Western media retains its primary focus on the Mideast, particularly unsurprising new violence among Israelis and Palestinians, manifestly mounting discontent in Iraq over the continuing American occupation, and increasing US pressure on Iran with respect to nuclear weapons development (ironically, as the US fends off accusations of fabricating Iraqi WMD claims), deadly conflicts continue to appear like brush fires across the African continent. While the ethnopolitical fallout of the Wars of American Aggression ravages the northern portion of Africa, Sub-Saharan states are beset once again with intertribal and interethnic warfare. These conflicts, unlike Cold War-era "wars of national liberation" manipulated by the two superpowers in such hotspots as Angola, are primarily motivated by ancient blood feuds complicated by security concerns of individual states and lust for the acquisition of such lucrative natural resources as diamonds and coltan, a chief component in mobile telephones.

Much of the bloodshed could be halted easily with swift Western intervention. Without the sponsorship of the superpowers, rebel and ethnic factionary militias incipiating many of the continent's unpleasant disharmonies are lightly armed and poorly trained. Prior to British intervention in Sierra Leone, warring groups used proxy children's militias. In the eastern Congo, conflict is perpetrated by armed bands of mere hundreds of members routinely wielding no more than small arms or machetes. While regional peacekeeping forces have had some difficulty intimidating and disarming these groups, Western forces have had considerably more success. French military forces in the Ivory Coast, for example, are widely regarded as unassailable purely due to their technological and tactical superiority. Nevertheless, the insertion of Western military force into such conflicts is not a panacea. In Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, where such interventions have been undertaken, there is no guarantee violence will not erupt again if British or French forces, respectively, are ever withdrawn. In the Congo, gradual arrival of French peacekeeping forces actually portended more fighting, as Hema and Lendu factions struggled to achieve maximum control prior to the terroritorial stasis which would ensue once the UN mission had reached critical mass. The most difficult conundrum of all, however, is societal reconstruction of the type which would ensure such chaos will not return to the regions to which peacekeeping has brought relative stability.

Such nation-building is difficult for the United Nations and other nongovernmental organisations notwithstanding the inexorable derision of American conservatives who find any lack of total success on the part of such groups as underscoring their utter uselessness, but the lack of tangible positive result in the one territory effectively governed by the UN- Kosovo- and other regions in which it plays a substantial role is compromised by both a lack of US commitment to and its constant undermining of the organisation by engaging in military conflicts in regions subsequently requiring UN restitution. The alternatives to UN reconstruction- reengagement in imperialism (demonstably failing in Iraq, an action which was taken under false pretenses to begin with) or abandonment to inertia (which many libertarians applaud for its "realism" in recognising what they perceive as the dual failures of internationalist nation-building and imperialism alike) hardly seem capable of achieving societal stability. What imperialism wrought in Africa must ultimately be corrected by anti-imperialism, namely the international cooperation necessary to achieve continental stabilisation and security. When the superpowers terminated their ideological chess match in Africa, violence seemed to ebb but returned with a severe and violent shock to the world- the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Like the domestic variation of libertarianism, which (perhaps inadvertently) promotes monopolistic and piratical capitalism, the Buchannanesque idea that any and all intervention is to be categorised immediately as a failure condemns Africa to the fate of the marginalised and beleaguered slave to the increasing wealth of the global north. Superficial pronouncements banishing the sale of conflict diamonds will not prevent torment and slaughter being wrought to control the mines producing them. A pity sum devoted to AIDS prevention forces American critics of neoconservative foreign policy to acquiesce, but fails to achieve any significant progress in treating or preventing the disease, especially when coupled with provisions explicitly precluding the funds' use in the promotion of birth control. That trivial stipend is utterly dwarfed by the amount lavished on the American military to produce weaponry which will more effectively reduce to ruins Arab cities. Nevermind that a healthy, stable Africa as an attractive market for investment will do more to stimulate the American economy than the narrowly focused defence deficit spending binge will ever achieve, while contemporaneously accomplishing far more for global security.

In order to be successful, the UN's capabilities must be substantially bolstered. Western governments can contribute to this effort by increasing their funding for the organisation while directing its finite resources to address only the situations with the most pressing humanitarian concerns. Ergo, while Iraq was clearly not a paradise with regard to the fulfillment of the UN Human Rights Charter, its stable environment meant that the armed assault upon it achieved far less in humanitarian terms than the application of the same resources allocated to the invasion of Iraq would have if devoted to the Congo. Nongovernmental organisations must not be spread to thin in order to produce maximum effect in ensuring future stable societies. Had Kosovo been afforded four years without substantial need for the UN and NGOs to focus their efforts elsewhere, the province's rehabilitation may have been far more successful. Currently, stabilisation forces and the local population feels as if abandoned by the international community. Sierra Leone may prove a similar success story if allotted the opportunity. From there, UN reconstruction agents would be able to tackle more challenging conflict-riddled African regions. The narrow, patient focus on relatively few reconstruction situations would also allow for international monitoring of the rejeuvanation project, which may express its concern for a lack of involvement of local officials or NGO officials' unnecessarily large paychecks (a consistent complaint in post-conflict regions).

Viewed in this context I will evaluate some contemporary security concerns in Africa and offer assessments of various courses of action the international community has or may take in addressing them:

Mauritania

Geographically West African, Mauritania's ruling elite primarily associates with North Africa and the Mideast culturally, and conflict between the government and radical Islamist factions have been at a flashpoint, apart from rising tensions between the country's rulers and black Africans, who complain of discrimination and in some cases are still subjected to slavery. Recently, Mauritania has been in the headlines due to the failure of a coup attempt on President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, who himself came to power via a military ousting of the government in 1984. The black Africans are probably not behind any coup attempt, especially as they lack any support from the military. The main source of discord is between the main contingent of ruling Arab elites and the government, primarily over policy toward the West. Taya had close relations with Saddam Hussein's Iraq until having a fallout with the Iraqi leader and deciding to pursue an occidental orientation, becoming one of only three Arab states to recognise Israel and engaging in a vigourous crackdown on Islamic sentiment. This fomented outrage among the still pro-Ba'athist population, which fused with a disgruntled fired army chief to provide impetus for Taya's attempted unseating. For the West Mauritania is a considerable conundrum, closely cooperating with regard to American policy toward Iraq and terrorism, though the elite population fails to share such sentiments and will prove a source of constant tension. At the same time, pursuing close ties with Nouakchott would inevitably tie Washington to its dicriminatory policies and slave-ownership permission. Maintaining the status quo for the short term is probably the best course of action in Mauritania, as hostility to Western policies, even more notable since military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the chief obstacle to be tackled before pressure can be mounted for the emancipation of slaves and the achievement of black Africans' civil rights. In brief, the larger issue of the United States' relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds must be resolved before any considerable progress can be made with regards to Mauritania.

Liberia

An unusual preponderance of global media attention has been focused on besieged and beleaguered Monrovia, held by forces loyal to President Charles Taylor. Twin rebel factions, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the more recently-formed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) are entrenched outside the capital, fighting sporadically government forces trapped inside. The streets of the city are swelled with refugees who have fled the fighting in the surrounding countryside. The issues facing Liberia are more long-rooted and complicated than mere frustration with Taylor's policies. The current Liberian president was himself a warlord during the Liberian civil wars of the 1990s, and following his election to the presidency in 1997 he contributed to the destabilisation of neighbouring Sierra Leone in order to produce a power vacuum conducive to the acquisition of its diamond deposits. Conflict diamonds were promptly rescinded as a source of Liberian revenue with the British-led intervention in the Sierra Leone conflict. Since then, Taylor's funding channels have further evaporated as MODEL gained control of southeastern timber reserves. The indictment of Taylor in a UN war crimes tribunal operating in Sierra Leone was widely blamed for his departure from a peace summit he was attending with rebel leaders hosted by Ghana. Ghanian officials had balked at arresting a visiting dignitary and some construed Taylor's flight from Ghana a sign of the failure of the internaitonal justice system, when it merely represented the inconsistency between the timing of the tribunal and the carefully tendered negotiations between Taylor and the rebels. Nevertheless, though Taylor's voluntary abdictation of the presidency, advocated by world governments in an initiative led by the United States, may cause a temporary halt to hostilities, that this conflict is underscored by ethnicity as well as disenchantment with the president may, as BBC analysts predict, means that the siege of Monrovia may be "just be another step in a long civil war." The LURD faction is dominated by members of the Mandingo ethnic group, linked to the Ulimo-K faction which wrought havoc during the civil wars of the 1990s, bitter rivals of Charles Taylor's. One of LURD's leaders, Chayee Doe, has a visceral hatred for Taylor's former faction, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which tortured him in 1990. MODEL is composed primarily of the Krahn ethnic group, linked to the 1990s' Ulimo-J faction. Both rebel groups maintain their independence of each other, and despite noble mission statements, the potential for seriously lethal clashes exists if such forces are to feud over control of the capital, with ex-NPFL government forces caught in the middle.

Some Liberians have called upon the United States to intervene to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Monrovia should rebel forces breach its perimeter. Founded by freed American slaves in the 19th century, Liberia is as much an American creation as Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast are British and French, respectively. Nevertheless, American forces are engaged elsewhere and Africa has traditionally proven a problem most dextrously handled by Europe anyway. French special forces, after all, whisked Westerners from the American embassy compound in Monrovia to a waiting French naval vessel, a deft demonstration of French military preponderance in West Africa. Nevertheless, a regional solution may be at hand. ECOWAS, the regional economic community of West African states, has put considerable pressure on Taylor's government via sanctions, and the Ghanaian foreign minister is indicating he may travel to Monrovia in order to appeal to Taylor to step down. Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast both have an immediate interest in Liberia's stabilisation, as it is crucial for guaranteeing their own security in the wake of ruinous civil conflicts.

It is clear Charles Taylor's hold on Liberia is entirely unsustainable and that his departure from power will inevitably break the siege of the capital. Whether it will bring peace to the country is another question altogether, considering the close links between ethnic groups and rebel factions. Nevertheless, Taylor's faction effectively bereft of support makes a stable post-conflict Liberia a higher probability.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

In Diplomatica's previous report (including essential historical background) on the humanitarian crisis in the eastern Congo, I explained that the UN would not authorise the deployment of any French-led intervention force on the basis of its implied support for Congolese President Joseph Kabila, who has himself involved in promoting interethnic rivalries in order to regain influence over the eastern half of his country. Nevertheless, no other state seized the initiative, or had the force projection capabilities in the region, as did France, and it recently began to despatch its substantial contribution to the newly enhanced MONUC mandate set to reinforce a small, ineffectual Uruguayan force. French troops are at the head of a larger spectrum of European and African forces set to arrive in Bunia, capital of Ituri province, where the fighting has been most fierce. Though far smaller than the French contingent, groups sent from the UK, Belgium, Sweden and Ireland, as well as South Africa and Senegal, are to take part in the police action. Analysts have clashed over potential French motivations for heavy contribution to the effort. While some suggest that France is supporting its sponsored leaders in order to advance its business interests, others have suggested it intends to plunder the region's natural resources, and former Clintonians have cited the short mandate for action by European forces (to be replaced in several months by a less heavily armed Bangladeshi contingent) as an indication the mission does not adequately intersect with any national interests. It is more than likely the primary rationale for French action is maintaining its sphere of influence in Africa, which it has been cultivating with extreme interest since several African states were driven into the spotlight by the UN debate on Iraq. France has recognised that through the support of large swathes of the third world it has greater potency vis-a-vis the United States. Furthermore, it seeks to again contrast the internationally mandated humanitarian mission to Congo with far more reckless American actions abroad, what I have dubbed the "Petit Irak" strategy of methodological juxtaposition after a Le Monde article suggesting the divergence in means between American action in Iraq and French activity in the Ivory Coast.

UN officials have wisely decided to tackle the problem of the wider Congo conflict by engaging the former players in the massive civil conflict which involved up to nine African states at one point during the late 1990s in open warfare in the eastern Congo. A delegation led by French UN ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sabliere has begun a regional tour in Angola, a participant in the conflict once known as "Africa's first world war." In my initial conclusions regarding the Congo I asserted that no long term solution was possible without a reconciliation of Uganda and Rwanda, which played a substantial role in shaping the area's current ethnic brutality, as well as between those states and the players in the civil war of the late 1990s, including Chad, Namibia, and Angola, which could play a new role in the stabilisation of the Congo's remote east. Securing the countryside and preventing further clashes there has become the new concern of UN monitors since the arrival of French forces in Bunia, and will likely remain so until the discovery of any adequate long-term solutions.

Zimbabwe

Having possessed a system of discrimination making South African apartheid seem timid in comparison, Rhodesia was naturally beset with a rebellion led by indigenous African forces against the unrecognised government of Ian Smith, who severed colonial relations with the UK and plunged the country into civil war. Eventually Rhodesia was forced back into direct administration from London before Margaret Thatcher's government handed over power to the rebel faction piloted by Robert Mugabe, who has remained in power since 1980. Recently, Mugabe has stepped up efforts at land reform in what was christened Zimbabwe, driving white farmers from their land and failing to discourage violent reprisals against them. Unfortunately, this reckless attempt at establishing equitable land distribution produced a near famine as highly productive farms were abandoned. Since then, chief opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai had fought an election campaign against Mugabe, the result of which was regarded with suspicion by the international community. Tsvangirai has since led massive protests against Mugabe under the auspices of his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which ultimately resulted in his arrest. Mugabe's repression of MDC protests has resulted in general demobilisation of the opposition. "We have not yet reached the stage where the people's anger with the regime is equal to their fear of it," one organisation member lamented. Nevertheless, MDC boycotts have produced significant economic pressure on the government. The most influential of regional governments, South Africa, continues to hope that negotiations between the ruling Zanu PF party and MDC will produce a satisfactory result, yet both factions are becoming increasingly divergent.

Speculation has reigned in the wake of the assault on Iraq that Tony Blair would authorise an invasion of Zimbabwe, marking the third time in a century Britain would have taken direct control of the territory. Nevertheless, as popular support for Mugabe erodes, the wisest course for the West is to continue to apply outside pressure, while encouraging regional governments like South Africa's to consider abandoning what some have chosen to construe as tacit support for the Mugabe government.

~

Emerging stories:

Jack Straw's Security Council reform plan

Blix claims smear by Pentagon

2003-06-09T23:34:00.000-04:00

EUphoria, EUphobia
Poland, Britain, and Europe

POLAND is Europe's new love-child. The state that just weeks ago the German press derided as America's "Trojan donkey" in Europe and which Jacques Chirac had patronised as "not well raised" for its support of American action in Iraq has been hailed in capitals across the European Union for its enthusiastic endorsement of membership within the continental bloc. The referendum on Poland's accession, despite all fears, produced a resoundingly pro-integrationist verdict. Nearly four in five Poles said tak to the Union, with a surprisingly high turnout of 59% allaying fears of invalidation and the resulting political scramble necessary to ratify the accession treaty in the Sejm, or Polish parliament. Despite some reservations, chiefly concerning protection for small scale Polish farmers and increased competition from Western European firms (not to mention the controversial second-class status Poland will occupy within the Common Agricultural Policy), Poles predominately viewed the vote as an investment in their national future. EU membership will primarily benefit urban areas and industries, and enthusiasm in the cities was notable. Current members may balk at the delight expressed by Poles who believed they now had the easy opportunity to work and study in France and Germany, whose economies are currently ailing and unemployment rates steadily rising, but nevertheless the former Eastern bloc's largest and most Eurosceptical state has now officially cast its lot with the Union, with primarily positive implications for West European economies, which will benefit from investment opportunities and newly opened markets. Despite fears of waves of German takeovers, the Polish economy is sufficiently strong enough to weather the European common market and to derive substantial gains from the Union's open borders.

Poland's political importance will no doubt improve as a result of the referendum as well. The result has cemented within Europe the conception that the country is committed to the Union and that its undying devotion to the United States is not the sole defining motivation of Polish foreign policy. Indeed, Polish leaders have striven arduously to build relationships on both sides of the Atlantic, assisting the US on Iraq and conspicuously cooperating with the Franco-German axis as part of the "Weimar Triangle" of states. Entering the Union, Poland's population of 40 million will qualify it for a voting position equal to Spain, one of Europe's traditional "great powers." The minority Social Democratic government under the leadership of Leszek Miller has been bolstered into a good position to call for a vote of confidence within the Sejm, and the fusion of his leadership with the forthcoming economic gains following formal accession in June of 2004 should allow Poland to rapidly develop an advanced welfare state similar to its new Continental partners. It will be in good standing for membership in the eurozone, projected for 2007.

While Poland's close relationship with the United States exposed most poignantly by the Iraq conflict had initially produced a sharp reaction from the rest of the Continent, the government has engaged in a strategy of appealing to both Washington and Brussels by affirming its commitment to both power centres. Poland has realised its strategic position can be enhanced considerably by partnering with the United States to expand its global influence and participate in the asset plunder of humiliated Iraq, while simultaneously and dramatically improving its importance to Europe by becoming, increasingly, a world power and acting as an independent force in the absence of a common European foreign policy. Commentators have likened its actions to Spain's, which has also managed to retrieve its status as a global actor by dually appeasing the US and engaging vigourously within the European community. Such tactics have found immense appeal across Donald Rumsfeld's "New Europe," as Balkan states are now supporting American positions on such issues as the establishment of an International Criminal Court in return for sponsorship within European institutions like NATO and the EU. Attempting to maintain these inexorably divergent partnerships is an unsustainable practise, as Turkey encountered when its population essentially revolted against capitualation to American demands or allure by American bribery. In both Spain and Poland, popular sentiment will eventually outpace the ability of governments to maneouvre between Europe and America and, should the current radical departure in American foreign policy continue, most likely force the "New Europe" into an acceptance of a European common foreign and security policy with the aim of containing the United States. Of course, popular rebellion against pro-American policies is not the only limiting factor- the emerging structure of the European constitution will require adhesion by member states to a common foreign policy, though retaining individual national vetoes, yet this stipulation may yet advance the formation of such a policy. Furthermore, as the "New European" states gain power, they will eventually attempt to seek independent action, and learn they have no formal imput on the decisions of American officials. Left with no choice other than opposition should their strategic interests be imperiled by American action, as was the case with France or Russia, or believing as German leaders did that American activity was beyond comprehensible logic, such states will realise that symbiosis with the US has become both useless and damaging, and will gravitate toward Brussels, which grants states formal influence and which consolidates states with similar strategic, economic, and ideological interests.

In the intervening period, however, the "New European" states retain the goodwill of the Franco-German axis by appealing wholeheartedly to the European system and to working within its framework. Britain, however, seized by rather irrational fears concerning the preservation of its sovereignty, deluded by illusions of its residual world power, and bemusingly unaware of its status as a front for American interests, refuses to employ the heretofore successful strategy of the "New European" countries. Of course, Britain is in a wholly dissimilar situation compared with Spain, Poland, and the Balkan states. It has little ambition to significantly increase its global influence, which, though severely debilitated since the empire's slow denouement, maintains a position of worldwide influence considerably greater than that of Spain via its participation in and heavy investment within the Commonwealth. It therefore makes little sense for Britain to exploit its association with the United States on the basis of expanding its international prestige. Instead, the British government believes it has the ability to moderate the United States' imperial ambitions by acting as a mentor of sorts and imparting the lessons of its own imperial experience. This is a demonstrably unsuccessful tactic, however, resulting in only cursory and superficial American patience for British influence and an actual diminution of British autarky, rendering ironic the yelps of paranoid Tories in Westminster decrying the loss of the UK's foreign affairs autonomy to Brussels.

The British strategy, by contrast to that of the "New European" states, diminishes British global influence by making it a slave to the European economy and to American policy. Having no ability to contribute to decisions regarding either, its self-perceived "independence" actually limits its ability to engage in a sovereign course of action. Accession to the United States has yet to produce a single tangible result to the benefit of the United Kingdom to the effect it has with regard to the "New European" states, and the contempt shown for Brussels has alienated and isolated it within its own economic bloc. Britain's economy is sustained by exports to Europe, and London has positioned itself as Europe's financial capital, though awkwardly outside the eurozone. A substiantial reorientation of the British economy toward that of the United States would provide no greater degree of influence on the part of British financiers, would devastate northern England's reliance on industrial production and shipment to the Continent, and would force it to endure an inflexible economic straightjacket with positively Argentinean results. By contrast, British fears that joining the "one-size-fits-all" eurozone can be addressed by its ability to contribute board members to the European Central Bank, its weighty position relative to other European national economies, and its already substantial integration into the Continent's trade network. Despite this integration however, it has missed significant growth potential, as trade within the eurozone has accelerated to three times the growth level between the eurozone and the three EU members (Britain, Denmark, and Sweden) remaining outside Frankfurt's economic influence. Increasingly, Britain will find itself adrift in notably unsplendid isolation with each day it fails to adopt the single currency.

The United Kingdom suffers from a mania of sorts, believing its influence greater than that of a medium-sized European power, and an increasingly ostracised one within Brussels at that. It espouses enthusiastic plans for the European Union along its own terms, yet fails, by its frustrating insular exceptionism from the Continental land mass and Continental mindset, to ever embrace the Union to begin with. When acceptance of the framework for Europe itself not forthcoming from London, how can it begin to shape the Union to its whims? Much vaunted desired partnerships with relatively eurosceptical states Spain and Poland have failed to properly materialise because of Britain's lack of commitment to immersion within the Union, strategies Madrid and Warsaw have employed. In order to maximise its position within the coming decade, Britain must come to terms with its lack of formal influence over Washington, and, slightly tweaking the American phrase, insist that it will provide no cooperation without representation before promptly terminating the "special relationship" established upon the inequitable terms so seemingly lusted after by Tony Blair's government. Having applied Toryite "sovereignty" rhetoric to its alliance with the United States, therefore, it would be advised to involve itself in the shaping of the European constitution and to adopting the single currency with great urgency. The revelation of Britain's necessary emancipation from the United States' fallacious foreign policies and immediate involvement in Europe will embrace the successes of both the Hispano-Polish "New European" and Franco-German "Old European" blocs by recognising Britain's remaining global power while promoting its position as a European partner. Only such a course as this will ensure the UK is not increasingly marginalised and subordinated in the near future.

~

-NEWSWEEK believes war crimes tribunals are doing more harm than good. Cited is the indictment of Liberian leader Charles Taylor, which is blamed for the current perilous situation developing as a result of the rebel siege of Monrovia. The timing of the decision was not very tactful, but it fails to prove the system is somehow inherently flawed, as it could have been easily modified not to coincide with peace talks between Taylor and rebels in Ghana if the tribunal and diplomats had worked in concert. Furthermore, Slobodan Milosevic's "mockery" of the court at the Hague is highlighted, as if this in any way diminishes the purpose or usefulness of the tribunal system. The alternative- the very American solution of, perhaps, summary execution, seems a tad hypocritical when addressing abuses of human rights.

-IT APPEARS this site is becoming almost as well-read by American expats as the International Herald-Tribune (photocopy of the New York Times as that has become). Welcome self-exiled globetrotters! You are living proof that even minuscule exposure of Americans to the outside world is an amazing ingredient of international and intercultural understanding. Perhaps someday I will join your ranks, sitting in a Ringstrasse cafe with a copy of IHT and some warm Viennese streudel.

2003-06-08T16:38:00.000-04:00

Inside the Empire
American Nationalism Investigated

THE PECULIARITIES of American nationalism have long been distinguished from the rather recognisable traits inherent in Eurasian ethnocultural identities. How such differences have come to shape the exigencies of American activities on the world stage has been explained in a Foreign Policy article by Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, "The Paradoxes of American Nationalism," which has made waves within international affairs circles in the United States. Pei explains that American nationalism is "defined not by notions of ethnic superiority, but rather "by a belief in the supremacy of U.S. democratic ideals." This manifests itself, he asserts, in rejections of the "nationalist" appellation by Americans associating the term with ethnically motivated classical nationalism as evidenced in European history, and an inability of Americans to comprehend the strength of patriarchical nationalisms abroad as opposed to transnational ideological ideals.

The implications are evident: the United States, believing in the absolutism of its ideals, seeks to transfer them abroad. "Americans not only take enormous pride in their values but also regard them as universally applicable," notes Pei. "According to the Pew Global Attitudes survey, 79 percent of the Americans polled agreed that 'It’s good that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world.'" Furthermore, "American political institutions and ideals, coupled with the practical achievements attributed to them, have firmly convinced Americans that their values ought to be universal." This is the genesis of American zeal for exporting secular republican democracy to the Middle East, or free markets worldwide, disregarding local idiosyncracies. Perhaps more disturbingly, when such blind policies backfire on Americans, their intrinsically short collective memory and conception of the United States as what Freud would call an "ideational construct" rather than merely a nation causes Americans to "see attacks on them as primarily attacks on their values." This would explain the reaction, therefore, to the 11 September attacks by many Americans, especially of the nationalist right wing persuasion. "Most [Americans] readily embraced the notion that the attacks embodied an assault on US democratic freedoms and institutions," Pei expounds. This was, of course, seized upon by officials within the American government, who chose, perhaps out of their own nationalist myopia, to emphasize various aspects of Islam, particularly of the fundamentalist strain, which made it appear inherently designed to globally assault liberal secularism. Philosophies of Islamic extremism were extrapolated to represent, for some of the more virulent commentators, flaws in the Islamic religion itself. Israel, too, had employed this tactic, arguing that "surrender" to Hamas and other Palestinian groups would be tantamount to the end of the Jewish state, as this was what a handful of radicals at the period of the first intifada's inception had argued. Given the close affinity between Israel and the United States and the unique attributes of American nationalism as evidenced by Pei, it was thus natural to come to the conclusion that a brooding, backwards ideology was sweeping the Arab world with anti-pluralist sentiment. In an exercise of retransferability, the Straussian conception that Israel represented a bulwark of Western civilisation in the Mideast merged with the American nationalist sentimentality that Palestinian suicide attacks amounted to an assault on a successful democratic model which such militants would be better off emulating than attacking, ignoring the tense history of collective ethnic strife underscoring the conflict. Indeed, Pei asserts, whereas Palestinian nationalism is "aggrieved," the American variety is "triumphalist," and therefore a lack of common perspective exists among the two nationalities.

Among the more interesting observations Pei makes is that of the innate hypocrisy contained within the United States' distinct nationalism:

Given the nationalism that animates U.S. policies, American behavior abroad inevitably appears hypocritical to others. This hypocrisy is especially glaring when the United States undermines global institutions in the name of defending American sovereignty (such as in the cases of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The rejection of such multilateral agreements may score points at home, but non-Americans have difficulty reconciling the universalistic rhetoric and ideals Americans espouse with the parochial national interests the U.S. government appears determined to pursue abroad. Over time, such behavior can erode the United States’ international credibility and legitimacy.

What Pei fails to grasp is the logic of the American conservatives who espouse such universalism while simultaneously rejecting international protocol. For these conservatives, international law is a constraint upon the United States' abilities to act as the missionary agent of American ideals- intervening in various locales to impose its brand of order. They argue that American military immunity is necessary as the United States acts as the legitimate guardian of "goodness" and therefore whatever means used to achieve its macro-geopolitical moral objectives are therefore justified, the "destroy the village in order to save it," mentality invoked during the Vietnam War. Indeed, the United States' relative isolation from the rest of the world culturally and geographically has made it prey to a rather rapacious and runamok subconscious conception that the expansion of American ideals and the pursuit of vital national interests are coterminous. Ergo, many Americans failed to see the implied hypocrisy in the overthrow of Chile's Salvador Allende and the installation of the dictatorial Pinochet junta in 1973, as it was merely one of many Cold War activities in the name of the "greater good"- extinguishing the influence of the Soviet Union and ideological communism (though Allende, of course, had little to do with the Soviet Union). Furthermore, Americans failed to see (though perhaps more out of gross ignorance) the hypocrisy evident in American alliances with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the "war on terrorism." Perhaps reduced to its most illogical but intangible, the provincialism of Americans disallows them the distinction between something which merely benefits the United States as a national entity and something which benefits the rest of the world, as the United States, representing ideational concepts, is less a geographical entity than an abstract like "freedom" or "liberty." That assumption, which can be expressed as "that which is good for America, is good for the world," is potentially the most alarming of realisations one might garner from Pei's analysation of the American character.

Among Pei's opponents are Francis Fukuyama, of "End of History" fame. Fukuyama sees such hypocrisy as necessary for the pursuit of national interests, and that the United States was not a unique example of countries which paper over less noble goals with moralistic justification. He argued that American moral pontification was the result of a need to convince other states to accede to its interests. Nevertheless, Fukuyama seems to ignore the American public's perception behind such activities, or perhaps the ideological fundamentalism motivating policymakers as well. American government officials, of course, are not all cynical, conspiratorial imperialists, but rather tend to stumble accidentally into courses which breed those perceptions due to their own acceptance of the coterminality between American interests and moral goals. The downfall of Fukuyama's argument is a result, in fact, of his own captivation with this belief. He noted that American idealism was responsible for positive progress toward several international institutions, but when confronted by post-Cold War American exceptionalism to such institutions, quickly reverted to justifying American self-righteousness by alleging the United Nations was not a representative democracy and that American global leadership was necessary, mirroring the sentiments of his fellow conservatives.

Pei's observation that American nationalism is the product of personal, rather than national action is interesting inasmuch as it relates to the very libertarian Anglosphere theory, which asserts unique organisational "civic societies" have been a product of English-speaking countries whose laws and traditions have originated from such philosophies as John Locke's. That American nationalism is individually motivated is the "secret of [its] vitality and durability" according to Pei, as it "has made nationalist sentiments more genuine, attractive, and legitimate to the general public." Unlike in other societies, American manifestations of nationalism are not state-motivated. Apart from the US, states,

...especially those ruled by authoritarian regimes, the deploy [their] resources, from government-controlled media to the police, to propagate "patriotic values." The celebration of national days in such countries features huge government-orchestrated parades that showcase crack troops and the latest weaponry...Yet despite its awesome high-tech arsenal, such orgiastic displays of state-sponsored nationalism are notably absent on Independence Day in the United States. Of course, Americans hold parades and watch fireworks on the Fourth of July, but those events are largely organized by civic associations and partly paid for by local business groups.

The distinction is explained by the article's essential thesis, that the fundamental individuality of American nationalism is due to its association with abstract concepts rather than ethnic-statist allegiances. This, however, makes American nationalism no less tribalist, parochialist, or dangerous, as explained above in the "coterminality corollary." Nevertheless, it makes American nationalism less detectable to its practitioners and inflates its propensity for manifesting itself as jingoism. Because American nationalism is ideational and personal, Americans tend to suppress or regard as heinous insults any problems afflicting the American state. Ergo, Ronald Reagan's triumph in the 1980 election was predicated upon boosting American self-esteem. The worship of such iconography as hawkeyed eagles or flag banners is explained by the affirmation of such as symbols of one's beliefs and one's personality. Fundamental human attributes of independence and individuality therefore are derived from the belief in concepts believed to be expressed by flag-waving. The pledge of allegiance becomes not surrender to a draconian state entity but a rather faith-based expression of nationalist religiosity based upon one's need for an ideological identity.

The attractiveness, therefore, of nationalism to Americans and its driving inclination to pilot hypocritical manifestations of foreign policy has resulted in some rather inevitable spurts of imperialism and the expected backlash therein. Manifest Destiny is seen as virtuous, "patriotism" supplanted euphemistically, and considerably in wartime, for jingoism or nationalism. To be derided as "unpatriotic" is regarded a most offensive insult. That the world is ruled by this galvanised spirit of blind national-ideational allegiance portends ominously lest its power be checked by states whose populations, naturally suspicious of state-sponsored nationalism, are more likely to pursue a rational course. The Anglosphere theory, an application of American nationalism's universality, has already been rendered null by such a process, as two of its theoretical main practitioners, Britain and Australia, are both torn by historical, geographical, and social ties to Europe and Asia, respectively, and naturally inclined to fear the dominance of the hypocritical hegemon.

~

-NIALL FERGUSON, a British author who has called for a restoration of the British Empire under American auspices, has now turned to promoting another anachronism: the Protestant work ethic, which he claims accounts for the disparity between American and European levels of productivity and, therefore, the strength of the American economy. He is especially worried about the Central and Eastern European states slated to join the European Union in June of 2004. "Unfortunately," he bemoans, "European Union labor legislation will reverse [long Czech workweeks], to prevent what the West Europeans disingenuously call "social dumping"- the competition from low-wage economies. Czechs will be obliged to work less by a combination of legal entitlements to a shorter working week, longer holidays, higher minimum wages and generous unemployment benefits." Sounds horrible, doesn't it, all those benefits? Not only does Ferguson fail to explain why the mere correlation between Protestant religious fervour in the United States and its higher "work ethic" amounts to causation, but he misses the point entirely- European policies are not designed to create an economic powerhouse (though the European economy will effortlessly outpace the US following its eastern expansion) but to provide for a higher quality of life for Europe's citizens. Ferguson resorts to adopting what sounds like 19th century dogma: "Enlargement of the European Union may simply confirm the eastward spread of the leisure preference in an increasingly work-shy and Godless European continent." God -whoops- forbid!

2003-06-07T13:54:00.000-04:00

Fraudulent Fallacy

DISCONCERTING would be an example of what the Greeks would call litotes, or understatement, concerning the verity of the apologiae for the heinous interjection of armed might into the weary, ailing carcass of a ravaged state. Thrice under the government of Saddam Hussein had a major war befallen the betrodden masses of Iraq, and their sullen cynicism upon the sight of American armoured vehicles set to "liberate" them into the pall of either anarchy or the institutionalised second class of a colonised subordinate revealed the visages of a conflict-weary people who once again sustained misery for little gain. Deliverence into the wings of the American eagle was never met with the esteemed enthusiasm claimed by those seeking a fulfillment of their zealously idealistic but myopic inclination to overwhelm the subtleties of geopolitics with the "moral courage" of bombardments exterminating entire neighbourhoods of innocent Iraqis. Indeed, when the United States assumed its "white man's burden" in Afghanistan, optimistic citizens of Mazar-e-Sharif cast off their burqas in orgiastic celebration, only to reemerge, cautiously, many months later, clad once again conspicuously from head to toe, per diktat of the various independent warlords which have assumed de facto control of the regions removed from Kabul. Afghans had expected to be embraced by the warm nurture of a United States which, even if it could not perceive the consequences of lapsed concern for lack of order or improper reconstruction, might be thought to realise the moral tragedy of abandoning a state to armed tribalist factionism, having claimed to cease the agony of the Afghan state as it toiled under the tyrranical retrograde theocracy mandated by the Taliban.

The United States, however, was not content to convert merely Afghanistan from a less than desirable, but evidently stable locale to a festering cauldron of armed rivalries. The model of the Afghan powder-keg was immediately expanded to the entire globe. The most heavily armed tribe, frothing with the mania of allegiance to any direction its wise men inhabiting the five-walled Temple of Militarism decreed, would inevitably emerge the dominant breed. On the altar of the Pentagon was sacrificed not only the fifty years of rational internationalism developed for the express purpose of avoiding the horrifying pall of human bloodshed, but the nearly five centuries of adherence to the Treaty of Westphalia and the system of independent nation-states. Wounded at the heart of its economic engine by radical extremist elements catalysed by its own inexorably expansionist mentality, the wounded giant decided to reorder the earth as it saw fit to grant it the greatest possible advantage. To this end, the fist-thrusts of jingoism and the charge of tribes pursuing the blood-lust of their own pathological glory has come to define an erstwhile logical planet. While Trotskyites, neo-Wilsonians, and Straussian conspirators hatch schemes in dim-lit rooms, the howls of bloodthirsty Visigoths echo over the propaganda nets sustaining their collective visions. A delicious irony is thus served over the morning newspapers as the same strategies are parlayed to elites as the advance of civilisation by the likes of Niall Ferguson and his fellow apologists for the mercantilist exploitation and Social Darwinist rassenkampf that define imperialism.

The same "humble foreign policy" as employed in Afghanistan had thus come to Iraq, and with it, the international system of order which had sustained the well being of the world so long as the United States recognised the constraints placed upon its hegemony as vital. The Bush cabal would faithfully keep its word to the American people and engage in true nation-building in neither, but rather breach the fragility of both as if a hammer smashing glass without the slightest means of reassembly. The inevasible fate of an Islamic world under the pin of an aggressive hegemon is rebellion, and rebellion indeed was expressed in the form of suicide attacks across the region. The falling dominoes of autocracy promised by the high priests of neoconservatism instead have been manifested as a tidal wave of intense anger. Far from being improved, global security has been severely compromised by not only the forseeable propensity for increased terrorist activity but the mad scramble for deterrence among states the militarists successfully urged George W. Bush to consign to a fanciful new ersatz construction of a bloc- nonthreatening in reality, so as easily to topple by the traditional military means developed with such expertise and a superfluity of tax revenue in the US, and to gain political stature for the conquering heroes within the administration- but also mythologised to present as fundamental a threat to the well-being of "freedom" as McCarthyist hoodlums had portrayed the Soviet Union in the 1950s.

Ergo, while Iran and North Korea desperately seek to create a sufficient arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in order to stave off an American assault, it is becoming increasingly clear none ever existed in Iraq, or, if they had, they had been summarily destroyed as a consequence of the inspections regime of Hans Blix and UNMOVIC. New details emerge daily of the prevarications passed on to the people of the world as the shocking truth. Even the antiwar opposition always believed Saddam Hussein was stockpiling such weapons, and primarily structured its arguments around the need to utilise the internationalist approach of intensive weapons inspections while maintaining vigilant containment of Iraq, as opposed to engaging in warfare. The revelation of the weapons' nonexistence or prewar eradication is therefore all the more poignant for turning prowar legislators and commentators against their respective participant governments. That there was intentional deception involved in persuading populations to accept the need for military action on the basis of an imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction has become the focus of probes and inquiries not only within the notoriously hostile British Parliament but within the hushed complacency of the seemingly forgotten legislative branch of the American government. Even those who still believe the war justified are openly questioning the stance of the president, believing the need for an open, democratic society as embodied by the exposure of such fraudulent claims trounces the political expediency of their own support vindicated by the pronunciation of an Iraq war "victory" predicated upon other (most likely humanitarian) grounds.

That the investigations over the issue merely concern whether intelligence was either compromised or misrepresented ensures a rather limited mandate, but opens the door to far more important questions. Of course, one of the initial justifications for the lack of evidence of the weapons is that they must have been well-hidden. However, it makes little sense for the weaponry to have been hidden so covertly. Saddam Hussein's primary prerogative was maintaining his power, shortly followed by the desire to pursue some greatness in the books of history. Merely embarrassing the Americans and British over the WMD issue was unlikely to have been his desire, considering so many suggestions that he would rather deploy such implements against the invading forces to force the least palatable military situation possible upon American forces. Furthermore, the absence of any crucial support apparatus for the production, maintenance, and deployment of such weapons to date raises its own questions. Saddam could hardly have hid a production facility needed to produce the type and quantity of weaponry suggested by Tony Blair to be able to deliver a blow to the United Kingdom in "forty-five minutes." War sympathisers will further attempt to cast in a negative light the intelligence agencies involved in the allegations, claiming the CIA to be innately hostile to Rumsfeldian doctrine. Downing Street has already repackaged discontented MI6 employees who have essentially revealed its requests for revisions of intelligence on Iraq as "rogue elements" seeking to compromise the organisation. In both the US and UK, however, the public seems to retain trust in both intelligence agencies as reliable organisations independent of the political manoeuvrings of Bush and Blair, respectively. Especially considering the intelligence concocted by Rumsefeld's puppet agency within the Pentagon has been thoroughlly debunked (especially considering the recent uncovering of the Defence Intelligence Agency's own doubts about the certainly of a weapons programme) and outrageous Blairite claims exposed as the products of uncorroborated speculation and plagiarised doctoral theses, the words of CIA and MI6 seem to retain the advantage in the field of credibility.

Of course, one wonders how long it will be before such weapons conveniently arrive in Iraq aboard a C-130 cargo plane. If Bush and Blair are capable of making claims of surreptitious nuclear materials deals between Iraq and Niger, they can certainly have vials of anthrax sprinkled around Tikrit to be stumbled upon by eager Iraqis seeking the vast reward for locating such propitious items. While all this is happening, of course, there is real risk the war, ironically, brought about what it was purportedly designed to prevent; the distribution of nuclear materials. Among the few international observers allowed access to Iraq, IAEA inspectors were granted access to facilities which had formerly contained materials placed under the agency's seal in 1991. Should the IAEA inspectors discover such seals have been broken and the materials removed in the chaotic spree of looting which gripped any region recently "liberated" by Anglo-American forces, such portends far more dangerous implications than the prewar status of Iraq's weapons programme, which now appears entirely nonthreatening. Possibly the closest thing to definitive proof of such weaponry in Iraq is the constant exposure of Iraqi civilians to depleted uranium shells used so avidly by American forces.

Likely Rationales for Attack

Realising the presence of such weapons as an immediate danger to the West could not have proven adequate impetus for aggression to Anglosphere leaders aware of Iraq's lack of capacity in this regard, one must consider with even greater certitude the multifarious rationales for warfare asserted by the antiwar opposition. While these may have each played a significant role, they could not have composed the full tapestry of casi bellorum against Iraq. It is true, indeed, that Iraq's possession of vast reserves of petroleum motivated American warhawks, but the acquisition of such vast reserves could have been obtained far more easily by reengaging Saddam Hussein rather than prematurely aborting his regime. Indeed, we are now well aware that Iraq's oil supplies played at least a significant role in determining the American course of action, at least according to Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence and a leading advocate of neoconservative ideology. In a quote mistranslated and printed by the Guardian, Wolfowitz appeared to directly assert the war had been predicated solely on the presence of Iraq's oil wealth. Rather, it appears, his assertion made it evident the Pentagon considered sanctions ineffectual with regard to Beghdad vis-a-vis less resource-rich North Korea in promoting the American agenda. "The...difference between North Korea and Iraq," he insisted in the properly translated quote, "is that we [the United States] had virtually no economic options with Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil. In the case of North Korea, the country is teetering on the edge of economic collapse and that I believe is a major point of leverage whereas the military picture with North Korea is very different from that with Iraq." Nevertheless, coupled with Wolfowitz's claim in Vanity Fair that the administration chose to focus efforts to cajole the public into Iraq's conquest using the fearmongering tactic of fabricating a WMD threat for "bureaucratic reasons," such deviation from the official party line comes at a less than advantageous time for the Bush administration and especially for Tony Blair's Labour government.

Considering petroleum's minor, but nonetheless present role in the American government's motivations for war, it is necessary to examine the other alleged influences on the White House which led the charge for military action. There is of course the evangelistic neo-Wilsonian strain of neoconservatism, a particularly virulent strain of revolutionary exportationism, for which Wolfowitz was an ardent crusader, and who insisted repeatedly that the execution of the war would bring about a democratic shock wave throughout the region. Not only has such a transformation not occur and is not likely to occur, but Iraq does not appear likely itself to granted any self-rule should such a democratic Iraq fail to be coterminous with American policy objectives. Wolfowitz's passionate insistence on "democratic" imposition notwithstanding, such crusading appears to be a fringe element within the administration. More prominent are the views of the rabidly ferocious National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, whose promotionism of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) had given credence to the accusation that Bush foreign policy is being driven simultaneously by a Bush Doctrine giving the administration the right to topple governments it suspects of harbouring "terrorists" and the assertion within the NSS that the United States is to remain the world's preeminent power and will take action to ensure this remains the case. Given the potentiality, widely accepted today, that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of converting his primary means of exchange for oil trade to euros from dollars, given the open hostility of the Iraqi government toward the United States, given the exposure of the US' vulnerability to highly coordinated but inexpensive and low-tech terrorist attacks, and given the growing Mediterranean ambitions of Europe and the emergence of China as a formidable power (not to mention the gradual reemergence of Russia under the nationalist bonbast of President Putin) the Iraq project was to serve as an example of the lengths the United States would go to preserve its status as global hegemon. It was able to erase rapidly a state with overt opposition to its policies, without respect to any contraints of international law to such an activity, gain considerably in power projection capabilities by capturing a keystone of the Mideast, secure aforementioned strategic reserves of petroleum, outmaneouvre its growing list of adversaries, and impress upon similar challengers to American policy its ability to decide their fates. While such a strategy, in fact, increased the propensity for terrorist attacks against American interests or the United States itself, it managed to allay concerns within the administration that the 11 September attacks had diminished the United States' capacity for global rule. The United States' activities in Afghanistan were insufficient, as the presence of al-Qaeda in that region proved a bothersome distraction from plots concerning Iraq harboured by angered neoconservatives since the mid-Clinton administration. Nevertheless, Afghanistan was a logical extension of the machtpolitik embodied by the NSS and provided an adrenaline jolt for militarist Republicans then more likely to accept action against Iraq, and furthermore was used as a means to mollify critics who would logically assert that the terrorist threat to the United States would not be addressed by action against Iraq while Afghanistan remained untouched. The paucity of attention lavished on postwar Afghanistan unveiled the administration's lack of commitment to that state as a central objective, but also of its "empire lite" policies regarding nation-building. The administration is content to maintain its conquests as weak, subordinate satellites rather than fully-garrisoned colonies or reconstructed independent entities, though Taliban resurgence and attacks now being mounted on the "safe zone" of Kabul itself have seemingly undercut such policies.

Though advisors to the Bush administration may have had such strategic considerations consistently in mind as they petitioned for the Iraq war, it is unlikely President Bush himself had the intellectual sophistication himself to perceive the significance of such nuanced arguments upon the geostrategic fulcrum. More likely to have influenced the President were personal aims, considering his father's "failure" of the citizens of Iraq in 1991 and the family grudge which had ensued against Hussein since the Iraqi dictator succeeded in turning pre-Gulf War politics into a personal showdown between himself and the first President Bush. Nevertheless, this was more a subtextual consideration than Bush's likely influence by arguments of Iraq's potentiality versus any known possession of weapons. Among conservative factions within the United States there is inconeivable suspicion of any government which does not produce obsequious support for Washington's objectives. Hence the inclination to immediately seize upon any ludicrous rumours regarding France's affinity for Ba'athism and, more pertinently, the conjecture regarding Saddam's weapons programme. That there is weaponry unaccounted for represents circumstantial evidence at best, and the continued assertions that Saddam Hussein was "deceiving" UN weapons inspectors by hiding such weapons or manufacturing them in mobile trailers could easily, with the physical proof gathered thus far, be levied against any state. This is policy governed by paranoia. Iraq could have produced (or could in the future produce) such weapons, and it might utilise them to further regional ambitions which it may have harboured, or else potentially offload such weapons to terrorist groups it could have been connected to. Not only, of course, did no substantial or even minuscule evidence exist for any of such claims, but in many cases there was substaintial indication the probability of the aforementioned events was nonexistent. Extrapolating this logic of paranoid preventionism, one might assert that Iceland in several centuries could develop a nasty strain of anti-American sentiment and seek to manifest such in the sponsorship of lethal anthrax-snowball attacks upon the White House, and to mobilise the Fourth Fleet for the cruise missileage of Reykjavik. Still, the most sceptical war supporters were ultimately moved by such arguments, particularly in Kenneth Pollack's book The Threatening Storm, which quickly became convenient propaganda for war enthusiasts.

Post Facto Humanitarian Apologists

Battle cheerleaders continue to argue that the war's justifications were irrelevant considering the outcome of military action, yet such outcome has yet to be determined, and if events consider with inertia on the ground in Iraq, those who asserted that taking such a course qould be tantamount to inviting quagmire will have been quite vindicated. Indeed, it seems rather myopic to believe there was a victory for global human rights in Iraq, when the invasion has yet to result in a single nationwide representative election, violence continues in the country unabated, armed factions are set to clash if any vacuum appears between the cracks of the US power-grip on Iraqi territory, and the entire state has been reduced much further into the shambles of poverty and squalour than had ever been experienced under the socialist stewardship of Ba'athism. In an American Prospect article entitled "Kant and Mill in Baghdad," John B. Judis examines two perspectives on the human rights argument through the lenses of the two respective philosophers. John Stuart Mill, he notes, would have viewed the incremental human rights improvement in Iraq as a slight victory, while Kantian universalists would naturally be more sceptical, believing the argument for the war was unjustifiable on the grounds of toppling Iraq's totalitarian government without applying a policy of democratising every state made captive by such regimes. It would seem from this analysis that Mill's view is a far more realistic and achievable philosophical outlook, yet this war is a failure even when examined entirely from this perspective. To achieve its geostrategic goals in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration assembled a "coalition of the willing" with its own brutal record of human rights abuses, from Uzbekistan to Eritrea. Turkmenistan, counted as a "key" ally in "liberating" Afghanis, is controlled by a particularly unpalatable gentleman. Much more damning an argument for those justifying the war on the basis of human rights is its consumption of vital military resources otherwise necessarily useful in the prevention of humanitarian calamities. So much of the US military is preoccupied with either pacifying newly conquered dominions or hunting down Islamic fundamentalists in such locales as the Philippines that despatching troops to such genocidal hotspots as the Ituri province of the DR Congo has become a logistical impossibility. The war's deliberate circumvention of international law and its invocation of the Bush Doctrine has set an international precedent now being used for mass slaughter from Chechnya to Aceh. Can war apologists invoking the human rights argument claim, furthermore, that there was an imminent danger to Iraqi civilians from the Ba'athist regime as opposed to the evident slaughter occurring in the Congo? Unveiling of mass graves has produced much evidence of past abuses by Hussein's government, but such postsciptions date to either the post-Gulf War uprisings or suppression of Kurdish insurgents during the Iran-Iraq War. One could hardly invoke any logical argument which would substantiate military action in an international court of law that military aggression resulted in the salvation of any Iraqi lives. This is pure conjecture based on the same logic of inherent distrust espoused by the paranoid national security Iraqaphobe obsessives. There is considerable evidence, however, of the vast multitudes slaughtered or injured in the inconsiderate bombardment of Iraqi cities by the "coalition." The most acrid humanitarians would believe that there is no cause for intervention at all lest national interest and concern for rights abuses intersect, and that therefore the world should be thankful there were interests worth "liberating" the Iraqi people for. Such has even more swagger and arrogance than neoimperialist dogma, by stripping the veneer off such interventions and openly declaring the rape of local resources for the express good of locals. Given the evidence of both the compromise of human rights and global security due to the Iraq invasion, moreover, it appears the Iraq war was a shortsighted application of such essentially deranged excuses for colonisation by some other name.

How can Bush and Blair account for an invasion which sacrificed the requisite toil necessary to construct the post-Second World War international order, which has demonstrably increased global instability and insecurity, which has reduced Iraq to a hotbed of misery and unrest, which has reduced the capacity for the global community to prevent the abuses of human rights, which has reduced to ashes the credibility of the United States and the United Kingdom and their status even within the West. Predicated upon shrewd, formerly marginalised advocates of American dominance and post-11 September emotional distress, the United States stumbled into Baghdad to recapture its wounded national glory by believing "good" had trumped "evil," and dragging with it an eternally faithful Great Britain, whose Prime Minister was only slightly less influenced by such Manichean inclinations and who descended Christ-like to Basra in open-necked missionary garb in an exercise of iconography certainly rivalling in subtlety, though not grandeur, the martial mania embodied in Bush's aicraft-carrier staged victory rally. Having done its part to preserve the special relationship with the United States, Blair has discovered that no amount of interfering in the sanctity of his intelligence agencies to produce thinly-veiled lies for the consumption of his countrymen may not have been worth his delusions of influence in Washington. Though the probes have opened in America too, it may take the collapse of a government across the pond to see through the uncompromising wall of conformity surrounding every aspect of the Bush administration's belligerent blasphemies.

2003-06-06T02:47:00.000-04:00

Mideast Mindlessness
Naïvité Underscores US Regional Policy

AFTER HIS nonchalant hijacking of the G8 summit agenda on global poverty, in which George W. Bush shocked and awed his European sycophants and adversaries alike into becoming proxy agents of threat proclamations to the dwindling "Axis of Evil," the two summits the President of the United States faced in the Mideast seemed to present far more complications for American interests. The "Roadmap" to Israeli-Palestinian peace perhaps, borrowing a popular cliché, faced numerous obstacles, while the situation in Iraq continued to disintegrate. The summits achieved little more than a halfhearted pro forma pledge by Arab leaders to "renounce terrorism" and some forced Ariel Sharon dialogue embracing uncharacteristically un-Likudnik rhetoric.

The two summit outcomes were primarily predicated on American pressure. Though the US government, especially one with such a heavy contingent of pro-Israel hawks, is unwilling to place a significant onus upon Israel to engage in major reform of its bellicose and patronising policies toward the Palestinian population of the occupied West Bank and Gaza, Bush's seeming personal commitment to the peace process seems to have elicited some emotional reaction on the part of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon's invocation of the word "occupation" to describe Israeli activities in the West Bank and Gaza, his newfound commitment to a "contiguous" Palestinian state, and general pledges to "support the Roadmap." Nevertheless, this does not not indicate a fundamental revolution in the Prime Minister's stance. He still believes, for example, in only allowing 50% of the West Bank to revert to Palestinian control, and to only abandon "illegal" settlements. Within Israel, analysts note, "some...believe his new moves are only tactical, concealing old policies of expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories," while "others believe he does want to achieve a settlement of the conflict in his final term as prime minister." Sharon's reading of the Roadmap, indeed, still seems to ambiguous to draw a final conclusion as to his viewpoint. Nevertheless, it is increasingly irrelevant what the Prime Minister believes, given the negatively visceral reaction to the document by his cabinet, which has repudiated the peace plans, and by various far- and religious-right groups within the United States, which are electorally core constituencies for the American President.

The President himself believes that his mere presence in the Mideast is enough to shake leaders in their bootstraps. Having successfully bombarded Iraq into submission the neoconservatives believe they can ride a wave of obsequious gestures from world leaders, indicated at both the G8, the Aqaba summit between Bush, Sharon, and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, and at the Arab summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. They point to the most serious objections on the part of Israel to various peace plans, notably Israeli security. Indeed, one of the many goals of the neoconservative imperial project in Iraq and the gunboat diplomacy with which the US has attempted to lasso much of the rest of the region is to neutralise Israeli security threats so that Likudniks are mollified on the issue of outside support to militant Palestinian groups, which both they and the American neoimperialists see as the primary means by which the intifada is sustained. This Kissingeresque round-the-circle approach to the intractable Israeli-Palestinian issue is not only fruitless, but infinitely dangerous if the means utilised for "negotiations" with surrounding states are scare tactics and overt intimidation.

Let us illustrate with the example of the Vietnam War. Indeed, the North Vietnamese were nominally funded and supplied by the Soviet Union. However, those who advocated the incipience, continuation, and escalation of American involvement in the conflict saw the fundamental issue as communist (primarily Chinese) expansionism in Southeast Asia by the proxy of Hanoi. Indeed, however, the Chinese were at odds ethnically with the Vietnamese for years, and fought a short war with a united Vietnam following the final capitualation of the South. During this period, moreover, China was intermittently involved in numerous border skirmishes with the Soviet Union, making the idea of a unified communist bloc in the region rather ridiculous to contemplate. American foreign policy chiefs during the war's duration failed to recognise the core issues behind the violence, namely, the struggle for social and economic justice in Vietnam. Harsh French colonial rule had produced a virulent reaction among northerners who revolted to form the communist state advocated by Ho Chi Minh, while the south remained solvent to the West as it retained a market economy under the strict jackboot of Ngo Dinh Diem, a brutal pro-American dictator (later replaced by other, even less palatable examples of repressive military leadership). The Vietcong's support came primarily from those unwilling to supplicate themselves before an intolerable dictatorship (the war, however, was billed by its most vivid enthusiasts as a "struggle for freedom").

While, of course, this allegory may not be directly applicable given the nature of American involvement in both that and the current Israeli-Palestinian crisis, some interesting and educational parallels can be drawn. The Israeli-Palestinian situation itself is not the central struggle which besets and defines the Mideast- that is the animosity between Israel and Arabs (and, sometimes, by extension, the remainder of the Islamic world). Nevertheless, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is highly symbolic and representative of this struggle, and this is the reason so many Arabs relate directly to the fate of the Palestinians. Ergo, the intifada is not a result of agents provocateurs operating at the behest of Tehran or Damascus but rather stems from Palestinian outrage at excessive Israeli military operations aimed at their "control," on top of the various other documented outrages they see committed upon them by the State of Israel. It is more, therefore, like the hatred and resistance among Vietnamese for dictators like Diem. Like the Americans during the Vietnam War, the Americans today seem to believe the Palestinians should merely sit back and accept Sharon's provocations as consequences of the need for Israeli security (as Diem's regime was played to be both some perverse beacon of freedom and an extension of America's "vital interests," i.e. a security blanket containing the Soviet Union). Now, imagine that, instead of committing troops into the heart of battle, Vietnam, the Americans of the period had instead launched a war against either the Soviet Union or China and sabre-rattled the other into accepting its positions. This is essentially its strategy in the Mideast today. Erroneous conceptions of Arab sentiment being manipulated by sinister power-mongers like Yasser Arafat or Saddam Hussein, or the mere conjecture that the intifada cannot be sustained on its own fragmented momentum have led policymakers to conclude that it is indeed certain external "regimes" which must be dismantled in order to ensure peace, by destroying the sources of manipulation and "obfuscation" as regards Arab opinion (the regimes) and isolating the intifada movement from the Arab world. Perhaps the most faulty assumption is that Arab and Islamic dissonance with certain indigenous leaders equates to support for American interlocution and interference. It would be tragically ironic if the neo-Wilsonians were to stumble on the same Achilles heel Wilson himself was deluded with as his actions at the negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles were motivated by his mistaken belief in the overwhelming support he commanded among the people of Europe.

The problem, of course, is that outside influence is not to blame for the continuation of the violence among Israelis or Palestinians, even given the evidence of some financial support to militant Palestinian groups flowing from Ba'athist governments in Syria and (formerly) Iraq as well as Iran. The strategy fails even when applied internally, for Yasser Arafat has too little influence to halt violence when engaged and too great to be ostracised in favour of a more pro-American Palestinian leader, like Abbas, who inevitably commands little support from extremists. Indeed, neoconservatives have either misunderstood or intentionally (for ulterior purposes) misrepresented the motivations of common Arabs, who they believe would rush to embrace American (and, to a lesser extent, Israeli) principles and to behave as America's obedient NATO allies if "liberated" from the autocracies which scholars like Bernard Lewis see as the primary obstacle to the adoption between Arabs and Israelis of a common peace plan (not to mention a cessation of anti-American terrorist activities).

Of course, one would surmise that such a policy as embraced by the current American presidential administration would inevitably lie in shambles. As engagement of Russia or China during Vietnam would have provoked nuclear war, the conquest and colonisation of Iraq will logically foment radical Islamic fundamentalist sentiment, manifested in terrorism. Meanwhile, the fundamental problem of Israel and Palestine is unsolved. Some American conservatives had been aghast at allegations Saddam Hussein had no terrorist ties given his propensity to compensate the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Nevertheless, the conflict continues unabated with the eradication of the Ba'athist government in Baghdad and Iraq's "liberation." Engaging the problem from the outside has merely exacerbated its magnitude. Even if proven successful, it is clearly demonstrable that the United States has allowed the barter of Israel's West Bank for America's. The occupation of Iraq will ultimately provoke, on a larger scale, retributionary strikes by both radicalised Islamic groups, Kurdish independence guerillas, pro-Saddamite factions, and sympathisers across the Islamic world. It hardly seems prudent to have unleashed such a horrific Pandora's Box when among its intents, securing an Israeli-Palestinian peace, remains elusive.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration conspires to keep confidential whatever it dictates toward its remaining potential foes in the region. The summit at Sharm el-Sheikh produced primarily paper pledges to Bush, however, presented in the face of his obvious capacity to engage the American military in any direction he so chooses. The hysteria about being the next target of neoconservative doctrine has produced the desired effect among advocates of Pax Americana. But fear among Mideastern elites will not necessarily placate their own restive populations, which remain, as administration officials cannot seemingly intimate, the problem. Indeed, much of the initial antagonistic sentiment among practitioners of fundamentalist Islam focused on such regimes as the neoconservatives endeavour to remove from power. (Ironically, these were rather like the society of the Platonic "philosopher king" which Straussian elitists within the administration envisage.) Nevertheless, such radical groups were sufficiently marginalised until the injection directly of American force into the region following the decades-long festering of such governments and the subsequent stationing of American forces in Saudi Arabia gave impetus to greater and more widespread support to such grassroots resistance to "foreign influence" being institutionalised by the despised regimes. Ergo, the regimes became not reviled because of their lack of conformity to popular sentiment, but because of their complicity with American demands, which ultimately resulted in unfavourable domination of the region by Washington's ironfisted dogma.

Therefore, so long as the Mideastern leaders actually conform to Bush's demands, they will be forced to occupy an increasingly precarious position. This has been discovered most poignantly by General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, whose tenuous position is highlighted by the constant and broad agitation by Islamist groups within the country for a fundamentalist state governed by shari'a, Islamic law. Musharraf has increasingly found difficulty towing the American line while attempting to maintain a dialogue with his increasingly radicalised population. This may, therefore, be the case in other Mideastern states which faithfully pledge to uphold Bush mandates. In Saudi Arabia, where the situation is perhaps the most fragile and is aggravated by a spate of recession and squalourous poverty gripping much of the urban population, the result has been coordinated suicide bomb attacks on Western targets in Riyadh. The neo-Wilsonians, therefore, are now in a dangerous position, having intoned very Trotskyite rhetoric against Saddam Hussein but now, in the consciousness of the Arab and Islamic world, fusing the concepts of despotism and American policy to create a rather very susceptible target for both aggravation and, ultimately, manifestation of such in the form of rebellion and destruction.

Of course there is the possibility that certain governments would not necessarily cooperate, at this juncture, with Washington. Iran, for example, has not been a very keen partner with the United States since the 1979 revolution, and from the beginning perceived its inclusion in the "axis of evil" as an imminent warning to begin the rapid development of deterrence implements, such as nuclear armaments. Iran is an example of the direction affairs can take when American policy goes awry. There is only so much accession to the US Islamic states will endure before either, fearing revolution, reversing their principles, or, fearing an inevitable attack due to the increasingly harsh language emerging from the US, beginning to take a defencive stance. In this case, American policy has created far graver security concerns in the Mideast, in the form of hostile states brewing with hostile anti-American sentiment fueling government activities.

And so we return to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, having observed how US policy toward Arab and other Islamic states has ultimately increased multifoled the volatility of the region and failed to achieve the cessation of any hostilities between the Israeli state and the Palestinian people. Indeed, such active American intereference in the affairs of Arab states which may be inevitably exposed as on behalf of Israeli concerns (to which there is considerable documentation in regards, though it is obvious that influencing the region in the favour of Israel, or "the peace process," is one of a host of reasons for the nascent imperialist impulse of American leaders) will most likely result in the inflammation of Palestinian opinion and the increase of attacks on Israeli targets (and, now, perhaps, American ones).

One solution would appear to be American disengagement from the region, though with de facto control of the security situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan it would be extremely difficult. Iraq's future government could, of course, be made the matter of the United Nations, and other nation's peacekeeping forces may bne able to fill the gaps with the US absence providing adequate justification to former war opponents for force commitments. Interference as a colonial aggressor in the Islamic world on the part of the US having ended, the Islamic fundamentalist movement can either turn its attention toward the toppling of regimes already disfavoured by the US or be relegated once again to a fringe element within society. Furthermore, the US should actively address the Israeli-Palestinian problem in an active way, but one which does not solely reflect the personal bond between Bush and Ariel Sharon. The US must put extended pressure on Israel in the form of sanctions and trade restrictions in order to guarantee various implementations of its peace plan. It must accept minimal reservations from the Israeli government, and it must recognise that as the sole centralised entity operating in the conflict, Israel is endowed with the ability for withdrawl and peacemaking that the various Palestinian factions cannot achieve no matter what creative governmental reform programme is implemented for the Palestinian Authority. On the Palestinian side, however, it is necessary to insist that the government be as broadly representative of the Palestinian population as possible, and that means allowing militant groups political representation in order to satisfy their crucial concerns and to guarantee their place at the peace table. These proposals are, of course, imperfect, but they offer a far less haphazard plan than the fantasy world as reshaped by the zealous coalition of Zionists, Christian fundamentalists, neoimperialists, and oilmen shaping the "Bush Doctrine."

Most importantly, one must always recognise that in the seemingly ancient and improbably resolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are always uncertainties. Most recently, Ariel Sharon's "revelations" concerning the "occupation" of the West Bank and Gaza seemed to signify he was moving in a bold new direction toward the role of peacemaker, but his reservations remain set firmly in place, while Bush seeks to marginalise increasingly any Palestinian other than Abbas, who has little direct dialogue, even, with militant Islamist groups. Israeli settlers will continue to be an issue, so long as they refuse to leave their colonies, while a new security fence under construction is raising new issues about the shape of a Palestinian territory to come.

The strategy of President Bush appears to be to wade into the Mideast conflict, the unseen and unspoken-of fallout of the Iraq War as his enforcement mechanism to cement, by sheer charisma alone, a shocked recognition of the need to do the bidding of the United States. Furthermore, he sees his "personal involvement" in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process enough to catalyse the process. Investing personal charm into a deadly and intransigent conflict is as ultimately naïve as imposing one's will on unwilling with the muscularity of military bravado is dangerously arrogant. And whatever lack of tact is evidenced by the neoconservatives' plottings concerning Mideast strategy, there was a noticeable lack of intelligence evident in the man who believes a smile and a handshake are all that is necessary to heal a scar fifty-five years in the making.

~

NEXT: Iraq and the Hunt for WMDs

2003-06-02T21:50:00.000-04:00

From G8 to GM

IT WAS a predictable result. The world leaders meeting in the picturesque seclusion of Evian-les-Bains conveniently ignored the assembly of dignitaries from developing nations, those French President Jacques Chirac had invited to the G8 summit both to make central the issue of alleviating global poverty and prove the validity of his conviction in a multipolar world. Instead, Chirac's arms clasped firmly around the rarely-reciprocating American emperor, the leaders of the summit issued proclamations to North Korea and Iran (the remaining duo of Bush's "axis of evil") against the development of nuclear armaments, which they found in direct violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Notwithstanding this treaty's own implicit failures and the further departure by the Bush administration from the traditional accomodations necessary for its enforcement, the warning was more than a little ludicrous. Nevertheless, the current frenzy over "reconciliation" had more than one European leader struggling to restore a cordial relationship with the United States, relationships justifiably abandoned when US policy veered illogically off course toward the infamy of the Iraq war.

President Bush seemed content to take the advice of Condoleeza Rice, his National Security Adviser, by completely ignoring German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Ms. Rice had advised Bush to "punish France," but divisionary rhetoric between Bush and Chirac was not overtly evident, as the two leaders smiled and linked arms, while Chirac both abandoned his initiative on developing nations and pledged to despatch a French special forces operation to contribute to the "stabilisation" of Afghanistan (not to mention praising Bush's unprecedented, but petty, commitment to AIDS eradication in Africa.) In return, Chirac received from Bush some books on Native American culture, and the pointed remark that "a united Europe, working with America, could do a lot of good on fighting terrorism and weapons proliferation and in helping those who suffer." The BBC's diplomatic correspondent interpreted this to mean, "in other words, Europe is welcome to help - but on America's terms." Chirac's spokesperson, Catherine Colonna, nevertheless stated that "[France has] not changed [its] point of view. Neither has the United States." A nearby French journalist remarked to the BBC that "Chirac thinks he was right, is right, and will be right." French officials seem unwilling to express the multipolar inclinations of the Chirac presidency in earnest following the divisions of the Iraq war, and may be waiting for a more significant opportunity to do so. Having promised in recent weeks to freshly engage forces with broad international mandates in both Afghanistan, and, more sunstantially, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France perhaps has opted to lead by example, utilising the "Petit Irak" principle of providing an example of sanctioned intervention (e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire), as opposed to the blatant circumvention of international consensus epitomised by the Iraq war. In fact, issuing a declaration on WMDs to Iran and North Korea may be part of this strategy. Rather than merely capitualating to American demands, as it seems, Paris has embarked upon a long-term policy of juxtaposing its approach with the Americans'. France has been a long-time partner with Iran and may attempt to emphasise dialogue with Tehran as opposed to the military pressure the Washington neoconservatives are so fond of, bound, if the precedent of the Iraq war is any indication, to follow the barrage of condemnation. The debate over Iran, therefore, will be relatively conservative, as was that over Iraq- over the means by which Tehran could be disarmed.

Still, the collapse of France's own summit agenda indicates the dominance Bush commands, still, in governing European affairs. Chirac is beset with considerable domestic criticism over his support for Prime Minister Raffarin's handling of pension reform, and inciting new divisions with Washington are either likely to draw more criticism now that his popularity has begun to noticeably wane or foster accusations he is papering over an unpopular welfare reform policy with fresh confrontation between himself and President Bush. Unfortunately for Chirac, pompous nationalist grandstanding is not as an effective deterrent to a dismal record on internal economic issues as in the United States.

While Western European leaders were likely to fawn in the orgy of re-acquiescence to the Fürher of the Free World, less cooperation was expected from Russia and its charismatic president, Vladimir Putin. A few days earlier Putin had chaired an important, and all-too-overlooked summit in Moscow of the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation. This group, primarily an axis between Russia and China, has as its stated aim the prevention of US domination of Central Asia. The Asia Times has a fascinating take on the resurgence of this body, which had languished until the incipience of the Iraq situation spurred new awareness of the need for multipolar power blocs to contain the advances of an aggressively imperial United States. The SCO affords China the opportunity to build influence in Central Asia without risking the antagonisation of Russia, which has traditionally held sway over the region. After American forces became involved in various Central Asian republics with the invasion of Afghanistan, the SCO's development became more urgent and accelerated. Currently, Russia and China are jointly pursuing energy assets in Siberia, including the exploration of various pipeline schemes, have engaged in considerable arms deals to their mutual benefit, and are concerned about the implications of a nuclear Korea on regional policy. China sees a nuclear Korea as dangerously increasing the probablility of resurgent Japanese militarism, and Russia's newfound cooperation with Beijing, coupled with similar objectives to France's concerning the need to provide a demonstrable alternative to US policy, motivated Putin to agree to call for a halt to the North Korean weapons programme.

Russian policy toward Iran is more complex. The 1979-1986 Afgahnistan War was seen as an attempt to contain the Iranian Revolution's spread to states under the Soviet sphere of influence. But Russian attitudes toward Tehran softened primarily as it became clear that it had become a principle centre of opposition to American Middle East policy and that by befriending Iran it could guarantee a squeeze on any Islamic fundamentalist organisations supplying Chechen rebels. Furthermore, Iran, like China, is a primary customer of Russian arms exports, which are vital to sustaining Russia's economy. Moscow's assistance on the construction of nuclear reactors in Iran, therefore, was merely a logical extension of its recent policies. Russia is probably genuine in its stated fear of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, however, given a powerful Iran's ability to gain influence over traditionally Russia-controlled Caucasus or Central Asian states and backing its policies with ballistic missiles. It is for this reason that Putin has agreed to halt the shipment of nuclear materials to Iran until it signed an international protocol allowing for more intensive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Iran, of course, is opposed vehemently to such a notion. It fired back a reply noting that, if US officials were so concerned with the potential for an Iranian weapons programme, they should provide it with, themselves, nuclear power-generation technology, as this would surely be adequately inspected. The immediate American rejection of this facetious proposal indicates both the paranoia in Washington of any potential for an Iranian weapons programme and the opposition to providing assistance in any way to what what neoconservative ideologues (and their liberal sympathisers like Christopher Hitchens) denounce as a "backwardly theocratic regime." Russia, for its part, has disagreed with the United States on the need for a wholesale cancellation of its material support for the construction of Iranian nuclear reactors, primarily for the reasons stated above concerning Russian-Iranian relations. Putin has ostensibly accused the Bush administration's request for such a halt to assistance of being "a situation where nuclear programmes or anything else is used as a lever for unfair competition against Russian companies on the Iranian market." Nevertheless, if Russia does have knowledge of any Iranian weapons programme, it is both more beneficial for a Russia fearful of a nuclear Iran to its south and to Russia's creditability on nonproliferation to immediately denounce any potential programme and to call for inspections as a means to handle it rather than attempting to justify Iran's pursuit of such a programme on the basis of the US' militant policies which inevitably send potential targets scrambling for instruments of deterrence.

As both Russia and France, the principle Iraq war opponents represented at the G8 conference, appeared to agree to issue stern warnings to Iran and North Korea as a means to juxtapose bellicose Bush administration promulgations with their own faith in the more muted application of international inspections, sanctions, and accomodating accords, the real tragedy behind the summit was not what some commentators will inevitably claim to be a return to their self-subordination to the US, it was the failure of world leaders to even begin to engage the problems facing the developing world. The US, in particular, has been focused almost entirely on its Trotskyite designs for the Mideast, ignoring the pressing issues which have emerged in recent weeks from Africa- the nascent genocide in the Congo, slavery in the Sudan, resurgent Christian fundamentalist rebel factions in Uganda...not to mention the fallout from recent horrors just beginning to fade in the public imagination, in West Africa, which were ultimately halted by the arrival of French and British forces but which, without a sustained and focused effort by overtaxed international organisations to provide the foundations for more stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies, may ultimately be the site of inexorable factionary warfare once again. "We can't build paradise," says a British soldier in Sierra Leone, a reference to the army's noble but ultimately unsuccessful attempts at helping reconstruct (or, perhaps, in the case of Sierra Leone, merely construct) a peaceful haven. Without a serious commitment by such leaders as the G8 to such initiatives as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which motivates African states to purge themselves from corruption in exchange for copious unconditional Western aid, in otherwords, there is nothing to prevent the Dark Continent or other parts of the developing world from descending into the depths once more of such situations (unlike Iraq or Afghanistan) which really do require immediate intervention.

The question of whether or not the international community could improve societies upon which intervention was inflicted was explored in a fascinating Guardian series on British military action during the Blair government thus far, entitled "Did we make it better?" Jon Henley, an international correspondent for the paper, traveled to three "post-conflict" locales: Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and, of course, Kosovo. Henley's perspective is rather biased against the international NGOs (nongovernmental organisations), and he dismisses with playful wit the white trucks of "UN-Land" while praising "our boys" who are "doing tremendous work." Nevertheless, despite Henley's lambasting of the UN and NGO record in these areas, he offers little alternative, and discovers himself the national military forces lack any capacity for long-term political reconstruction. The most accurate conclusion one could make from this series is that the rapid development of post-conflict locales and the initial demands for rapid progress on "nation-building" leads to both logical shortfalls on the immediate projects and the sapping of resources from any previous operations still being undertaken. This is why, for example, Kosovo, which is the only of the three areas to be directly administered by the UN, has fallen so short of expectations. Indeed, with little resolved, governments are demanding timetables for a "pullout" from the province, convinced little else can be done (and aided by the protests of various factions relishing the impending absence of the order imposed by KFOR, and other, troops). For all Henley's criticisms of the means by which international organisations handle post-conflict environments, the essential conclusions one can make are that it is necessary to keep such environments to a minimum in order to reduce the strain on the UN and NGOs and hence lead such regions, after being abandoned, back to the chaos which fomented their initial crises; and that as much capital, infrastructure, intellect, military power, and attention as possible must be lavished upon each one...not to mention the need for summits like the G8 to take precautionary measures in order to prevent such circumstances preceding intervention-level catastrophes, actions like engaging the leaders of the developing world attending the summit. South African President Thabo Mbeki's pleas seemed to fall on deaf ears.

The summit essentially was to have dual foci: Chirac's courting of a developing nation agenda and Bush's pressing obsession with security and the "war on terror." This highlighted the two world perspectives of the two leaders, Bush, who sees military engagement (or gunboat diplomacy) as the primary means of addressing security concerns, and Chirac, who subscribes to a less myopic view that, perhaps, socioeconomic issues contribute to violent uphevals- and furthermore, that such issues cannot be solved by either imperialism (neoconservatism) or economic globalisation (neoliberalism). This last concept, motivated by conservative free market ideologues, drives much of Bush's foreign economic policy, and is at the heart of an issue currently burning between the United States and both Europe and the developing world- genetically modified foods.

Jeremy Rifkin of the Guardian writes on how this issue has far more potential to unite Europe and divide it from the US than any mere geopolitical position. At the heart of the debate is not whether Europe is flaunting WTO regulations by preventing GM food imports from the US, but, as George W. Bush asserts, that the EU is a direct contributor to African famines by virtue of its GM import limitations. In fact, Europe has no full-scale moratorium on GM imports, nor, as Bush has claimed, is its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) responsible for impoverishing the developing world singlehandedly- American subsidies to agribusinesses match if not exceed European provisions. Furthermore, Europeans are incensed by allegations their policies sideline Africa, with European countries providing the largest portions of their GDPs for aid, especially to Africa, while the US ranks lowest among industralised states. Not to mention that the much-praised Bush AIDS plan is far too little to contribute significantly to Africa's battle with that disease compared to what the US could provide, and that corollaries insisted upon by Christian fundamentalists within the US have specifically stipulated that the aid cannot contribute to birth control supply or education- which not only fails to address one of the primary roots of the AIDS problem itself but does not recognise the intricacies of the African continent- that low instances of birth control utilisation have also contributed to high ratios of youths, which, combined with the continent's longstanding economic malaise, is a bubbling concoction of inevitable outrage and bloodbath.

Ludicrous accusations concerning European policy toward Europe notwithstanding, charges that any attempt to restrict GM foods imports by Europe will contribute to starvation in Africa are thoroughlly refuted by Rifkin. Considering most famines are in countries actually producing food surpluses, he notes, "the hunger problem has more to do with the way arable land is utilised." He goes on to explain:

Today, 21% of the food grown in the developing world is destined for animal consumption. In many developing countries, more than a third of the grain is now being grown for livestock. The animals, in turn, will be eaten by the world's wealthiest consumers in the northern industrial countries. The result is that the world's richest consumers eat a diet high in animal protein, while the poorest people on earth are left with little land to grow food grain for their own families. And, even the land that is available is often owned by global agribusiness interests, further aggravating the plight of the rural poor. The introduction of GM food crops does nothing to change this fundamental reality.

Not to mention, he adds, that GM seeds are considered the intellectual property of their bioengineers, which means they are either controlled by large biotech firms or farmers are forced to pay royalties before replanting each season. Furthermore, many of the "miracle genes" in GM foods, vitamin enriched and more nourishing, it is said, than organic produce, is ineffective when consumed by an already malnourished individual. How, then, such foods would help fight famine becomes a more difficult question.

This does not take into account, even, the health and environmental concerns put forth by the critics of GM foods. Once thought perfectly safe, such products have now begun to have spotty health records, and have been known to irrevocably alter local biospheres- which would be a disaster in Africa, in which sustainable development must be a reality in order to preserve resources for later development as well as maintain requisite ecosystems to ensure the well-being of the planet. In the rush to employ the dynamics of the free market and the assumed superiority of its products, the United States has sacrified such a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of GM food production, ultimately to the detriment of Africa.

However, Rifkin writes, this may be the issue which eventually explodes in the face of American arrogance. Europe's citizens are diametrically opposed to the consumption of GM foods, even if the EU is forced to give way on import restrictions. It's seen as a cultural affront- gastronomy as the last bastion of regional autonomy from the anonymous ubiquity of the globalised fast-food world. Rifkin, for one, believes the GM issue "may well turn out to be the straw that breaks the camel's back for European-US relations. The battle over GM food is uniting the European public and giving people a new sense of their common European identity, while distancing them even further from their old ally across the Atlantic." This may be beneficial to the developing world in more ways than one- perhaps, for instance, Europeans will one day be able to speak up for their own principles at such summits as the G8, to ensure that the opulence and talent of the world's wealthiest nations is reinvested in those without the privelege.

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I salute Bunkshooter for keeping closely abreast of the developing genetically modified foods situation, to which Diplomatica, to date, has only paid cursory, if any, heed.

2003-05-29T17:55:00.000-04:00

Europe's Consitutional Quandary
Three Essays on Europe's Future

Our Constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. Thucydides II, 37, epigraph to the European Constitution.

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A DRAFT VERSION of the European Union constitution was published this week by the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Diplomatica will embark upon a full-scale analysis of this constitution and its implications upon its final adoption by the Union, and here will mainly explore the primary provisions as well as the reactions across the Continent.

The impact of the draft's publication was felt primarily in Britain, in which various elements of the anti-integrationist right have used it as a launching pad for a much larger national debate over Britain's fundamental place within Europe, its economy, and its increasingly unified government. The draft's publication has indeed come shortly after controversy erupted in Britain over the government's somewhat ambiguous stance on a referendum for the adoption of the euro as the country's primary currency. Elsewhere on the Continent, the draft was primarily met with apathy as voters confronted individual national problems- the focus was on local elections in Spain and Italy, while controversy over rollbacks of social benefits embroiled France and Germany. The candidate countries of Eastern Europe are encapsulated by their petty newfound glory in becoming surrogates for the American imperialist project in Iraq and are too consumed with grandstanding military summits to this effect to pay much heed to whatever emanates from Brussels. Nevertheless, the draft's publication has sparked anew some debate between small and large member states, the former of which claim their interests have been "run roughshod" over by the Convention's chairman, M. Giscard d'Estaing.

More truthfully, the document is a pathwork of compromise, a bit of grey matter which was therefore bound to cause little excitement amongst those who did not look for it specifically (such as the British newspapers). It calls for a relatively strong European presidency, nominated by the European Council (which best represents the interest of Europe's nation-states) and elected by the democratically-selected European Parliament. A coordinator of European foriegn policy would also be selected by the Council, but with the corollary that "member states shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area." However, there is validity to the arguments of the small states in that the one member-one vote Commission, which best represents their interests, sees its powers reduced quite dramatically in comparison to the Council, and even the Parliament (to a far lesser extent). The argument for the Commission's diminution was made by those who believe its composition simply cannot be sustained given the number of states composing the EU after the completion of accession in June 2004.

The potential pitfalls are many. The constitution solidly reflects British hopes and values as they correspond to Europe, but nevertheless the contingent of the British right has taken upon itself to ensure this is not seized upon by Britain's people. Their mythologising has done the document much discredit, and many Britons who would logically be arguing for the maintenance of this draft over the adoption of future, more integrationist models are instead finding themselves in a position advocating a type of regression within Europe to the primitive days of the nascent European Economic Community.

The constitution also fails to adequately address the issue of democracy, which was its designated intent. Europe was always seen as a rather non-transparent entity, a bureaucratic maze effectively divorced from public opinion. With pan-European public sentiment during the Iraq crisis proving the merit of the "European spirit" as a veritable force within European politics (if it could ever be coupled with pan-Continental governmental representation), one would think the Convention would have found a means by which to incorporate a greater degree of citizen participation in the European government. That it did not was a reflection of the degree large nation-states have held sway over the proceedings of the Convention. For it is not a more integrated Europe that is a danger to democracy, but the continuing concentration of power and representation within the EU in the hands of national governments rather than the votes of the European populace. This has resulted in circular arguments promulgated by those who would wish to keep Europe impotently divided through the continual invocation of "sovereignty." A more integrated Europe would be a less democratic Europe, they surmise, using this constitution as viable evidence. Nonetheless, loosening the ties that bind Europe would only dissolve the capacity of individual citizens to make decisions on pan-continental issues, as such retains the sovereignty of the nation but not that of the European citizen. The lack of transparency is not a Continentalist plot related to integration but a direct consequence of the expansion of powers of the Council and its appointed ministers representing national governments.

Finally, the constitution in its current form renders Europe inept to posing a necessary challenge to the United States' global leadership on the world stage. Provided, few European states have awoken to the necessity of this counterpolar arrangement, or would charge that it embraces a confrontational Cold War mentality, but nonetheless can be achieved via a more equally balanced partnership with the US involving gentle balancing and finesse rather than military aggression as practised by its former foe, the Soviet Union. Insofar as Eurosceptics are always posing the question of Europe's values and existence, they are stated concisely in the constitution's preamble ("values underlying humanism: equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason...perception of the central role of the human person and his inviolable and inalienable rights, and of respect for law...progress and prosperity, culture, learning, and social progress...democratic nature of its public life...to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world"), and should provide a basis on which to assert Europe's own independence and viability as an alternative social model as well as a bulwark to Washington's imperial proclivities.

I. Britain: A Question of Belonging

"YOU will pay for Europe's pensions!" blared the headline of the UK's Sun, perhaps the most abrasive news tabloid in Britain. It was part of a barrage of Eurosceptic charges leveled at the release of a draft of the European Union constitution under debate at the Convention for the Future of Europe. These have been primarily delivered by the right-wing outlets of the British media, which have made nonsensical claims and speculations over the content of the draft. The Guardian's Timothy Garton Ash calls them the "armies of Euroscepticism," which are "equipped with highly advanced weapons of mass distortion," among them the "chemical (the Sun), biological (the Daily Mail) and nuclear (the Daily Telegraph and the Times)." Ash warns that the constitutional issue may be the "end of [Tony Blair's] premiership." Of course, Blair has weathered significant criticism over a whole host of issues, several controversial wars included. Ash's paper continues to speculate as to exactly when the demise of the Blair government will materialise (yesterday the paper's website was headed by rumours he may "face a rebellion" over the inability to specifically locate weaponry of mass destruction in Iraq). At the same time, support for Blair's positions on Europe is embraced by the paper's commentators. While the rightist papers mentioned have all called for referenda on the draft constitution to stave off perceived losses of liberties or erasure of Britain's "thousand-year history," as this would inevitably prove the "will of the people" to be firmly in the lap of "sovereignty," the Guardian's columnists, specifically Mr. Ash, are smug enough to make the same assertion, believing in the ultimate commitment of the British populace to the European project.

Mr. Ash's musings on the subject are less overt than others on the British left, who seem to be convinced of a "silent majority" of Britons ready to pledge loyalty to Brussels. Nevertheless, credit must be given to Mr. Ash's conviction that the media has been obfuscating this issue for far too long while the government seems to aspire to the kind of ohmacht-sehnsucht (desire for impotence) usually reserved for those frozen out of power. "The matter of Europe," Mr. Ash begins, "really does pose the question: 'Who governs Britain?' However, the choice we face is not: 'Brussels or Westminster?' The choice is: 'Our elected government or the Daily Mail?'" The observation of the command of the rightist "Murchdoch press" upon the British political consensus is more than adequately expressed in the following passage:

Yesterday, the leader of Her Majesty's opposition, Mr. Charles Moore (aka the editor of the Daily Telegraph, but in reality a more formidable leader of a more formidable opposition than [Conservative party leader] Iain Duncan Smith), was...in ebullient form - until John Humphrys asked him if a vote against the constitution would not be a rejection of Europe altogether. Then Charles Moore reined in and juddered, like a huntsman suddenly faced with a very large ditch. After a fumbling pause he said no, it would not be, but "it would be a rejection of Euromania". It would be the rejection of "top-down Europe" and perhaps the beginning of "bottom-up Europe".

Leaving Mr. Moore's rhetoric, more blind slogans detached from the moorings of realistic implementation, or, indeed, articulation than actual refutation of the cogent snare set by his interrogator, as this is meant to be more a critique of the position of the British left, this exposure of the inherent flaws within the Eurosceptical argument do not necessarily amount to the need for a referendum on Britain's place within the European Union. Indeed, while Mr. Ash and his fellow pro-referendum leftists argue that Britain should become more engaged in Europe in order to inject its own interests into the Continental debate, his position is sabotaged by his own savagery of the ineffectuality of both a referendum and the stances espoused within the rightist media:

Will the whole of the rest of the Europe, all 24 states and 400 million people, exclaim: "Oh gosh, the Daily Telegraph has shown us the error of our ways, so let us now go back to the drawing board, and build a good old British-style 'bottom-up' Europe, not a dreadful, French-style 'top-down' Europe?" If you believe that, you'll believe anything.

While the British government has justifiably lashed out against its Conservative opposition and its ridiculous calls-to-arms over the draft constitution's release, it will achieve little via the deliverance of a referendum to the British population, which Tony Blair believes frivolous considering its lack of major adjustments to the British national constitution. Indeed, the document is rather inertia-based and involves no such drastic manoeuvres to alter the status of British sovereignty as, say, the adoption of the euro as the UK's official currency. Nevertheless, the greatest danger is in the rightist press' accusations that Blair is compromising British democracy, especially over fears he may "lose" the referendum. Indeed, a loss is entirely conceivable, due to the media's influence over the issue and its conversion of some potential apathetic individuals to a virulent anti-constitutional stance.

Should the British people continue to insist upon a referendum, the government cannot rest on the laurels of its esoteric positions on the arcane, mysterious bureaucratic drama that occurrences in Brussels are for the everyday Briton. Indeed, it must deploy (along with serious invective) the standard-bearers of its logic as ambassadors to the public in order to subvert the demagoguery of Rupert Mudoch's media empire and its allies. The vast majority of the British people are either clueless as to the content of the draft constitution or the reasons for its existence. Those who are tend to be under the sway of the Sun et al, and spit out fabricated syllogisms concerning the subordination of parliament's authority to the European Commission president, the subsumption of the fundamental rights of the British people via a European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the horror at an attempt to formulate a common foreign policy, which might, indeed, involve an end to the prostitution of the British state to Washington policymakers.

Ergo, Blair's government should either articulate immediately that the draft constitution will undergo voluminous amendment changes during the next round of the Convention's debate, and therefore postpone any referendum until then, or embrace the idea of a referendum (as Denmark has), while more effectively attacking the positions of the Eurosceptics. As the credibility of the Blair government is set to erode tremendously, Blair should enlist the assistance of notable Labour and Liberal Democratic party leaders in a transpartisan effort to promote what is really little more than an attempt to anchor the government of Europe in a reality other than a treaty. Before any progress can be made in strengthening Europe via the document itself, such essential steps must be taken to quell the illogically visceral reaction in the United Kingdom against it.

II. The Continent: A Question of Equality

CENTRAL to the quandaries facing the Continent as a result of the draft constitution's publication should be the balance between small and large states as well as the degree of transparency afforded by the new document vis-a-vis the government of Europe. The two are, in fact, intricately linked, for marginalising the smaller states risks the finale to the European project. "Do we want a directorate in Europe where the big six states decide everything?" asked German Christian Democrat MEP and convention member Elmar Brok. "If so it will be the end of the European Union." Indeed, to invoke a peculiarly American reverance for "founding fathers," Jean Monnet, instrumental in the establishment of the Treaties of Rome, who was a rather ardent European federalist and devised the idea of a European "community" rather than a Metternichean concert of powerful states, would not have approved of the new draft constitution.

The greatest and most fundamental challenge within the EU has always been the balance of the interest of the states and of the central authority. The central authority, about to be represented within a constitutional construct, cannot, therefore, simply ignore the needs and desires of the smaller states of Europe, especially as their combined power rivals multiple larger states within the "big six" of Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Poland. The EU cannot risk the consensus of cultures which it has been built upon being broken as smaller states perceive their domination by more "imperial" powers. In this way, Jacques Chirac's condemnation of Eastern European states for their support of the US in the Iraq war, so blatantly and overtly phrased, was seen as a dangerous step for European integration.

The recognition has been, for the smaller states, that the increased power of a central authority granting them equal or near-equal status to the larger states, specifically the European Commission, would be to their benefit. They have therefore been alienated by the document in its current form, which surrenders overriding powers to the European Council. Furthermore, the smaller states believed the position of a powerful European executive would diminish their capacity for imput on the EU's governance, as the rotating presidency would therefore end. However, with the expansion of the Union to 25 members, the rotation would most likely render such states equally powerless for most of the time. If the position of a European executive were fused with the capacities of the European Commission, it could both cement the necessary establishment of a European presidency as well as appease the interests of the small states with an expansion of the Commission's influence. He or she might still be nominated from within the Council, as a concession to the "six" powers.

Of course, the concept of a European presidency, among other measures intended to either increase the power of or centralise the Union, are seen as moves made to contribute to the development of some draconian European "superstate" which would act to dominate the lives of its citizens. As mentioned above, those who would weaken the Union for the gain of nation-states would argue such centralisation is implicit in the seizure of rights granted to the people by the state. However, as the Union's strength is weakened by the insistence of nation-states that their control must be central (e.g., it is Tony Blair's policy to secure a "Europe of nations"), the people of Europe continue to be just as removed from the decisions made in Brussels as before. While statist governments seem to concur that it is an essential element of Europe's purpose that measures must be taken in the sphere of law on a continental scale in order to address naturally continental issues, their desire to maintain a state-centred Europe disallows the citizenry from taking effective direct part in the debate on such laws (or "directives," as EU law will continue to be referred to as, due to British posturing for compromises on various language aspects of the constitution). Ergo, it is exactly this nation-centred Europe which maintains the esoteric Brussels bureaucracy. Only a Europe which breaks down borders and national influence, and allows for far more participation of its people in Brussels lawmaking would be an effectually democratic Europe.

To illustrate, let one look at the example of the United Kingdom. The Labour government there has claimed considerable success in its policy of "devolution," in which significant powers have been granted to the regional governments of Scotland, Wales, and, to a far lesser extent, Northern Ireland. Such moves were made to appease centrifugal sentiment among the Scots, Welsh, and Irish Catholics. Nevertheless, the people of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are still afforded the opportunity to proportional representation granted to residents of the English counties. One would think it a ludicrous affront to democracy to merely include at Parliament in London a handful of representatives from each region, appointed by a Scottish or Welsh premier, as opposed to the current large contingent of MPs. Yet this is exactly what the antifederalist, or, more accurately, the nation-centred Europhobes propose for the European government. Control is maintained in the hands of a few elite ministerial appointees within the European Council while the European Parliament is essentially impotent and the intellectual technocrats of the Commission, whose ideas have shaped much of the Union's positive progress so far, are continually marginalised. Both Europe's brain trust and its people are relegated to symbolic positions while decisions are made by national ministers wrapping themselves in the cloak of patriotism, history, and sovereignty in order to deflect criticism. No one seems to have realised that in the history of Europe, patriotism and absolute sovereignty resulted in the catastrophic bloodbaths which led to the foundation of a unified Europe to begin with. The draft constitution is, indeed, "a step backwards," as Commission President Romano Prodi said in a characteristic eurofederalist criticism of the document.

Those British leftists who continue to insist the Prime Minister seek good relations with the Continent in order to introduce British values to Europe are submitting themselves to the same cocktail of nationalist sentiment which overrides the European debate. The Convention, and the constitution, are about the people of Europe, including Britons, being represented within the European government which already composes their laws. Europe does not need a rallying cry, it already has one: cementing the institution of democracy within the extant continental government. Should it not, the European people will ultimately become overly cynical about the purpose of their Union and its government, and increasingly will voice their distrust. The deception of the nation-centralists will have been complete, for the desire to leave at Europe's helm the elites of Europe's national cabinets was not one made in order to submit the continent to their despotic rule, but to destabilise the foundations in which the very ideas of European unity are cemented. The people of Europe must awaken from their apathetic nonchalance and delusions, discard for a few moments such pop cultural distractions as the Eurovision song contest, and vigourously involve themselves in the struggle for their future.

III. The EU on the World Stage

"Europa ist eine echte macht." -German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

THAT EUROPE should project its potential power for the mutual benefit of the planet is essential whether or not one subscribes to the aim of a European counterpole to American hegemony. In a world beset by innumerable severe humanitarian crises, an entity with the economic and military capacity of Europe has a responsibility to engage in producing the most effective solutions possible to global calamities. This includes such widely agreed-upon items as the deployment of a strong European Rapid Reaction Force and the promotion of worldwide sustainable economic development. United, Europe can achieve far more than it ever could as separate, individual nation-states. The reorganisation of the two million military personnel currently under the aspices of "the fifteen" current EU members into an effective peacekeeping force would both solidify the purpose of the EU in the world and serve as a necessary cost-trimming measure.

However, under the European government proposed by the current draft constitution, the European foreign policy coordinator (or "external representative" in Britannic parlance), who is to preside over the execution of common foreign and security policy decisions, is appointed and serves under the auspices of the European Council, this subjecting Europe's foreign policies to the same sclerotic divisionary schism experienced during the Iraq crisis, during which it almost seemed to be American policy to keep Europe divided and weak. One senior diplomat admitted of the draft that nothing within its contents would prevent such from happening again. Reality is even less encouraging- the EU failed to even stand by its declaration in Athens espousing the need for a "central UN role" in Iraq, its representatives on the Security Council co-opted into acceding to American demands.

On foreign policy, the constitution is explicitly vague. Europe is to "to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world," according to the preamble, it is to "due regard for the rights of each individual and for their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth," which is "the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope." It is more constructive on the specific provisions. On defence, it notes:

The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.

This, however, seems more of a guidepost than a piece of constitutional law. Unfortunately, many clauses of the draft have such a composition, which gives it all a very tentative feel. One would hope the issue of European defence to be decided by such a landmark summit on the nature of Europe, as the history of such law-framing indicates that fundamental questions left unanswered in the interests of expediency (such as slavery within the US) often explode in due time. A more promising measure is the clause relating to the absolution of the Union's common foreign and security policy:

Member states shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area.

They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.

Of course, one wonders if and how this shall be enforced. Indeed, the issue of whether there will be an essentially judiciary to review whether decisions made by the European or other governments are within the boundaries as set forth by the constitution. Nevertheless, that this has been written down as law for the first time indicates it may be respected by a quorum of European states if implemented (with the consistently likely exception of Britain, the perennial anomaly), to the same extent at which today's EU directives are. Unfortunately, qualified majority voting rights under the new constitution are not extended concerning foreign policy, and the veto is preserved, allowing one state alone to throw the wrench into the EU's CFSP operation. One would think such substantial lessons as the demise of the 17th century Polish empire due to the liberum veto of individual nobles or the much more recent examples of UN vetos being cited as reasons to ignore the institution would have indicated to European statesmen that such systems are intrinsically failures, but concerning those whose policy is to dismantle the European project as soon as possible, or merely render it inept, it is a tremendous success.

Unified foreign and security policy is one if not the most touchy issue clouding over the entire constitutional debate, primarily because the ability for a nation to decide its own foreign policy is probably one of the most fundamental tenets of "national sovereignty." Therefore, it is of utmost necessity to provide reasons for the expression of such a common foreign policy. In the order of greatest acceptability to the European population, they are, firstly, the need to ensure the effectiveness of promoting European values in the world as stipulated by the constitutional preamble (by fusing individual national resources), second, to embrace the spirit and nature of the European project by avoiding the dangers of a divided Europe as were devastating in the past, and, finally, to ensure that the axis between the United States and Europe is a true partnership and not merely a means to extract unconditional support for Washington's policies.

The connection between the European constitution's development and the increasingly hostile attitude in the United States toward the assertion of any development regarding the unity of Europe, especially when expressed in the form of opposition to American foreign policy, was recently made poignantly by Nick Clegg, MEP (Member of the European Parliament). "America has changed," he notes simply. Indeed, fundamentalist Atlanticists like to believe that Europe's opposition to the war on Iraq represented a radical departure in trans-Atlantic relations which required immediate correction, rather than observing initial or corresponding reactions on the other side of the pond. American policy has now taken on the tinge of dualist moralism. "Concerns about the intended and unintended consequences of military action," Clegg explains, "are swept aside. If it's right, it's right. Period." This, furthermore, contributes to the notion among Washington policymakers that Europeans are "wimps" for engaging in a more pressing analysis of international politics than one's own personal interpretation of the Bible. Mr. Clegg mocks the overweening simplicity of the Bush administration's attitudes thusly:

Far from being a complex world in which nations bump up against each other in unpredictable ways, Bush's universe is an enticingly simple one of good over evil. It must be a blessed relief to absolve oneself of all the worries about how the world hangs together and replace it with a great moral gunfight at the OK Corral. I almost envy the succinct, neat symmetry of it all.

Unfortunately for Europe, Mr. Clegg notes, the Bush administration viewed Europe as gaining some backbone, if "evil" for its disagreement with the American president's positions, during the diplomatic scuttle preceeding the inevitable invasion of Iraq. "Not only," he observes, "is Europe condemned as weak and ineffective, there is now an emerging view that it might be in America's interests to keep Europe weak and effective." In staunch juxtaposition to the sinister machinations which pro-war Americans seemed to believe were taking place at the Elysee Palace or the Bundeskanzleramt, "it is impossible to exaggerate the fawning adulation heaped on Blair. Tony walks on water in DC. He represents exactly the kind of Europe they want - on side, loyal, decisive, 'one of us.'"

The policy of banking on the "New Europe" of Tony Blair and his opportunistic cohorts in Poland and Spain in order to deliver back the Continent seems, in any case, to be a non-starter for Washington, so long as reactionaries in Britain continue to insist Britain stay adrift from the Continent. "There's little point in Tony walking on water in DC if he's drifting without a paddle in Paris and Berlin," as Mr. Clegg states. Meanwhile, the unrestrained scepticism toward Brussels seems to make manifest Charles de Gaulle's warnings that Britain represents a "Trojan Horse" of American policy attempting to enter Europe, and therefore hardens Europeans' attitudes toward closer British collaboration within the Union. Indeed, Tony Blair could learn a thing or two from Polish leaders, who have been far more effective at maintaining both intra-Continental and trans-Atlantic relations, if only for the Machiavellian posturing of increasing Polish influence on both sides of the ocean.

Polish machinations, especially its ludicrous gamble on playing a part in occupied Iraq, are bad for a unified European foreign policy, but not nearly as bad as much of what Britain has achieved recently. Poland, at least, makes one fundamental recognition; that with all the wrangling over national sovereignty as opposed to a more "federal" Europe, some states, like Britain, have let their independence be surrendered long ago to Washington. Despite outward appearances, Warsaw is more effectively asserting its time-cherished independence, playing both sides. Europe's lesson should be to assert its own sovereignty vis-a-vis Washington, and to exposure the flagrant foot-soldiery of some European capitals for the Pentagon's deleterious endeavours. Mr. Clegg comes up short in attempting to surmise who has gained from such unwavering pro-Washington policies:

And then back to Britain. Back to the Daily Mail, the Sun, the Tories and their hysterical reaction to a surprisingly unambitious "constitution" for Europe. They, of course, would agree with many in Washington DC. Europe, for them, should also stay ineffective and weak. But to the benefit of whom? The present lot in the White House and the Pentagon, for sure, and a handful of anti-European newspaper proprietors. But what about us, what about us Europeans? It's enough to make you agree with the French.

America has indeed changed, and its new policy of promising to hand out nonexistant treats to lapdogs who help it secure new lebensraum has led to the enforcement, via cordon sanitaire against a truly ambitious European constitution, of a continental apartheid meant to subsume the incipient progressive aspirations for Europe held by Franco-German leaders. While they direct their foreign policy by the consensus of their citizens, no amount of Pace banners could have stopped the likes of Silvio Berlusconi from clicking his neofascist jackboots in the direction of West Texas. No wonder the leaders of the "New Europe" have such contempt for the idea of a true European democracy.

2003-05-25T17:54:00.000-04:00

Reality Council
Behind Resolution 1483

TARIQ ALI is a supreme pessimist. In his recent Guardian piece, he explains that the purported divisions within the (relatively) wealthy and prosperous "global north" were merely temporary glitches. With the nearly unanimous (save for the absence of Syria's ambassador) passage of the UN resolution authorising the US and UK to jointly occupy Iraq with little oversight from the Security Council (resolution 1483), he believes, "the UN security council has capitulated completely" to the demands of the occupying powers. Other commentators concur, though with less "global justice" vitriol. Editorials in newspapers across the United States suggested the resolution marked the beginning of the UN's acquiescence to a new world structure of "benign US global hegemony." A BBC analysis concurred, noting that "This resolution gives official blessing to a new era, an era of what the American right like to believe is the 'benevolent hegemony' of the United States in Iraq, and maybe around the world."

More cautious commentators looked to the vote as the means by which the UN was to return to the central stage of global policy-making. That the United States needed to return to the Security Council in order to retract the sanctions on Iraqi exports and hence increase its petroleum output proved that it was once again "relevant," some believed. Nevertheless, some saw in this "relevance" hints of the "rubber stamp" fears which permeated the suggestion of a UN-approved attack on Iraq during the diplomatic furore of February. According to Barnaby Mason, the BBC's diplomatic correspondent, "critics of the Bush administration will say [American policy] treats the UN as a tool - to be picked up when it is useful and ignored when it is not." The most negative reactions, predictably, came from the Arab media. Al-Thawrah of Syria asks "Has the ordinary citizen in the world understood the aims of the USA, which goes on about freedom but is the first to ignore freedom and human rights?" Al-Watan of Qatar declares that the resolution "was really about handing over Iraq to the USA." And the United Arab Emirates' Akhbar al-Arab (roughly, "Arab Glory") proclaims ominously that "the Iraqis will not put up with those who raid their wealth, nor will the occupation of Iraq ever gain any legitimacy."

Nevertheless, there is little to look for beyond the fact that this resolution was a recognition of situational reality. The United States and United Kingdom already control Iraq, and the most potent leverage held by opponents of the war- the ability to lift UN sanctions against Iraq within the Security Council- was only effective up to a point. Though France's position on sanctions waffled, my original prospectus on its strategy was once again in evidence during the final deliberations prior to the passage of 1483. France could not afford to be painted as antihumanitarian for arguing vehemently against the end of sanctions. Whereas it could invoke moral conviction during the February debates over a use of force against Iraq, the sanctions issue failed to present an issue clear-cut enough for such grandstanding. What would have been arcane diplomatic posturing for what in the long term may have been a greater good would be perceived by many (and, indeed, spun by the Murdoch and other radically pro-Bush press within anglophone countries) as a shrewd gesture, trading the welfare of the Iraqi people for an ideological stance or, worse, a mercantilist power-grab (as all French foreign policy decisions seem to be painted recently. A proposed French interdiction force in the Congo has been labeled by suspicious conspiracy theorists as an attempt to influence or gain control of the gold or diamond trade.) France seemed to have appealed to its declaration of "pragmatism" over Iraq, recognising that "the conquest of Iraq is a fait accompli and desir[ing] not to aggravate relations any further with Washington," according to a BBC analysis. Critics of the French position believe it hasn't the will to resist American economic pressure or the desire to weather a showdown with US representatives at the G8 Summit in Evian. Nevertheless, France, and, indeed, other European powers may be calculating that the US Iraq venture is inherently self-destructive, and that the less the UN (and Europe) is involved in such a disastrous policy, the better. This "to the victor go the spoils" (and, ergo, the disasters) philosophy was first expressed by officials within the Pentagon itself and has seemingly been turned on its feet in European capitals. The BBC notes, more moderately, that:

France has another calculation which may or may not be optimistic - it still believes it will not be long before America runs into real difficulties in Iraq and the wider Middle East, at which point allies like France will be needed once again. That consideration makes it easier to swallow the bitter pill of America's UN victory.

The tenuous balance Germany walked on the sanctions issue was ultimately untenable. Originally arguing for a lift in the economic restrictions placed upon Iraq, in order to inculcate once again close German-American relations, the Schroeder government ultimately found such unpalatable to its large-scale ambitions for its large-scale ambitions for greater independence within NATO and for a united European foreign policy. Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister, later argued that the German position had always been for a "suspension," rather than a cancellation, of sanctions, and a meeting in Berlin with Colin Powell was disastrous not only due to the lack of fundamental agreement with members of the Schroeder government but also due to the Bush administration's simultaneous interference with the German political system via its open courting of the opposition conservative Christian Democratic Union party. In the end, the tightrope of the German position was too thin to walk on, and the Schroeder government was facing entirely too much criticism over humanitarian concerns. The commentary on the resolution by the German ambassador to the United Nations, Gunter Pleuger, however, was gruff. "This resolution is a compromise," he said. "It does not fulfil every wish of all parties, but as compared to the initial draft of the co-sponsors, we have achieved substantial improvements."

The Russian response was similar. Seregi Lavrov, ambassador to the United Nations from Moscow, stated simply that the resolution "was a compromise." However, Russia had been its most vehement opponent from the start, primarily for realpolitik reasons. Moscow required collateral to ensure the preservation of its contracts with the Iraqi government, as well as guarantees of its unpaid loans. It immediately wielded its position on sanctions immediately, that they would not be lifted without significant concessions on these issues to the Kremlin. Washington, of course, has a history (since the fall of the Soviet Union) of continuing to accomodate Russia, which it sees as a legitimate power (due to its military strength, which is why some advocate a militarily powerful European Union.) Concerns about the humanitarian validity of withholding sanctions removal was not a concern, of course, in the capital which has executed for nearly a decade the violent war in Chechnya.

Russia having achieved its modest goals, and France and Germany's leverage squandered by domestic and international criticism, it made little sense for the remaining war opponent with a permanent seat on the Council, China, to continue to resist. The antiwar states were justifiably enthused to have achieved any changes to the resolution in their favour. To have achieved the UN role envisaged by the document in Iraq's future governance, as opposed to relegating the organisation to mere humanitarian purposes, was an achievement over absolutist imperialism. The recognition must be made, however, that it was none of the original antiwar states which forged such a role, but an allowance by the de facto occupation forces in order to give the appearance of allayed discord within the West. The UN role granted is almost purely symbolic, and the "compromise" is more of a sham legitimisation. The wording of the document appears to grant a major role to the UN's representative, but a holistic analysis brings one to the conclusion that the sole power to decide the fate of Iraq lies not in both but merely in one of the occupation powers- the United States.

Indeed, this was no capitualation of the Security Council. It was an achievement of all it could accomplish in the face of overwhelming American full spectrum dominance, in its manipulation of its allies' political systems, the exploitation of its opponents' moral consciences, the obfuscation of international law to provide "legitimacy" for plunder. The Security Council recognised the reality not only of the situation of Iraq, but of a unipolar world, and it was depressing. The vote was not so much marionetted by the puppeteers of the US State Department or motivated by transatlantic reconciliatory rhetoric, but almost preordained by the failure of a world which has not yet fused its advantageous resources to overthrow the global preeminence of the Washington neoconservatives, the Earth's new Marie Antoinettes, who proclaim of their critics on a ritual basis "let them eat depleted uranium shells."

Carte Blanche

The specifics (see full text) of the resolution are infinitely clever, designed to give the look and feel of international control while providing little structure for any international oversight, and essentially none for international enforcement vis-a-vis American decisions on Iraq's future. The structure of a UN resolution is divided, simply, into two primary parts, the precepts, which begin in perfect active participles, and the decisions, which are defined by present tense action verbs. Resolution 1483's precepts provide the initial illusion of a direction for Iraq's future. Nevertheless, one recognises, if the US decides to depart from such directives, there are no options for the Security Council to take action. Furthermore, with no mechanism for legal interpretation (such as a constitutional court) the resolution can be invoked for a plethora of scenarios. For instance, the second precept, in which the Security Council is "reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq," might be invoked to allow the United States to crush any factionary rebellion, a clear infringement upon sovereignity, though Washington could claim its actions are all in the long-term interest of Iraq's stability and integrity as a unified state.

The next precept involves Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction. Due to its inclusion in a UN document, one may be led to believe that any mention of such weapons would involve the work of UN weapons inspectors. Nevertheless, the Council is "reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq" without specifically delineating the task for its own inspections regime. The US has hinted at allowing UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq, for limited activity at certain unrestricted sites, but only, analysts say, after the retirement of Hans Blix, which Washington perceives as an adversary. Nevertheless, no guarantee of UN inspectors inclusion in any of the Iraq reconstruction process is made in the resolution document. Hints made to allay fears hold little credence when not included in a document which itself contains multifarious half-truths designed to confuse the international community as to its intents.

This statement is followed by the Council's "stressing":

the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly

This statement is one in which a hopeful Security Council can be most outmaneouvred by a fiercely independent US, however. There are no guarantees within the document of an end to American rule in Baghdad, or any specific dates by which to vacate the country. Indeed, such statements mimic that of the US administration, which has paraded such rhetoric as propaganda in the effort to convince many of its "benign" intentions within Iraq. Ergo it is relatively insignificant. More troubling is the exhortation that the UN encourages:

efforts by the people of Iraq to form a representative government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender, and, in this connection, recalls resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000

Such endorses the general convictions of the United States that the Mideast much be "modernised" and "democratised" along the basis of Western states, rather than finding its own, popularly-endorsed path to such, as in Iran. It disregards the notion that progress may indeed be made via the apparatus of an Islamic state or other form of government, or via a long and arduous process of unimposed social reform. The UN, American conservatives have long argued, is too inclusive of undemocratic regimes, and they have always wished to see it either become an instrument of the imposition of an absolutist policy embracing both neoconservative-style "regime change" and the economics of the neoliberal "Washington Consensus." This may be a dangerous step of the UN in this direction, although it has always embraced open dialogue with governments in violation of its human rights charter. Nevertheless, with even Britain and Australia, active participants in the war, affirming support for an Islamic state if such comes about due to the desires of the people of Iraq, this seems to be a blatant item of support for the American absolutist doctrine. That the resolution acknowledges the "need for assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank" is troubling in this regard, given the uncompromising support for the enforcement of the Washington Consensus, especially upon such states as Argentina (during the 1990s) by these organisations.

The resolution further resolves "that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance" though the actuality of its directives gives little hope that the symbolic offices allotted for said purposes will amount to any impact on American policy if in any opposition to Washington's positions. Such may include whatever follows from the Council's affirmation of "the need for accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime," which not only endorses the American term for Iraq's previous government ("regime"), but seems to grant the impetus for a victor's kangaroo court to try ex-officials of the former Iraqi government for human rights violations while American crimes go entirely unpunished. This is further buttressed by provision three of the resolution, in which the Security Council "appeals to member states to deny safe haven to those members of the previous Iraqi regime who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to bring them to justice."

The precepts also manage to include some humourous bits, including the Security Council's advocation of "the need for respect for the archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious heritage of Iraq, and for the continued protection of archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious sites, museums, libraries, and monuments," indeed, too late after the savage looting of the Iraqi National Museum, the burning of irreplaceable scrolls in its libraries, the irrevocable damage to its archaeological sites and other sickening occurrences resulting from the anarchy that came with the downfall of the Hussein government. Provision seven of the resolution enlists Interpol and UNESCO in cleaning up the US' atrocious "mistake" in this regard. That the Council also determines "that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security" while simultaneously lifting the sanctions specifically designed to remain in place so long as such a threat continues to exists is quite amusing as well- even before recalling the lack of assurance such a threat can be minimised via the reintroduction of UN weapons inspectors.

The US and UK, "welcomed" as occupying forces in Iraq, are hence labelled (disturbingly) "the Authority," and are "called upon" (in provision four of the resolution) to:

promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future

However, as with previous such actions, there is nothing the Council can truly do to ensure such ends (the same applying to provision five, hoping for American adherence to Geneva and Hauge Conventions guidelines for occupation forces, as if the US has paid any heed to such documents in the recent past.) Indeed, while US officials brag about how quickly the output of oil can be increased, vast swathes of Iraq continue to go without electricity, and to breed agitators openly advocating the immediate overthrow of America's colonialist regime.

Among the most important provisions of the resolution is number eight, the appointment of a UN "special representative" to assist in reconstruction tasks. Secretary General Kofi Annan has already acceded to US demands that he appoint UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The responsibilities of this much-touted "Special Representative" are to be limited, and his powers extremely so. He is to coordinate refugee return, humanitarian operations, infrastructure renewal, and other activities relatively detached from the formulation of the new Iraqi government, in which his sole role will be to "advance" efforts to construct one of "international legitimacy." He is given no real power to overrule US decisions in this regard, and is seemingly bound by a point placing him in charge of "encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform," a line echoing President Bush's sentiments that "reform" needed to be imposed upon the Mideast. The language of the resolution makes Mr. de Mello's position seem significant, however, he is given little specific inclusion or power within circles with true position to determine the Iraqi government. Provision nine, stipulating the need for a provisional interim administration, seems to fall in line with original Pentagon plans for a puppet government headed by Ahmed Chalabi. No time limit is set for its implementation or expiration- ergo, Mr. de Mello merely has the responsibility for its creation, at some point, in the future, rather than a detailed mandate to any end.

Provision ten formally lifts the sanctions, save those on arms, as the "Authority" probably surmises that Iraq will not be in need of a military during the creation of its so-called "independent" state, which, even should it come into existence, will surely be dotted with American military installations to a greater extent than postwar Germany or Japan. As per disarmament, provision eleven encourages the US and UK to report to the council on its progress, merely alluding to the previous inspections regime by promising to "revisit" their mandates, at an undefined point in the future.

Points 12, 13, and 14 call for the establishment of an Iraq Development Fund, to be granted $1 billion from seized Iraqi assets, among other sources (provision 17), which some have seen as one of the concessions made to the antiwar parties. The fund, nonetheless, will be overseen by the World Bank and IMF, aforementioned intruments of American neoliberalism, which will probably assure that it is not used to set up any protectionist regime but rather to allow for the invitation of American capital to Iraq's oil-rich sands. Bechtel and Haliburton, of course, have already been awarded favourable contracts. The fund, of course, "shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the [puppet] Iraqi interim administration," for what were probably meant to be specifically delineated purposes but are left to the entirely open-ended clause of "other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq," which could potentially be used to justify anything.

A primary concession to Russia and other creditor states is evident in provision 16, which channels the payment of Iraq's debts through the multilateral system of the Paris Club. Russia, Germany, and France had feared the US would simply cancel the debts, although some speculated that might have had too many reverberations throughout the developing world, especially in African states with tremendous debt problems which would inevitably agitate for equal treatment. Indeed, such a move may have violated the methods of the financial institutions enforcing neoliberal globalisation and hence led to the collapse of the American economic model in the developing world. One may have expected the troika of states to have agitated for a greater UN role by offering to waive the debt, but Moscow and Berlin were always more interested than anything in retaining their funds (not to mention that the EU also has a vested interest in the debt-repayment model of globalisation.)

Among the most controversial issues involving the UN in the reconstruction of Iraq was the oil-for-food programme operated under the auspices of the Secretary General. American conservatives had long argued it should be abandoned completely, as some investigations point to bizarre contracts granted through it which seem to favour certain states (notably, and predictably for those making such allegations, Russia and France.) Nevertheless, the bulk of these contracts seem to have been negotiated by the previous Iraqi government anyway. Furthermore, the programme has been instrumental in providing humanitarian aid to Iraqis. How the food distribution network would operate without it was under question. Russia, of course, would not support the resolution until it knew that contracts granted under the programme would be retained. Among the concessions granted to those states supporting the interim continuation of the programme were its six-month continuation until being phased out and the retention of (some) lucrative contracts. Provision 16 stipulates these as well as the transfer of control of the programme's operations to the occupation "Authority" following its six-month denouement under the Secretary General. This would, theoretically, allow for complete control by the US and UK of Iraq's oil supplies and the direction in which the funds gained from oil exports are allocated. With the necessity of providing large reparations to the Paris Club creditors, the retention of Russian and other contracts and (especially) the invitation of certain American energy firms coupled with the implementation of a neoliberal economy by the IMF and World Bank, one wonders how sufficient funds for food supplies will ever be achieved. Though the "Authority" and its (potential) puppet government are granted the ability, pursuant to provision 16b,

to review, in light of changed circumstances, the relative utility of each approved and funded contract with a view to determining whether such contracts contain items required to meet the needs of the people of Iraq both now and during reconstruction, and to postpone action on those contracts determined to be of questionable utility

the burden to the budget emerges with the need (16e),

to fulfil all remaining obligations related to the termination of the programme, including negotiating in the most cost-effective manner, any necessary settlement payments, which shall be made from the escrow accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8(a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), with those parties that previously have entered into contractual obligations with the secretary general under the programme.

Ergo, the concession to the contractual parties is a significant burden upon the provision of humanitarian relief, but is only so much so due to the unlikeliness of the "Authority" allowing for an Iraqi state oil agency (some in Washington even consider such socialist policies "Saddamite," as if on par with quasi-genocidal activity.) The initial Iraq Development Fund, as aforementioned, is ill-prepared to fill the gap, due both to the composition of its oversight agencies and the paucity of its funding. Even as provision 20 stipulates transparency measures for petroleum exports and specifically denotes that proceeds will be contributed to the fund, the fund's allocation is so vaguely defined as to make this irrelevant as to whether petroleum export funds are directly transferrable to humanitarian concerns. Provision 22 further places a restriction upon member states as to the interference with the unrestricted shipment of oil supplies, rendering future sanctions against any undesirable Iraqi administration, US-headed or otherwise, infeasible until 2008.

Fallout

Provision 25 of the resolution allows for the Council to review the status of the occupation within a year, perhaps allowing for the original opponents of the war to take concerted action to intensely monitor whatever activities the US will have engaged in and hence prepare to, perhaps, take action against it, with damning evidence. If the role of the UN Special Representative is obstructed, for instance, it will be reported, as stipulated, at "regular intervals" to the Council, which should take note for the period at which the resolution is revisited in 2004.

Observing the UK's status as officially-recognised occupation force as well, one might speculate as to the potential implications. The UK has said previously that it hopes to achieve a central role for the UN on Iraq, but it has also been frozen out of important positions of power concerning the country's redevelopment. Decisions affecting the true administration of the country seem to be issued directly from Washington and from its resident proconsul, Paul Bremer. That the UK has lost significant trust in its commitment to the European Union, has a plethora of opponents to Blairite policy within its government and population, and that it has seemingly gained nothing but enmity from the Arab world unseen since its previous colonial ventures there following the First World War seem to indicate that it will not continue the illogical policy of abiding by every whim of the White House indefinitely. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that it would ever lead a charge within the UN against US Iraq policy, or that any yelps from Downing Street would make an impact on Pentagon strategy.

I suggested previously that the EU could reshape its elusive Common Foreign and Security Policy around achieving a central role for the United Nations in Iraq. It seemed to be a goal which every EU state- current and future- could agree, and was enshrined in a joint declaration at Athens which seems to be little-mentioned as of late. Nevertheless, there is still a chance for the EU to rally around this goal and put concerted pressure on the United States for more UN participation in Iraq's reconstruction. Of course, as some predict, Iraq's worsening status may force the US to request this in any case (as the UN role in Afghanistan has increased gradually with both the declining security and humanitarian situation as well as American disinterest in a region no longer at the centre of its attention.) Perhaps, by the time at which the UN is set to review 1483, EU CFSP will have been solidified by both increasing consternation and frustration with the US on the Continent and the ratification of the new European Constitution, which Convention officials hope to achieve by the expansion of the Union around the time of the resolution's revisitation in June of next year. Tariq Ali would have one believe the only significant resistance to US policy can only come from the "masses" of the "global south." Yet one would hope for the triumph of soft balance and enlightened reason over the violence of worldwide class warfare Mr. Ali seems to fantasize about. Ali's absolutism is as dangerous as Bush's, believing the West should be reformed by humbling uphevals in the "south" as opposed to a realignment within the NATO-Russia sphere.

Should the European states have truly adopted the mantra of allowing the US to live with the burdens of imperialism (and the implicit demise it invites) it is an unfortunate and dangerous option, but one which may, in the end, be the most effective in dissuading the United States from further "regime change" operations. Indeed, Iraq appears to be a time bomb waiting to explode in the face of those who championed its conquest. Nevertheless, past failures in imperial domination on the part of the United States, in the Philippines and elsewhere, are forgotten quite rapidly, and, indeed, it seems to have taken under 30 years to have recovered from the malaise that was the defence of informal empire in Vietnam. Failure does not deter a nation whose collective memory does not extend far, and whose respect for history was evident in the nonchalance at the incineration of precious Iraqi historical relics- the only consistent forces able to resist American "manifest destiny" have been counterweights to its voluminous power.

Without a balance of power within the UN to enforce its will upon the United States, the world will continue to see insignificant verbal opposition or unavoidable appeasement of its intentions emerging from the Security Council. In any case, for now, the only weapon seemingly remaining in the arsenal of those who would oppose Washington's current policies is time- bringing the destructive residue of its insalubrious and still illegal war on Iraq to haunt the United States for a generation, and gradually uniting the world against further imperialist activities. Until Europe (and hopefully a larger chunk of it) decides its ability to block American activity worthy of wielding again, a bloody quagmire in Iraq may be all that stands between the United States and its next target.

2003-05-20T23:48:00.000-04:00

Horror in the Heart of Darkness
Congo: The Situation and the Options

WHILE diplomats at the United Nations engage in final discussions on the proposed Anglo-American resolution legitimating the occupation of Iraq by forces which launched an unsanctioned, illegal blitzkrieg upon it in March, two serious humanitarian issues have flared; one in Congo, and the other in Aceh. Both situations are set to be fatally ignored, as the United States continues to distract the world with its useless aggressive invasions of Middle Eastern holdouts. The Achesonian doctrine of "flexible response," therefore, has succombed to a "cried wolf" effect, in which its ludicrous invocation toward the ends of American imperialist adventures has stiffened international opposition to the projection of any sort of armed force. Furthermore, while American troops are tied up in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Russian troops are engaged heavily in Chechnya, and, in the wake of Europe's Iraq war schisms, a European Rapid Reaction Force or even widespread support for a European Security and Defence Union nowhere to be found outside France, Germany, and Belgium, peacekeeping forces are unavailable whether or not the Security Council can agree on their deployment.

I wrote previously that the projection of peacekeeping or intervention forces cannot be achieved unilaterally, even if approved by multilateral means (i.e., a Security Council vote). France's interlocution in the Ivory Coast's civil conflict has provoked anger that it is merely acting in its own interests, promoting the current president and his government in Abidjan in order to preserve stability conducive to the success of French businesses there. Similarly, France has been prevented from deploying numerous troops to the eastern Congo regions due to its implicit support for the presidency of Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa, who is now joining regional rivals Uganda and Rwanda in playing rival ethnic factions against each other in an attempt to gain local sway. While seemingly justified, considering the area in question is Congolese territory, the means by which he has sought to achieve reconquest (active participation in enflaming quasi-genocidal rivalries) is troubling. France's past colonial history in West Africa and its power plays within it during the late 20th century have made it potentially as troublesome a lone force to inject into the continent as American troops in the Mideast.

There is every indication the Congo melée requires some form of rapid engagement. Reports of cannibalism erupting in the jungles have earned a pledged UN investigation, though Amos Namanga Ngongi, head of the Un mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, stated that there is no way the reports of cannibalism "cannot be so persistent and false" simultaneously. "There cannot be so much talk of such things if it is false." The cannibalistic impulse has a tendency to rear its head in the Congo, with reports of the incident having occurred in 1968 and intermittantly since 1998. An Associated Press report cites a 15 January UN investigation uncovering that "rebels of the Congolese Liberation Movement and the allied Congolese Rally for National Democracy committed cannibalism, rape, torture, and killing in the [Ituri] province late last year," and a subsequent 3 April massacre in which reports of cannibal activity were rampant. Reports of potential ethnic cleansing, however, do seem more verifiable. One businessman in the provincial capital of Bunia told the BBC that he would advise Kofi Annan to despatch "at least 15,000 troops immediately to prevent the Hema being eliminated from the map of Congo. If he doesn't act quickly he will count the dead bodies like they were counted in Rwanda in 1994."

The situation in the eastern Congo has always been complex, at least as much as the "cocktail of violence" that was the Balkans during the 1990s. In 1998, Uganda and Rwanda formed an entente intent upon the overthrow of the Congolese government in Kinshasa. This was precipitated by the attempted expulsion from the Congo of Rwandan forces which assisted the president at the time, Laurent Kabila, in his successful rebellion against former Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Nevertheless, Uganada, Rwanda, and Burundi all relied on the buffer of Rwandan forces in the eastern Congo for protection from various armed groups in the region operating outside the control of the central Congolese government. These included the Hutu Interahamwe militia, which fomented ethnic rivalries with Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government, splinter factions of the Rwandan armed forces, primarily Hutu, which had participated in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, Mai Mai local defence groups resisting the migration of Rwandans into the Congo, the Sudanese-sponsored Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), employed to fight the Ugandan government, and several Burundian Hutu groups which, much like the Rwandan Hutus, sought to engage the Tutsi-dominated government of their country. The inability of the Kinshasa government to impose order in its eastern regions had created a power vacuum from which such groups could operate against the territory of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, had Rwandan forces actually disengaged. Instead, the joint Rwanda-Uganda invasion, initially via the proxy of the Tutsi-dominated Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), followed by direct involvement of Ugandan and Rwandan troops, ensued, in order to secure a Congolese government more amenable to the security concerns of the African "Great Lakes" countries. Nevertheless, the conflict eventually embraced much of the continent, with Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe participating on the side of the Congolese government, the aforementioned primarily Hutu groups operating essentially synchronised with Kinshasa, and Rwanda and Uganda pursuing individual border security concerns- Sudan-sponsored rebels and Hutu groups, respectively. The fallout between the two regional power rivals, Uganda and Rwanda, led the two to sponsor rival factions in the DRC, notably the Hemas and Lendu groups. A superficial agreement signed in 1999 at Lusaka would supposedly guarantee regional peace, but little movement has been made toward compliance with the Lusaka accords, and the multifarious factions each accuse others of violations. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the withdrawl of Ugandan and Rwandan troops has caused the region's recent destabilisation- even without overt or direct military support, the rival factions in the eastern Congo have lanced for each other, seemingly on the same trajectory as during the wars. Kampala and Kigali, of course, continue to provide both tacit and covert military aid to Hema and Lendu groups, which have now begun to identify with ethnic rivalries within Rwanda; the Lendu feeling themselves to be as the Hutu, while the Hema seem to be compelled toward the Tutsi. Nevertheless, shifting alliances have been the rule in the region, and while the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) was previously backed by Uganda, it is now seemingly within Rwanda's sphere of influence. Similarly, both Hema and Lendu have alternately sponsored Hutu or Tutsi groups within Rwanda and Burundi. The entire situation is further complicated by the presence in the vicinity of large quantities of gold, diamond, and other precious natural resources. Canadian and British oil companies have recently launched major exploration initiatives into the area, for example. All this augments the desire for the various factions to gain the greatest control in the region and to do so by any of the most brutal means necessary.

Unlike the Balkans, however, the Security Council is unlikely to present any opposition to intervention, opening the path for a large, UN sanctioned force. The complication, as considered earlier, is both the willingness of member states to contribute and the assembly of an adequately professional as well as multinational force. Though local forces would normally be most appropriate, here they are most likely to fan the flames of old hatred, not to mention be as ineffective at pacification as any one armed faction is in itself. Imperial overreach has corralled both the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention that much United States military capacity in the future will inevitably be used in "protection" against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The Guardian's Patrick Smith suggests an acceptance of the French offer, coupled with British, Canadian, and South African forces. South Africa may be in a position to play a larger continental role, but one has concerns about the implications of Pretoria engaging in what may be seen as empire-building in the fallout of the Namibia and Angola situations. British forces are overtaxed in the new American colonies plus other UN peacekeeping ventures, and Canadian forces are dismally weak and primarily deployed to hard-pressed Afghanistan.

The irony, of course, is that those who have so long argued for humanitarian intervention, and "flexible response" are now pinioned by military reality into hopelessness over the Congo crisis. The United States, the world's most powerful military, is impotent to halt the violence, not the least because of fears over a guerilla war in densely-forested regions, which has precluded heavy involvement in both the Philippines and Colombia. The conservatives within the American government, moreover, only see use of force as legitimate when involved in protecting (or, ahem, expanding) vital American interests, which was why they vehemently opposed the actions in the Balkans, seen as an over-altruistic gesture, and promote global response to both fabricated "rogue states" (in order to demolish regimes inimical to expanding American influence) and any trace element of "fanatic terrorism." That nearly half of American land forces are currently still deployed in or near Iraq makes it further difficult for a troop contribution to the Congo. US action has also tied up traditional peacekeeping forces in cleaning up its Iraq and Afghanistan messes. The best bet may be reliance, in the end, on France, despite its purported insidious designs on Africa, coupled with a force from Germany (which is essentially free to act, given its noncompliance with the Iraq war and sponsorship of a rapid response unit for Europe), Italy, Spain (both of which are under intense domestic pressure to not actively participate in Iraq's occupation) and perhaps minor contingents from India and Pakistan (which deployed to Somalia in 1992) and even China. A role should be found for the UK, which has some forces available and experience with African guerilla wars, South American forces, which operate in similar terrain, and perhaps a tiny American unit or American logistical support (in the form of aircraft carriers and resupply vessels.) The conditions are perfect for the deployment of a European Rapid Reaction Force, as has been recently mused in Brussels, but its nonexistence due to European foreign policy disagreements and therefore reluctance over fusion of militaries precludes such an alluring option.

Nevertheless, when considering intervention, one must always bear in mind the potential consequences, without painting too rosy a picture of what the future entails. The problems which emerged from the Balkan Wars were not all the result of unilateral American (though masked by the auspices of NATO) action, but many of which would have emerged from any injection of outside force into a volatile region. The UN must have a strategy for the region's future beyond the stabilisation of borders or the obtainment of a cease-fire between rival factions. The creation of infrastructure allowing the central Congolese government to exert more control may be one option, though this may be questionable given the propensity of pro-Congolese groups within the fragile region to seize power violently. Another is the creation of an internationally-policed buffer state, the natural resources of which can be used as tools for the alleviation of underlying socioeconomic tensions. An economically prosperous eastern Congo would probably lead to a less likely propensity for ethnic clashes and greater government control overall. More secure borders for the "Great Lakes" states is a direct consequence. This effort, however, would require a massive effort by a broad spectrum of global military forces, fundamentally impossible due to the American engagement in self-destructive pursuits in the Islamic world. In any scenario, the utilisation of diplomatic means to defuse the Uganda-Rwanda rivalry is essential for regional security. Granting both states rights to mineral deposits in the eastern Congo, probably a necessary concession for Kinshasa to make, would go a long way toward preserving stability in the area, though monitors may have to remain for years in order to ensure battles do not erupt over the exact amount of resource control apportioned to each state.

American global leadership should be infinitely questioned over such a situation. Given its continual proclamations on the UN's ineffectiveness, it itself is militarily incapable of engaging in the Congo currently. Absent available or feasible local interlocutors, the problem inevitably falls upon the global community, in which the only remaining reserves of military capability lies. Inasmuch as the US has the ability to declare where and when it can intervene, outside the authority of the UN, with disastrous consequences, it can choose where and when not to, with potentially even worse results. Ergo, the global forum must be established as the primary world order so that the true crises of the time may be addressed in both a prompt and considered fashion. No doubt, given previous American intervention escapades, its capacity for forward-planning is severely diminished in the hoopla of war-time. American movies focus on the struggle, not the long and laborious aftermath. Aside from a few Nuremburg trials films, there is no feature production set during Marshall Plan Germany. This symbolises an aspect of the American mentality infinitely dangerous when its ability to engage a "Hobbesian world," to use Robert Kagan terminology, is the arbiter of the Earth's future.

Everyone agrees that some action must be taken, and taken soon. The death toll from the current conflict has been placed at somewhere near 3 million, and some suggest 120 are dying a day. MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force there, consists of about 700 embattled Uruguyans holding the airport at Bunia, helpless to even count the dead, much less intervene. Does the world have the ability to address an actual humanitarian calamity, or will it continue to seek faux military glory via the orchestration of set-piece tank battles against traditional foes?

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Notes on the Global Condition-

-CLAIMS OF ATROCITIES have already been made in the rapidly escalating Achenese rebellion. Reports indicate schools are burning across the province, as the rebels pin the blame on the ruthless Indonesian military and the army claims the fires were set by rebels seeking to damage the image and reputation of the Indonesian armed forces. Human rights groups warn of a "bloodbath" in the province, while Acehnese independence movements, spearheaded by the organisation GAM, have no international support or legal legitimacy guiding their cause, despite the widespread separatist sentiment among the local population.

-FIGHTING RETURNED to Macedonia, where armed Albanian groups are again clashing with the Macedonian army in the country's north. The feuds coincided with a visit by US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a leading, if not the leading, member of Washington's neoconservative ideological cabal. Christopher Deliso of antiwar.com has some interesting opinions on Wolfowitz's visit, including claims Wolfowitz made continued US military aid to Macedonia contingent upon becoming a signatory of a document absolving US troops from any responsibility under the International Criminal Court, a manipulative tactic used on other obedient slave-states of the "New Europe." Deliso also asserts that the US has manipulated the sporadic war between Albanian expansionists and Macedonia for years in order to shatter its ties with an increasingly independent and powerful European Union. Waning US interest due to the "war on terrorism," however, has allowed Macedonia to recover, at least until the (uncoincidental?) resumption of violence coinciding with Wolfowitz's trip to Skopje.

-TOMORROW: Analysing the final draft of the Anglo-American occupation resolution.

2003-05-19T23:45:00.000-04:00

Iraqi Reconstruction and International Politics, Act II

INDICATIONS that Germany's so-called "reconciliation" with the United States would occur over the pending UN resolution on the lifting of sanctions on Iraq and the recognition of the US and UK as "occupying powers" may have been overoptimistic (for the US) have mounted recently. I recalled earlier signs that such a so-called reassessment of German foreign policy skirted around the deeper commitment of the Schroeder government to playing a more independent role within the Atlantic alliance. Remarks on the personal philosophy of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Schroeder's frustration with backdoor Anglo-American diplomatic deceptions during the 1999 Kosovo War, Germany's pledge to seek the entirety of its debts owed by the Iraqi state, and its participation in the European Security and Defence Union contributed to that outlook. Now it seems divisions over Iraq between Washington and Berlin are once again contributing in a breakdown in relations. On a visit to Berlin Saturday, US Secretary of State Colin Powell spent more time courting CDU opposition leader Angela Merkel than with Chancellor Schroeder, while President Bush openly courted the CDU at the White House, having invited Hesse governor Roland Koch (seen as a potential Chancellor) to Washington. Frankfurter Rundschau speculates that "In the medium term, the Bush administration is clearly putting its money on the Christian Democrats," a disturbing prospect. This represents open interference by the Bush administration in internal German politics, at least symbolically, and has disturbing implications for Europe's future if no effective opposition is mounted to the schismatic strategy of American diplomats. That, in what was meant to be a "frenzy of reconciliation" over the new Iraq resolution, Powell and Bush have decided instead to push for a German "regime change" should both demonstrate to the Schroeder government that its tangent of Franco-German obstinacy over Iraq and future issues should continue, as well as exposes the general contemptuous attitude of the current US presidential administration toward any degree of European sovereignty.

London's Times felt that Colin Powell had "failed to win the outright support of Berlin," on the occupation resolution. Powell noted his talks with Schroeder and Fischer were "candid" (i.e. rough) and that he welcomed the German position on sanctions, though Fischer later made that eminently obvious such was still uncertain, and that Germany was still functionally arguing for suspension, rather than cancellation, of the UN embargo. More importantly, perhaps, veto-wielding Russia and China announced that they had "serious questions" about the US' draft resolution and that "major changes" were necessary to secure their support within the Security Council. All powers signified a willingness to compromise, but Russia and China are unlikely to legitimise any occupation after what they regarded as an illegal war, and Germany's position is unlikely to move closer to that of the US after its behaviour over the past week. Russia, for one, has returned to its prewar ambiguity vis-a-vis relations with the United States, swearing cooperation over the issue of global terrorism (and using this declaration to launch new initiatives against Chechen independence agitators) but also holding joint naval exercises with India, in which its long-range bomber aircraft were flown for the irst time since 1992, a clear demonstration (and intimation to the Pentagon) of Russian military deployment capability. President Putin also promulgated his intentions to, in the wake of the new military paradigm developing after the Iraq war, modernise the Russian armed forces and even develop new nuclear weapons, not an entirely surprising occurrence concerning the US' intentions to do the same, a possible Iranian nuclear programme, newly-indicated possession by North Korea, and a potential Japanese acquisition of both nuclear and missile-defence technology. It is worthwhile to note that Russia and China are both signatories of the Shanghai Co-operation Pact, which pledged resistance to growing US power in the world via the concerted action of the two considerable powers, the Cold War's end notwithstanding.

The situation in Iraq itself continues to deteriorate. Paul Bremer, the newly-installed American viceroy in Baghdad, proclaimed that his Raj wanted to re-incarcerate prisoners released from Iraqi jails upon the capitualation of the former Iraqi government. Of course, it most likely will not bode well among Iraqis to incur the type of Saddamite crackdown necessary to roundup all the former political as well as legitimate criminals, all of which Bremer claims are causing, singularly, the anarchy continuing to reign on Baghdad's streets. The Independent calls this course of action a "peculiar endorsement of Saddam's judicial system." One may question whether or not Bremer is really the well-tempered diplomat-administrator his supporters in Washington claimed he was as liberal commentators gained hope the State Department had won a "victory" over Rumsfeld's brash Pentagon in deciding the country's future fate. The former administrator, choice of the Defence Department's neoconservative clique, Jay Garner, yelped at the entourage of press following him around Iraq that "we ought to be beating our chests every day. We ought to look in a mirror and get proud and stick out our chests and suck in our bellies and say: 'Damn, we're Americans!'." This was, somehow, in reference to Iraq's infrastructure, which he had claimed survived the war intact. Bremer's actions, however, speak louder than Garner's words. In addition to the aforementioned remarks regarding justice, the proconsul has decreed that all former Ba'ath Party officials would be banned from participation in the Iraqi government. Forget parallels with Saddam, the international press seemed poised to compare this move with a Stalinist purge, in which all members of a certain segment of society were immediately disqualified from any participation in even the most noninfluential compartment of the bureaucracy. This purge, of course, poses immediate problems for the restoration of any sort of order or civil society in Iraq. The Ba'athist apparatchiks represented the intelligentsia in Iraq, the intelligent individuals with the capability to run an efficient and well-organised government. The recognition that such relatively low-level civil servants are integral to the operation of governments, especially during periods of reconstruction was key to the American efforts in Germany and Japan and the reorganisation of eastern bloc states following the end to the Cold War. One might understand an American aversion toward the inclusion of such individuals as Tariq Aziz in the Iraqi government, but even advocates of de-Ba'athification would be hard pressed to understand why the US would want to expel all the experienced members of Iraq's governing apparatus when its consistently stated desire is a rapid reconstruction and withdrawl. The quickest route to Iraq's renewal, if such could be achieved, Jonathan Freedland of the Guardian and others have argued, is to hand Iraqi society to the lower-level Ba'athist bourgeois.

Of course, that Iraqi self-rule was even a goal of the current American viceregent was called into serious question recently, though Bremer's propaganda agents attempted to deny there were no such arrangements being made to indefinitely postpone self determination, as nearly every newspaper worldwide had alleged the previous day. Nevertheless, certain Iraqi factions seem to be taking independence into their own hands, as the Kurds have been said to be independently offering oil deals to Western energy companies, despite the futile efforts of Bremer's iron fist to intercede. Unfortunately the all-powerful Polish occupation force originally destined for northern Iraq was reassigned to the even more restive regions of the Sh'ite south, otherwise its few, inexperienced troops might have assisted Bremer in causing a serious international incident by ruthlessly suppressing Kurd autonomy. Of course, that may have been the plan all along, as it would certainly placate Turkey, whose government, neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz have recently insinuated, is better-off being overthrown in a pro-American military coup. If one were an administration sympathiser one would hope such an orchestration on the part of the Pentagon would be more well-played than the previous putsch, which the Bush regime had attempted Venezuela.

Another hallmark of the haphazard Bremer Reichskommisariat has been the rise of the old Iraqi dinar's value as opposed to what has become an increasingly inflated dollar. With the demise of Iraq's central bank, the dinar has become an entirely stable currency, allowing it to circulate at a fixed rate and hence gain significant value, whereas the colonial administration's distribution of dollars to Iraqis, in their attempts to bring a return to both an orderly society and to introduce the currency as the primary means of exchange in Iraq has resulted in its imminent decline. One questions the ability of the Bremer regime to effectively rebuild anything in Iraq without comprehending such simple tenets of economics as velocity of currency circulation. Nevertheless, for Iraqis, the fruits of Saddam's old patrimony now shine down in the form of the erstwhile dictator's visage on the colourful dinar notes. Of course, nothing could better indicate the ludicrous American attempt at colonialism than this descent into the insane deluge of the bizarre: the US has endeavoured to use the rock group Metallica and popular children's television programme "Barney and Friends" as tools for the pacification of its new backyard playground of festering fundamentalist resentment and armed factionary clashes. Fun!

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Notes on the Global Condition

-CANADA informed the United Nations that it would have to spurn the UN's request for international peacekeeping forces to assist in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where an uneasy truce has temporarily stalled a potentially genocidal war in the country's lawless eastern jungles. Canada claimed it simply had neither the forces or the capability to participate, a move which is expected to fuel a growing national debate on the Liberal government's commitment to the armed forces, which many say is too weak. France, meanwhile, offered to contribute forces to the region, but was rebuffed due to its implicit support for DR Congolese President Joseph Kabila. North American or Asian forces might be altogether more appropriate for peacekeeping efforts in Africa, as European forces, while praised as effective in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, have a tendency to inflame old anti-imperialist passions. Currently, a lonely contingent of Uruguayan forces under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping mission are holding an airport in the region, and little else.

-SLOVAKIA enthusiastically endorsed membership in the European Union, after similarly successful referenda in Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, and Lithuania. As in many of the former Eastern Bloc countries, concern about voter apathy was strong, but the degree of participation was sufficient for the vote to be counted as valid. Slovakia will thus join the EU along with other candidate countries in June 2004, though Brussels officials are highly concerned with socioeconomic conditions in the country, especially discrimination against Roma (gypsy) minorities, which has been dampened only slightly to to halfhearted efforts by Bratislava.

-ARGENTINA has a new president. The election of Nestor Kirchner is seen as a victory for the old-line Peronist left, which advocates a sharp break from the eager engagement in US-sponsored recommendations for trade liberalisation. Argentina's economic collapse was largely blamed on the failed policies of former president Carlos Menem, the other candidate in the recent runoff election, who bowed out ignominiously to avoid crushing defeat. Though ostensibly a leftist victory, Kirchner's ascendency was seen as a return to traditional Argentine politics, unfortunate for those who had believed the country would embrace a new spirit of government organised around what were increasingly powerful neighbourhood councils and worker-owned production facilities. The rise of neo-Peronism in Argentina is the latest in series of leftist sweeps at South and Central American polls as the American economic philosophy of neoliberalism is overwhelmingly rejected. Kirchner has promised to look to other South American economies, rather than the United States, for assistance in economic regeneration, a potential boost for the fortunes of the MerCoSur trading bloc of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina.

-THE UNITED STATES claims that al-Qaeda is directing terrorist activities from within Iran. This new revelation on the part of the US may indicate that the emphasis of the neoconservative faction had swayed from Syria to Iran, longtime source of frustration to the faction, which had been closely linked with the early years of the Reagan administration. Speculation is rampant that the US is looking for any justification (as it had in Iraq) to claim the need for a "regime change" in Tehran, including its purported attempt at the production and/or acquisition of nuclear armaments.

-INDONESIA has launched a fresh offencive against rebels in the breakaway Sumatran province of Aceh, after peace negotiations in Tokyo failed. Jakarta continued to seek some level of autonomy for Aceh while the rebel factions would agree to nothing less than full independence. The inability to compromise led to an escalation of hostilities, including an Indonesian declaration of martial law and, subsequently, the deployment of Indonesian forces as Achenese rebels indicated their "readiness for war" and their ability to "fight forever." Considering Jakarta's record with relatively peaceful independence movements, as in East Timor, the prospects of a quick and clean operation in Aceh, with a clear victory for either side any time soon, are extraordinarily dim.

-A HAWKISH FACTION has emerged within the Japanese political spectrum, similar, it seems, to the American neoconservatives. Acutely aware of the emerging North Korean threat, these Japanese hawks have been keen to engage in the revival of the missile defence concept and to radically reshape the Japanese military for a greater world role, including the obtainment of nuclear weapons. Japan's military has heretofore been a mere defencive force, and Japanese liberals, traditional pacifists, are concerned about a breach in constitutional convention proposed by the new faction. An expanded Japanese military would have extraordinary consequences for the regional security situation, especially considering China's concerns over any Japanese ability to defend Taiwan.

-THE PHILIPPINES has struck at operations of the Moro Independence Liberation Front (MILF) organisation, which Manila claims is a violent Islamic fundamentalist extremist group. Critics claim the move was merely posturing for the Filipino president's visit to the White House, at which she is expected to announce the Philippines' depletion of military assets in the "war on terror" and the need for greater US assistance. American forces, moved away from the front due to prior image concerns, have returned in the role of observers and advisers, which portends ominously for those who recall the origins of American involvement in the Vietnam War.

-FRANCE has been voted the most likely candidate for "regime change" at whichcountryisnext.com.

2003-05-17T16:35:00.000-04:00

From Riyadh to Karachi to Casablanca to Beirut...
Terrorism in the Islamic World Exponentiating in the Wake of the Iraq War

THIS WEEK alone, major terrorist incidents have erupted prodigiously across the Middle East and its environs, causing a rapid reassessment of Western, especially American, involvement in the "war on terrorism" and whether purported successes were merely ploys exploited for political advantage while threats to stability continued unabated. Certainly, as Democratic presidential candidates in the United States now claim, the war against Iraq stripped away vital resources needed for threat detection and counterterrorist infiltration- not to mention shattering the last vestiges of goodwill much of the world displayed toward the United States in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks. Nevertheless, the Iraq war had a more devastating effect, in radicalising a much greater segment of the Arab and Islamic worlds than ever before, and making manifest what had hiterto been partially baseless propaganda about American imperial designs on the Mideast. A revived al-Qaeda, evidently, as that organisation's hallmark traces lie all over the recent attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca, is again stalking the globe, hitting whatever targets present themselves in the absence of strictest security.

In Morocco, security is notably lax, given the country's lack of experience with the type of Islamic extremism boiling further to the east. Various institutions representing the United States, however, such as its embassy in Rabat or consulate in Casablanca, are considerably protected. In Saudi Arabia, US military installations, due for a substantial withdrawl but nevertheless still operational, are well-guarded. Therefore, in each country, is was simply easier to strike civilian targets. Both governments attempt to pose as US allies, although Morocco, notably, criticised the Iraq war. Nevertheless, the strike on Casablanca proves not only that collusion between Islamic states and the US is unacceptable to al-Qaeda, but that it has the ability to strike on a broad spectrum of geographical targets. It is unlikely the attackers were themselves Moroccans- Rabat has been tracking Saudis within Morocco for years whom they have suspected attempting to form a Qaeda cell- and therefore such can only be an example of al-Qaeda's projection capabilities. In Indonesia and the Philippines, proxy or sympathiser groups act on its behalf. Being able to hit targets from one end of the Eastern Hemisphere from another instills as much fear in one's enemies as the United States' capacity to send F-117 stealth aircraft from the continental US to strike targets in Europe, as it had during the Balkan affairs of the 1990s.

The targets themselves seemed to have a tenuous theme, primarily of anti-Western sentiment. The three primary objectives for the terrorists were a hotel containing a considerable number of Jews, a Spanish restaurant, potentially also popular with a Jewish crowd, and the Belgian consulate, which may seem illogical until one realises that the consulate was severely damaged by an attack meant to be carried out against an Italian restaurant catering to Jews. The Italian consulate, too, was slightly damaged, being in close proximity to Belgium's. That Spain and Italy were allies with the US in its assault on Iraq is probably irrelevant- their restaurants were targeted for their Jewish affiliation, otherwise the attackers would have been far more likely to engage American or British tourists. Ergo, the attacks seemed to indicate more protest of Jewish influence, though the fact they were carried out against two foreign restaurants and a modern hotel indicates they had the earmarks of anti-cosmopolitanism as well. The different means used to coordinate the attacks (by car as well as suicide bomb) indicate a variety of groups may be involved, from Palestine and Algeria one would logically guess, considering the targets and geographical siting of Morocco, but al-Qaeda's ability to infiltrate and penetrate globally certainly makes it the primary suspect in the incident. That Morocco has a relatively Westernised economic base, and has even (at one point) petitioned for EU membership, has probably played a role in al-Qaeda's targeting of a state not sufficiently independent of Western influence. That an e-mail circulated by an al-Qaeda operative, Abu Mohammed al-Ablaj, released following the Riyadh attacks, stipulated that the organisation's new targets would be "the heart of America, the Gulf countries and allies of the United States, particularly Egypt and Jordan." Presumably, Morocco can also be listed as a US ally, however tacitly it articulated its support. Most telling, perhaps, was his indication that "the world will see how we make America pay the price for invading Iraq."

Activity has not been limited exclusively to the Riyadh and Casablanca incidents, though these have gotten considerably the most attention. In Karachi, twenty-one petroleum stations were attacked, all affiliated with British or American oil companies, a clear indication of displeasure with Anglo-American influence in Iraq, over the government of Pakistan, and in neighbouring Afghanistan. In Lebanon, officials assert nine individuals were arrested after plotting attacks against the US embassy in Beirut. Attacks in such rapid, coordinated succession have been effective in stunning the world back into paranoia over Islamic fundamentalism. The disturbing headlines emerging from the efforts to reconstruct Iraq, meanwhile, are relegated to back pages. That Iraq has assumed a centrality in the politics of the Mideast rivalling that of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is essential to understanding the nature of this new terrorist offencive. The United States has become an occupying power far greater than Israel in scope and brutality. Israel is despised at incredulous levels in the Mideast after its activities in the wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973- none of which involved an Israeli assault on civilian targets within Arab capitals the level at which the US executed the clusterbombardment of Baghdad. A Newtonian response mechanism has hence welled up in the Islamic world to meet the nature of the threat posed to independence. The global reach of the United States has provoked the organisation of a society devoted to an assault, worldwide, on its interests when conflicting with the goal of Islamic fundamentalism, or, at least, departure from suppliance toward Washington. What Israel fomented in the form of small-scale suicide bomb attacks by Palestinian radicals has multiplied into an ideological movement manifested by a group with worldwide strike capacity, in order to resist the macro-imperialism of the American hegemon.

The response of the West to such a novel instrument of global instability must be twofold- first, engaging in an effective security apparatus, and, second, ensuring the conditions which have produced such violent fringe elements of society- and which continue to catalyse such a movement- are not allowed to arise again. To do so requires an abject acknowledgement of past failures, most notably the type of heavy-handed occupational philosophy which has been instrumental in birthing terrorist movement. The stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia led to the formation of al-Qaeda, which opposed such an American interlocution on the soil of "the guardians of the holiest sites in Islam." They were subsequently sheltered by the Taliban, a group which emerged from a cabal of religious extremists among the mujahideen militia groups opposing the Russian puppet government ruling Kabul prior to 1979 and the subsequent Russian invasion (and there is no need to mention that both the pre-Taliban mujahideen and the forerunners of al-Qaeda were financed by the US in order to prevent the Soviet Union from maintaining its influence over Afghanistan...) The situations in the Palestinian territories and Chechnya are essentially similar as well. In order to bring about an effective halt to the zeal for such violent extremist groups, not only must the Israel-Palestine situation be solved or show substantial progress toward some resolution, but the occupation of Iraq by American (or American-chosen) forces must immediately end, a face-saving Chechen peace accord must be reached, Afghanistan must be both functional and independent, and Pakistan must seem to be less an adjunct of US demands- lest the unthinkable, that a revolution occurs and its primarily hardline Islamist population obtains the stewardship of its nuclear weaponry. In each situation, the UN and regional powers, like Iran and Egypt, must take a leading role, rather than the United States, in order to stifle the developed suspicion and demonstrably rational fears of the US compromising constructive initiatives in the region currently.

In providing for an effective security apparatus, the United States must recognise the limitations placed upon not only governments in the Islamic world, but in Europe as well. In his Foreign Affairs article, Jonathan Stevenson argues that the United States and Europe take fundamentally different approaches to counterterrorism operations, and that Europe's security measures need to be far more comprehensive in order to provide effective protection for the United States. Of course, Stevenson, in his triumphalism of the draconian dictations of American "Homeland Security" chief Tom Ridge, huffs that Europe, "unfortunately," has less of a disposition toward losing its civil liberties, and that it engages in threat, rather than vulnerability-based assessment of impending danger. What this last sentiment truly indicates is that Europe is more concerned with engaging actual, specific threats through a vastly superior system of intelligence gathering rather than take such unnecessary measures as panic-inducing and economically volatile security alerts, police-state measures at airports, and "pre-emptive" strikes on weak, vulnerable "rogue states" which just may, someday in the future, manufacture weapons capable of defending against such strikes.

The primary failure of Stevenson's analysis of the different perceptions of security within the transatlantic community is the failure to recognise that the US is intrinsically more vulnerable due to its command-control policy toward the Mideast- of course, as American neoconservatives like to argue, such policy is "necessary" what with the "weakness" of Europe to defend against "threats"- as if threats to Europe really exist. Ironically, Stevenson also claims European security systems cannot be effective without a more tightly integrated EU, though the US embarked on a course to, essentially, divide and conquer Europe during the Iraq crisis. At the same time the US seeks to split Europe and manipulate its weaknesses to preserve its own global hegemony, it loses an element of its own national security. Finally, Stevenson argues, those who claim Europe needs to be courted as an effective ally in the terror war fail to see that the terrorist threats Europe has engaged formerly have all been rather isolated and connected with political movements, rather, he asserts, than al-Qaeda, a truly ingenuous conception of terrorism. Nevertheless, Europe's security forces, counterinsurgency experience, and intelligence apparati seem to have been achieving a far more effective assault on al-Qaeda cells within Europe than the United States' policies have been in pursuing it in the Mideast. Furthermore, recognising the political element of al-Qaeda is to recognise regional realities which lead to its increasing power, like the chronic poverty afflicting Saudi Arabia. The European approach, with its recognition of such political elements, can be extremely useful in solving what are now fringe conflicts in the Mideast as well- as in the Palestinian Territories and Chechnya.

The failures of the American approach are summarised quite succinctly in Paul Krugman's New York Times column "Paths of Glory," in which he refutes ludicrous assumptions (radiating from the American propaganda organs) that the Bush administration has pursued an effective assault on al-Qaeda. In the most telling segment, he reflects on how television has manipulated Americans into believing in the success of Bush's initiatives:

The administration's antiterror campaign makes me think of the way television studios really look. The fancy set usually sits in the middle of a shabby room, full of cardboard and duct tape. Networks take great care with what viewers see on their TV screens; they spend as little as possible on anything off camera. And so it has been with the campaign against terrorism. Mr. Bush strikes heroic poses on TV, but his administration neglects anything that isn't photogenic.

Ergo the parades in Mazar-e-Sharif when entered by the forces of the Northern Alliance during the Afghan war, but the relegation to the tickers on the bottoms of the cable news networks' screens the despatches from Afghanistan's hinterlands of renewed warlord violence or increased Taliban activity. The (some say staged) made-for-television moment when a handful of Iraqis pulled down the large statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad was played up significantly on television, but Fox News and others fail to carry the less seemly images of the occupation. Why is CNN, for example, not reporting on the nefarious machinations surrounding water rights in the Mideast following Iraq's conquest?

So it is with terror. The attacks on Riyadh and Casablanca were opportunities for President Bush to make grandiloquent speeches (well, as grandiloquent as possible for the US' most prosaic president since Calvin Coolidge) condemning al-Qaeda and vowing to continue the "war on terror" which has become as cyclical and ludicrous as the "war on drugs." That such attacks are excuses for the imposition of more martial excess and fearmongering rhetoric by the Bush administration indicates the circularly prophetic nature of information flow in the United States- these attacks, clear indications of the failure of the anti-Qaeda campaign, are reconstrued as justifications for the continuation of military activities enraging the Islamic world, and encouraging more attacks. The cycle merely deposits higher and higher approval ratings for the administration, and the manipulation of an ignorance of even recent history (doesn't the failure to locate WMDs in Iraq count for something?) ensures that the systemic extermination of Muslim civilians by either al-Qaeda attack or American clusterbomb continues indefinitely.

2003-05-16T23:25:00.000-04:00

The Convention Connection
A Europe of the People is a United Europe

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION is meant to create a constitutional basis for the European Union and to tie it ever closer to its people. Nevertheless, its proceedings have emerged as a more arcane debate over the structures of the EU's various branches of government. The primary struggle has been between large and small states within the Union. The large states which have sought to operate beyond the Elysée Treaty consensus of Germany and France, the "European Core," which have consistently driven the Union toward deeper phases of political and economic integration. Ergo, their prerogative has always been to preserve their most essential component of independence- foreign policy. The large states wish to see the role of European chief executive as well as European "external representative" (as the Europhobes in the UK like to refer to the position of an EU foreign minister) as functions of the composition of the European Council, the body of EU government composed of committees from the national governments of member states. This would allow the nation-states to hold the most considerable sway within the EU government, as opposed to the popularly elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the European Commission "Eurocrats."

The Commission is a body represented less by populational proportion, and influenced less by decisions emanating from national capitals, as the Council. As such, the smaller European states, even those sceptical of deeper integration, oppose the efforts of the larger "sovereignist" states to build a Europe predicated on the Council's decisions. Recently, sixteen European states, ten of which are incoming Central and Eastern European states, submitted a document to the Convention Chairman, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in opposition to the maneouvres of Britain and Spain, the primary proponents of the Council plan. The only exception among the inbound members was Poland, which, like Spain, seems prepared to pursue a vigourously centrifugal agenda vis-a-vis centralised European foreign policy. Within the current membership bloc, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Portgual, Austria, and Ireland signed the document, a reflection of their relatively small populations. France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, which notably asserted the right to integrational flexibility during their summit on European defence last month, remain committed to a bizarrely convoluted and esoteric compromise, also supported by M. d'Estaing, granting each the Council and Commission specific and limited powers. Such a compromise would inevitably bring the EU into situations similar to its crisis today, in which one bloc of states is pursuing a vastly different agenda than others. What's more, many in the current EU "fifteen" fear a logjam of discussion if every EU state, post-expansion, is represented within the Commission. The Netherlands, for this reason, joined Belgium and Luxembourg in proposing a 15-nation rotating membership for the Commission.

This, however, would not bring the stability to the Union which the Commission needs to supply as the de facto executive committee of the European project. The forces exist within the Union to create both a Commission and Parliament of significantly expanding powers at the expense of a Council which is composed primarily of national bureaucrats contesting issues for their own national gain and their own expanded personal political prestige. While the national element remains important within the EU, it should not be enshrined in such an institution as the Council, which elevates states to the supreme position of sovereignty at the expense of the other, more democratically representative bodies of the EU. It is precisely the Council and its ability to grant the centrifugal states their independence of foreign policy action which is cementingthe schism of Europe as unveiled by the Iraq situation- and manipulated by the United States.

Instead of attempting to curry a compromise between the two competing blocs, the "European Core" states should instead place their emphasis on supporting the small states and their quest for a Europe governed primarily by the Commission. Without their ability to project individual influence, the large, centrifugal nation-states are tied to a Europe in which they are the substantial minority- as well as subjected to both an executive and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) representative disconnected from the national influences of a Council-controlled European entity. The Commission could easily avoid the feared logjams if clearly delineated time periods are given for debate and if the Commission was directed by a strong executive. Not only could such an arrangement produce a European executive appointed from among the Commission who could presumably overrule the decisions of the centrifugal states, but the "European Core" states could endeavour to subvert the objectives of such states by proposing such an executive be elected by and from among the people.

Reaffirming the Convention's democratic purpose is a key means by which Europe can be strengthened. The "spirit of Europe," as exhibited prior to and during the Iraq situation, is at once strong and unified, though defied by the petty power scrambles among European leaders. Anti-French insults resonated across the English channel while the majority of the population of the UK, prior to the war, gave higher approval ratings to French President Jacques Chirac. While the Prime Ministers of Spain and Portgual entertained Bush in the Azores, the streets of Iberia erupted in protest. Every balcony in Italy had a rainbow banner reading, simply, Pace, although the country's corrupt, proto-fascist Prime Minister theoretically has control of the vast majority of the Italian media. In France and Germany, opinion of the respective governments soared. Even in Poland, at one point, antiwar sentiment ran at 97% (Newsweek statistic.) The centrifugal sentiment is a minuscule minority, but a powerful one. Ironically, however, their primary concerns about a Europe of broadened and deepened integration, that Europe has grown disparate from its citizens, has served to strengthen their own standing. The self-fulfilling prophecy of the Eurosceptics continues to subvert the fusion of the European state and the European spirit.

The "European Core" states, therefore, should both insist on a European Commission president elected directly by the citizens of the EU, and a broad expansions of the powers of the European Parliament, now cut out of many vital decision-making processes left to the omnipresent Council. The small European states have insisted upon the maintenance of the rotating presidency, but they may be willing to compromise for Core support on the problematic Commission issue. Not to mention, both Germany and France can use such as an opportunity to prove to smaller Central and Eastern European states that they are looking out for such states' interests and not looking to exert political or economic domination. The public presentation of initiatives for a more democratic Europe should galvanise public support and put pressure on both the representatives within the Convention and the Eurosceptic, centrifugal states.

The thorny problem, one may insist, is of the governments of the centrifugal states, seemingly defeated or left out in the cold. They may still seek to obstruct or obfuscate such a process. As I wrote earlier, the prerogative of such "New Europe" states is the apprehension of more power, both to act as equals to the Core states within the EU and to become world powers in their own right. This is true especially of Spain and Poland- for Britain, it is a question of maintaining a somewhat imperial policy through the proxy of the United States. Even Romania sought to claim its global role recently by making the highly dubious claim it halted terrorist activity coordinated by the Iraqi embassy in Bucharest. Tied to a more centralised, more democratic, and more effective European entity, such states would be forced to seek power by other means than playing European pawns for Washington's interests- they would have to support an expanded European Union on the world stage. Within such a tightly-bound Europe, such is the means by which the power and influence so sought by Spain, Poland, et al can be increased. Poland will probably find it more to its advantage to have safe access to EU investment havens in Africa and the Mideast than to be the subject of suicide bombings as proxy occupation agents in US colonial outposts anyway.

If a united Europe is to fuse with democracy, promote its weltenshauung abroad, ensure the rising prominence of its member states via a government in which they are fully represented (rather than an imperial power they attach themselves to like barnacles), this is the route the Convention must take. The world cannot afford a passive and divided European continent while the American hegemon dances its imperial swagger across the Islamic world and beyond- nor do the citizens of Europe deserve governments that would rather exploit attachments to neoimperialism for individual gain or blind nationalism while the masses stand united in their demands for unity and peace. These governments should not be influenced by the hijacked and loaded term "Atlanticism." The Atlantic relationship throughout the Cold War respected partnership- either because the United States intelligently observed that this was the means by which it could retain the commitment of Western Europe to its anticommunist cause or because the United States and Western Europe merely shared a common enemy. In any case, with the finale of the Cold War and the rise of the European Union, relations within the Union have become strained over the nature of such an Atlantic partnership, primarily because the United States has taken a worldview which dictates to, rather than consults, its former vital allies. The nature of "Atlanticism" today is to comply with the impliable decisions of Washington or be relegated to a role on the sidelines of international action- of "isolation," as critics within Germany and France contend. The United States believes its unchallenged military power gives it not only the means, but the right to execute its missionary crusade on the trajectory which has always been partially obstructed by the geopolitical reality of power-balancing. It has gotten to the point at which former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pens an article in Le Monde urging Europeans, for the sake of the "transatlantic bond," to grant the United States a permanent observer status not only within the European Convention, but within its future councils of government as well. Could one even imagine Washington's response should the EU ask if members of the European Commission could sit in on meetings of, say, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee? Or the cabinet meetings of the Bush White House? Is it not blatantly obvious that "Atlanticism" has come to mean subordination and masochism?

To be sure, a government founded upon the essential sentiment of the citizens of Europe would never allow such a hyprocritical injustice, but if one takes the pages of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as any indication, any step taken against Washington (or, for that matter, the US' "one-size-fits-all" approach to global economics) is a step toward Europe's ruin. It is under this pressure that Germany has begun to gravitate back toward the US to some degree, essentially agreeing to vote along with the US on a UN resolution granting what has been construed as a legitimation of the occupation of Iraq by US-UK forces and, therefore, the lifting of sanctions on Iraq. Russia, however, still opposes such a measure, and France has reneged to a degree on its original pledges to end the sanctions, as they have, internationally, become acknowledged as merely a post facto means by which the Anglo-American imperialists can justify their slaughter of Iraqi civilians and seizure of Iraqi oil supplies. Europe, split so chronically and under such pressure to conform to the irrational conservative desire for the maintained status of the Atlantic Alliance, at any cost to European sovereignty, is unable to seek even compliance with the declaration it made at Athens to grant the UN a "central role" in Iraqi reconstruction- a principle to which even the government of Tony Blair then adhered. Fortunately, signs indicate the Schroeder government in Germany isn't willing to immediately capitualate to US expansionism, but to truly bring the American war machine to a grinding halt, to achieve the critical balance so necessary in the achievement of global stability and the effectiveness of international institutions, the Convention, via the aforementioned strategies, needs to authorise a Europe prepared to tackle the responsibilities of a true Atlantic partner- one which knows when and how to deny its superpower ally.

~

Notes on the Global Condition-

-US DEFENCE SECRETARY Donald Rumsfeld, possibly the most hated man on earth, recently proposed to "cut the red tape" of defence appropriations. "Rumsfeld submitted a proposal to Congress on April 11 that would scrap virtually every reporting requirement intended to let lawmakers oversee major defense spending programs." The US Defence Department is now utilising the same arguments against the American pillars of democracy that it had against the United Nations- that legislative debate is inefficient and, in fact, detrimental to the ability of the United States to rapidly carry out vital military operations. Perhaps, with Congress itself threatened, more Americans will be willing to speak out against this dangerous ascent of martial influence on the policies of the US government. As Cicero said, Silent leges inter arma ("Silent are the laws among arms.")

-JAPAN passed legislation to strengthen its military might, affirming the fears of China and the rest of the region that Japanese militarism may be awakened in the face of the North Korean threat. The situation is developing gradually, however, and there is still no indication of the direction Japan may go, considering the volatile balance and intermittant nature of talks between the DPRK and the United States.

-BREAKING NEWS: BOMB ATTACKS ON CASABLANCA. More tomorrow.

2003-05-14T15:04:00.000-04:00

Backlash
The Worldwide Terrorist Response to Repression

THE BOMBINGS in Riyadh this week were the tip of the iceberg for global terrorist activity. The Sydney Morning Herald reports that the US is warning of a "new terrorist onslaught." Further bombings are possible in Saudi Arabia, and Australians are being warned to stay out of Indonesia on any "nonessential business." Australia, of course, has felt itself in a vulnerable position since the Bali bombings and its involvement in the invasion and conquest of Iraq. Meanwhile, Russia is reeling from two suicide bombing incidents in Chechnya, which President Vladimir Putin claims are linked to the Saudi attacks.

The incidents in Riyadh were inevitable given current US policy in the region. The idea that terrorism is some coherent objective which can be singled out for destruction has seemingly been guiding the direction of American action in the Mideast. George W. Bush, making pathetic attempts to obscure the obvious failure of his fallacious economic policies with bombastic warrior-rhetoric, said in Indianapolis that the Riyadh attackers' "only religion is hate." It was an obfuscation which played well in Indiana, a traditional hotbed of rabid allegiance to the Republican Party line. Unfortunately, due such a blindfold of zombie-like jingoism, Bush won't lose as many votes as he will percentage points on any American employment index. In what must be some bizarre feat of mental gymnastics, the citizens of the United States conclude not only that the same failed supply-side economic policy will produce jobs this time around, but that the same application of martial excess is what is needed in order to prevent such activities as the Riyadh bombings- though their continuing occurrence seems proof that a terrorist backlash has been catalysed, and not prevented, by such military solutions.

Indeed, the milieu in the Mideast continues to worsen for its citizens as a direct consequence of American activity. Afghanistan has disintegrated into a measley patchwork of warlord-controlled territories and uplands where the Taliban has been regrouping. American soldiers there report they feel "almost forgotten" by Washington, while Afghans joke that the pinnacle of the nation's "reconstruction," the Kabul- Kandahar- Mazar-e-Sharif highway, has taken longer to reconstruct, and is in worse condition, than the original route, dating to the 1920s. Indeed, massive protests in Kabul erupted recently challenging Washington's seemingly forgotten promises to create a model society in Afghanistan or even merely to rebuild it. It should come as no surprise that the reason the Taliban has gained such renewed success is its erstwhile capacity to introduce some element of order- and as an indication of a fallout of relations between the United States and the Afghan people. Iran's purported attempt to begin a nuclear weapons programme is an immediate response to clear indications the US intends to perform "regime change" operations on any "rogue state" which dares oppose its hegemonistic sway. US "allies" in Central Asia, like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, only manage to suppress militant Islamism with the repression of popular sentiment by autocratic decree. Turkmenistan in particular is ruled by a narcissistic despot whose cult-of-personality iconography puts the imagery of Ba'athist totalitarianism in Iraq to shame. Pakistan's military government (lest we forget "President" Musharraf is really General Musharraf, having seized power in a coup) relies on similar subjugation of Islamist sentiment, which is quite possibly the world's most fervent, especially in the lawless hinterlands of the Afghan border. Islamabad's recent dissociation with fundamentalist guerilla groups operating in Kashmir may have given impetus to a rapprochement between South Asia's two volatilely-balanced nuclear powers, but has further eroded support for Musharraf's regime and furthered antigovernment Islamist sentiment.

Nowehere could be worse than Iraq, where the power of Shi'ite clerics continues to grow considerably. The new policy of the latest American proconsul, Paul Bremer, intended to instill a sense of "law and order" in the colony, is to shoot looters on sight. Surely such a practise would instill fear, but it seems to have less to do with a due process of law and order and more with the type of insensitive imperialist bravado as demonstrated by the British and the Amritsar Massacre, or perhaps that same empire's strafing of restive insurgent elements in 1920s Iraq by biplane. Of course, one could argue, the need for the imposition of order is so great as to ignore the niceties of anti-brutality statutes for police activities. Nevertheless, such a callous order is bound to provoke a response among Iraqis already furious over the mere presence of American forces on their soil. The paradox of imperialism is hence underscored- lax application of order results in chaos, the actions needed to restrain such chaos lead inevitably to uprising. That the United States has acted with such surprise at what were obviously impending developments is an indication it has lost grasp of its own imperial history and its consequences- the bloody Filipino insurrection, the Cuban revolution against American puppet Fulgencio Batista.

Russian activity in the region has also caused significant unrest. Chechen revolutionaries, dismissed now in the West as in Russia as "terrorist bandits" (in gross ignorance of Russia's ludicrously harsh treatment of the autonomous republic) have had nowhere else to look but the Mideast. Traditionally the Chechens have sought support from relatively moderate Islamic states like Turkey and Egypt, but their continued allegiance to the United States in its "war on terror" has forced the beleaguered and forgotten Chechan resistance to seek out assistance from such rekown terrorist organisations as al-Qaeda, alleged to be behind the Riyadh bombings and, according to Russian President Putin, involved in the recent Chechnya assaults as well. Though this may in fact be true (and the indications are that it is likely) the exclusion of any independent journalists from Chechnya have made any official Russian reports impossible to verify. Putin, of course, gains considerably from linking Chechen terrorist activity to al-Qaeda, by continuing to enlist tacit US (and, to some extent, European) support in the savage Russian activity taking place there, and by building a degree of sustained credibility in Washington, with which he had a fallout over Iraq, as a continuing "war on terror" ally. The Russian imperative in Chechnya, of course, is to crush the rebellion in order to gain political currency from the nationalist Russian population and to appease the ex-KGB hardliners in the Kremlin arguing for the need to preserve Russian "integrity."

Ultimately, the Russians would indeed like to participate in a multipolar atmosphere, and for this, the Kremlin believes, its military credibility must be sustained by containing such outbreaks of separatist sentiment as that occurring in Chechnya. Of course, this is anathema to the intrinsically pacifist Europeans, disgusted by the Chechen situation, and preventing Europe from conjoining itself more closely with the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, both "Old Europe" and Russia seem to share the counterpolar philosophy, and each should target specific objectives to bring about a more healthy and intimate relationship. In return for closer economic and military support and ties with Europe, the EU could pressure Russia to grant Chechnya its independence. While ostensibly this might bring about the revulsion of the nationalist community in Russia, or a national disillusionment on the scale of the (1979-1986) Afghanistan war's aftermath, in the long term Russia's national prestige may increase as global prominence improves due to a counterpolar alliance with Europe and a significantly expanded economy.

As per Saudi Arabia, its close ties with the United States had been a rallying point for years for al-Qaeda or similar organisations opposing the House of Saud's control. The purported link between al-Qaeda and the 11 September attacks on the United States was a video featuring Osama bin Laden condemning the presence of American military personnel on Saudi soil. Though the US is now decamping its military assets from Saudi Arabia in favour of the less risk-prone localities of Qatar and Kuwait (not to mention Iraq), the careful manoeuvre of the US and Saudi Arabia to make it seem the Kingdom had requested the departure of American forces evidently backfired, as it created the impression the American troop presence had always been at the behest of the Kingdom rather than an unwelcome presence imposed on the militarily weak Saudi state. Indeed, this action, and the announcement by the Saudi Foreign Minister that its cooperation with the United States concerning terrorist activity would be more open in the future, are indications of the continuing, or even increasing adhesion of the House of Saud to Washington, and therefore formulating opposition among an increasingly restive and pro-Qaeda Saudi populace. Saudi Arabia has always attempted to maintain a precarious balance between the conservative elements of Islamist persuasions and sympathies, which assert that state's special obligations due to its possession of Islam's two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, and its necessary ties with the West, in particular the United States, which provides it outside security and a crucial market for its petroleum exports- the black gold on which the fortunes of the royal house rest. This accounts for the bizarre juxtaposition between the Kingdom's sponsorship of the teachings of Wahabbi Islam in its schools and the violent advocation of its overthrow by the agents of al-Qaeda and like-minded organisations. More and more, the Kingdom's attempts to appeal to a (slightly) more moderate element of fundamentalist Islam seem to be earning it both the antipathy of the United States and its own increasingly extremist population.

Islamic fundamentalist sentiment is a compendium of many influences over a broad spectrum of societies, but eventually it boils down to more than simply a "religion of hate." It is a struggle for freedom, the same which the United States believes it is bringing about in such places as Iraq or Afghanistan. The irony is that such a struggle is one not merely against such regimes as those in Pakistan, Turkmenistan, or Saudi Arabia, but against foreign domination as well. Arabs reported feeling humiliation, not joy, at the sight of US troops entering Baghdad. The attacks in Riyadh were coordinated against Western compounds which provide personnel support for the infrastructure of the Saudi regime. This freedom fight is not against Western culture- only the most extremist of Islamic fundamentalists (and the most delusional) advocate a total destruction of the West or even Israel, though such feelings have been played up significantly in the US, Israel, Europe, and Russia in order to enlist support in the "war on terror." In actuality, the fundamentalists wish for cultural and political independence, and seek it through an ideology growing in attractiveness for its homespun qualities, as opposed to the Western-style nationalism exhibited by Nasser and Saddam. It will continue to grow in support as Russia and the United States pursue policies similar to Israel's in exercise of reflexive and reciprocal violence- and the resistance will continue at such basic levels as children throwing rocks at tanks, if this is the only means available.

Of course, one should not glorify terrorist activity as "anti-imperial resistance." Attacks upon civilians are reprehensible. Nevertheless, the seething rage at what are increasingly seen as anti-Islamic pursuits of the Russian, American, and, of course, Israeli militaries will manifest themselves by any means possible. With American troops withdrawing from Saudi soil and the massively improved security of American bases in Saudi Arabia, the next logical targets for suicide bombers were the "support elements" of the Saudi-Western axis in the more accessible compounds. Such attacks on civilians do, in fact, have moral equivalency in the eyes of their sponsors, in that American, Russian, and Israeli tactics often result in the deaths of an equally great number of innocents. Who can forget Ariel Sharon's butchery of Palestinians on the outskirts of Beirut, or, for that matter, the recent cluster-bombing of Baghdad (and the aforementioned shoot on sight policies envisioned by Proconsul Bremer). What has occurred in terms of civilian casualties and human rights in Chechnya is too horrifying to describe. Given the support among Russians, Israelis, and Americans for their respective actions, it is also hard for the Islamist insurgents to follow the logic that civilians are not involved in the repression of their culture, religion, and independence. After all, such activities correspond to the American and Israeli obsession with security, the American impulse of Manifest Destiny, and the Russian nationalist gestalt. All three repressive states are democracies, though, as a consequence of their increasingly martial atmospheres, liberties have been degraded in each.

The recognition that the atmosphere in the Mideast much change in order to significantly eradicate terrorism is now at hand- but the methodology used for such reform (American colonialism) has clearly brought both more instability and less likelihood of achieving the common objective of security. The most zealously idealistic neoconservative recognises that terrorism is not a concrete target which can be demolished in a fell swoop of military action, but a desperate method utilised by those seeking to fulfill an ideological commitment fomented by a combination of unsatisfactory levels of independence, economic prosperity, and social harmony. True reform therefore cannot come about as a result of military action such as that in Iraq or Afghanistan, as it degrades one's sense of independence. Even if such is followed by rapid disengagement militarily and allowance of an indigenous government, the resultant and inevitable chaos (as evidenced by Afghanistan) ensures a loss of potential for economic growth as well as the inability to preserve stability and thus social harmony. In Palestine, all three factors are clearly lacking; Palestinians live in a tentative climate of refugee camps, are overpowered by the incessant Israeli occupation, and the resultant instability wreaks havoc on economic progress.

Continuing to view the plague of terrorism as a type of contemporary barbarism against "civilisation" is to provoke an infinite spiral of death and destruction. As William Butler Yeats wrote, ever poignantly, in his "Second Coming":

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all convictions, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

~

Notes on the Global Condition-

-CHINA AND JAPAN have been engaged in productive discussions on common military policy intended to stabilise the region and contain the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack, according to to the Asia Times. The Chinese realise that the introduction of more North Korean intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBCs), which have a range stretching as far as Taiwan, might provoke (as indications continue to stream from Tokyo) a Japanese nuclear programme, which could be completed in mere months, covering the same range, and hence preventing any Chinese "military option" for reunity with T'aipei. China is also concerned with potential Japanese participation in a joint missile defence programme with the United States, as such would require a significant projection of the Japanese military regionwide in order to provide the appropriate defence shield and detection apparatus. This is an extremely productive step for security in East Asia, especially considering the third party, the United States, still considers "regime change" against North Korea an option.

-THE US MILITARY is seeking to substantially move its base operations in Europe to the east, in a move which officials insist is to take advantage of its strategic location with greater proximity to the Mideast than Germany. Nevertheless, the shift does seem intended as a consequence of Germany's lack of support for the US war against Iraq, and to show appreciation (and to build continuing ties with) Eastern European states like Bulgaria which obsequiously played the United States' lapdogs, especially during the Security Council debates. However, the BBC reports, US troops face a cool reception even in Bulgaria, where the popularity of American military basing rights does not match the zeal with which the government pursues it.

-CHRISTOPHER PATTEN, an external representative of the European Union and a European commissioner, slammed Tony Blair's government, especially his chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, for their reluctance to adopt the euro. Euro promoters say Britain is inevitably intertwined with the European economy and its involvement with the euro would allow it to participate in decisions which effect the eurozone. Opponents claim it would lash Britain to a system of monetary rigidity. Nevertheless, the delayed euro decision in Britain risks leaving it increasingly isolated among European Union states, as Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson comes under considerable pressure to adopt the currency, Norway has felt the same centripetal forces leading it to consider EU and euro membership, and Denmark feels pressured to act alonmg with its Scandanavian neighbours.

2003-05-10T16:26:00.000-04:00

Building the Counterpole
On the Atlantic Balance

"Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit."
-President Woodrow Wilson

IT APPEARS several others have stumbled on my formula for a European containment of America. In his International Herald-Tribune column, William Pfaff enumerates means by which "Europe can gently check America," including outmaneouvring the US diplomatically to act as a civilian "global citizen," much in the way the US seeks to constantly interdict militarily. A Le Monde analysis sees French intervention in the Côte d'Ivoire as a model for how such military action should be handled- by UN mandate rather than unilateral decision. The article argues that the UN lacks the means to administer or employ sufficient military force, and that the world model should be one of national military forces sanctioned by the United Nations engaging in such operations. It sees the Côte d'Ivoire situation as France's "petit Irak," i.e., as an example of a potential European model for international order contrary to that of the United States. In that this analysis is relatively conservative and feasible it provides a strong basis upon which to rest a potential European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Such compromises should be the basis for the CFSP's construction, as there already powerful issues around which the Union can coordinate its policies and force concessions on Washington with- namely, the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq, and a "central role" for Iraq's administration for the UN. Applying concerted economic and political pressure on the United States should not only gain the acceptance of such relatively modest, yet powerful goals on the part of the US, but should provide a powerful message both within and without Europe: that of the irrefutable power of a confederated European foreign policy. Eventually, this could become a catalyst for further developments in the formulation of CFSP and the appearance of a European "counterpole" within existing Western economic and security constructs with which to wield European strength against American domination.

Ultimately, the United States seeks to exploit the divisions among nation-states within Europe to its advantage- but nevertheless the leaders of the so-called "New Europe" still hold opinions contrary to the policies of the United States, currently consisting of the aforementioned issues around which a European CFSP might unite. The problems with reliance on such "New European" states are aptly illustrated by William Pfaff's IHT column, "Abusing Old Allies Doesn't Pay," an exhortation to the United States to be a willing partner with Germany and France, which can provide, of all the European states save Britain, the greatest material support. Pfaff argues that the "New European" states are fundamentally too weak- the invitation extended to Poland to police a sector of Iraq was greeted warmly in Warsaw, but the US was asked to make up for the shortfall in Poland's ailing budget, and Poland had considerable concerns about UN authentication. Furthermore, Poland could only make a force of 1,500 troops available, requesting assistance from Denmark and Germany. Denmark, Pfaff explains, has a military strength barely larger than Poland's earmarked Iraq stablisation force, and, for reasons of political consistency, Germany politely refused the offer. Other "New European" allies, like Romania, pledged troops, but of a negligible amount. Public opinion in the region generally runs more contrary to US interests than American planners might like to admit. The US has proposed to move much of its military assets in Germany to the Czech Republic, where it presupposed it would be welcome. The Czech president, however, compared a US troop presence to Soviet occupation, and consequently the issue of American basing rights in the Czech Republic will be put to a referendum, in which initial estimates show support for a US presence lies with the minority. A BBC analysis finds that Poland is unmistakably a "big country" within Europe, but not necessarily a "big power.

The more influential nation-states under the influence of the US include Britain, Spain, and Italy. Nevertheless, considerable political opposition in each country has made it increasingly difficult for the US to rely on London, Madrid, or Rome for unequivocal support without some degree of reciprocation. In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi faces multifarious corruption charges and faces both a court system and electorate hostile to his policies and leadership. In Spain, Prime Minister Aznar is beset with such considerable opposition to his foreign policy that the Spanish legislature has actually attempted to draft legislation forbidding public protest of Spanish military actions. Similar ridiculous measures have been taken in the supposed democracy of the United Kingdom, in which antiwar leader George Galloway has been suspended from the Labour Party over allegations he accepted bribes from Saddam Hussein. Such activities have the pungency of governments run by tabloids, and, indeed, such is the extent such governments must go to in order to conceal and suppress the popular sentiment for policies affirming their national identities, and, indeed, European sovereignty, vis-a-vis the current vasselage to the United States.

The belief that the anti-war EU states (I shall henceforth dub them La Résistance) will fall in line after being "isolated" from the rest of Europe, or, indeed, the world, is equally fallacious for US policymakers. Germany recently indicated it might vote along with the UK and US on a UN draft resolution authorising the occupation of Iraq by the United States and Britain and giving the US (essentially) control of Iraqi oil supplies, in order to patch relations with the United States (such a resolution was made in order for the US to join OPEC and gain sway over global oil supplies, one EU commissioner asserted.) However, a significant degree of evidence suggests this is a measure meant to placate conservative political pressure to return to the Atlantic partnership while the Schroeder government pursues a long-term policy of engaging in confrontationalism and counterpolar maneovres. In an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer affirmed that the Schroeder government was committed to a policy of European opposition to US policy, especially in the Mideast, and prescribed the same "global citizen" priorities outlined by Pfaff in outmaneouvring the US diplomatically. Fischer said that the American government was altogether uncompromising and that the Atlantic relationship's well being depended on the evolution of a power at least as strong as the United States on the opposite side of the pond. "Europa ist eine echte Macht," he said, "Europe is a genuine power." Furthermore, Diplomatica has obtained, thanks to the generosity of reader Toshka in Belgrade, a Strategic Forecasting document from 1999 explicating the consequences of the Kosovo war on NATO. It poignantly illustrates the frustrations of the Schroeder government in the handling of the crisis, and the potential for the schism which erupted over the Iraq situation:

NATO's greatest price will be paid in NATO itself. Gerhard Schroeder has tried to put a good face on it, but the Germans were and remain appalled by the risks the Anglo-Americans forced Germany to accept in relation to the Russians. Schroeder insisted on Friday that Russia should be treated with "respect," a code word for avoiding another such confrontation. Germany cannot afford another episode of Anglo-American diplomatic brilliance. Thus, when Schroeder said last week that: "Human rights are and should be inviolable," but that "we have to look at issues very closely and in fact differentiate between different situations," he was announcing that it would be a long time before Germany tried this again. He went on to say that NATO action should be "confined to its own territory and that should continue to be its way." After Kosovo, a compliant Germany within NATO simply should not be taken for granted any longer.

Ergo, one can assume that Germany, at least under Social Democratic leadership, will continue to work toward the permanence of an American multilateralism via the construction of a counterpolar entity. Schroeder's concerns over Anglo-American manoeuvres, Fischer's remarks, and assertions by the German finance ministry that the Bundesrepublik will accept nothing less than all its debts held by Iraq repayed in full seem to suggest that Berlin's policies will generally gravitate closer to the Paris-Moscow axis than to Washington, or it will at least seek to engage in such flexibility arrangements within the EU which provide for a deepening of such integration policies as CSFP. Such was illustrated in Germany's participation in the summit on the creation of the European Security and Defence Union.

Even if the EU was able to coordinate its policies around a common pillar, and even if the "New European" states relent to popular sentiment and acknowledge their own fundamental positions of opposition to foreign domination, the question remains as to how Europe would be able to pressure the United States. The recommendations made in my initial explorations of a European containment strategy called for a key strategic element revolving around the establishment of diplomatic relations with states which would allow the EU to both gain credibility as a power with the world's best interests in mind as well as encircle the US. Such ideas were generally affirmed by the strategies espoused by Pfaff and Fischer. Nevertheless, by far the most crucial element is a strategy meant to exert pressure on the US economically. Commanding some 40% of the global economy (Le Monde statistic), the EU is in a primary position to challenge the US in this regard. As the "New European" states become further integrated into the European economy, moreover, they will have a greater proclivity toward supporting policies designed to bolster the EU's economic prominence, perhaps at the expense of the US if necessary (ideally, this would make such states more amenable to political balancing as well.)

The barons of Wall Street snicker that an overreliance on social welfare programmes in European states has created a "sclerosis" which has ground the German and French economies to a halt. While this may be true to a degree, the fact that Europe's economy is so seemlessly integrated into that of the rest of the world, especially the United States', is telling: that the economic malaise currently being experienced by the globalised economy is not a phenomenon brought about by an individual state. The US was, in fact, forced to acknowledge this when it backed down from trade policies designed to harm France (as such a policy would have inevitably backlashed to injure the US economy as well.) Furthermore, disparities in both statistical analysis and cultural activities account for misunderstanding of the economic situation in both Europe and North America. Especially the fact that American workers have a propensity toward low-income "filler" jobs while "unemployed" dilutes its real economic character: in Germany, unemployment benefits provide for greater living standards than one receives in the US "employed" at a filler position at minimum wages, and hence more funds are injected into the German economy. Indeed, the European economy is in the least poor shape of any of the three primary industrial regions (also including the Pacific Rim and North America), explaining why the Euro is hitting fresh highs against the dollar. The 2004 EU expansion and potential integration of the new member states of the Eurozone, not to mention Schroeder's ambitious Agenda 2010 policy for the German economy, should bolster the European economy and reverse any trend toward stagnation alleged by US investors.

Already, the US has been forced to accede to Europe on trade practises. When the EU exterted pressure on the World Trade Organisation to ask the US to comply with regulations against the administration of tax breaks to exporters, the US had no choice but to relent to European demands.

Most intriguing are the possibilities envisioned by Hans Martens in his European Policy Centre paper "The Falling Dollar- New Responsibilities for the Euro." Martens points out the dangers of the US trade imbalance to the American economy, and its ultimate vulnerability to European pressure. The US administration, Martens notes, feels invulnerable to such reliance on foreign investment as represented by the trade imbalance. The administration's policies advocate tax cuts leading, purportedly, to greater levels of consumer spending, rather than the savings needed to finance American investments abroad (to redress the trade imbalance). As Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, stated (in a speech which coincided with the inception of the Euro's rapid value acceleration):

Countries that have gone down this path invariably run into trouble, and so would we. Eventually, the current account deficit will have to be restrained. Boosting savings is essential even though it does not affect the number of people in the workforce. But it surely affects capital investment, which it finances, and the productivity that it engenders.

Myths that the decline of the dollar will bolster the US economy are thoroughlly dispelled by Martens:

A declining dollar should help the US out of its economic problems, insofar as it will make it easier for the Americans to export. However, this automatic regulator does not really work for several reasons. Firstly US export volume is relatively limited, and has been further reduced through the transfer of output because of international investments. The sales of daughter companies if US enterprises based in Europe for example is much bigger that the exports from the US to Europe. Secondly the Balance of Payments problem is no longer just a trade issue. Servicing the external debt, which is of the order of $3 trillion (or around 30% of the US GDP) is a much more important factor. Even if the debt is dollar-denominated, investors might not in the long run accept to be paid in ever devalued dollars.

The problems of the dollar can no longer be ignored- the "benign neglect" with which the currency's slip has been treated in the past, claims Martens, because the deficit has reached the dangerous level of 5% of the GDP, low capital influx is unsatisfied by low interest rates, and the euro has emerged as a competitor- a currency with a domestic base larger than the US' (and with the inclusion of the accession states will be almost twice the US' population). The euro could also be used in the future as the currency of choice for investors in China and Japan looking for a stable and high-value currency, as the dollar once was. Indeed, speculation is rampant one of the motives for the US invasion of Iraq was that it was planning to convert its oil valuation to euros, a dangerous precedent for the dollar, as it would begin the process of cementing the euro as the primary currency of international exchange.

Nevertheless, in order to achieve this level of prestige, it is necessary for the European states to embark on such initiatives as the "Lisbon objectives" (designed to create a European knowledge-based economy) as well as structural modifications and modernisations of the unified European currency apparatus. Furthermore, increased direct European investments abroad are needed to supplement the declining export share Europe will face as the result of a strong currency. This can be achieved in relation to the "global citizen" priorities, namely, by opening exclusive markets like MerCoSur and various "closed" Chinese regions to more open trade with the EU. The building of a political relationship with Russia also increases the possibilities for cooperation in Siberian mineral extraction, heightened by Russian interest in moving toward the European economic aggregation. Revising the Growth and Stability Pact (restricting deficit levels) is also essential for both avoiding economic stagnation, promoting social justice, and providing for effective economic competition with the US. Allowing for deficit spending on investments (as opposed to mere pork-barrel projects, the so-called "Golden Rule" in use in the UK) is an effective solution to such problems and should be explored by the European Central Bank more extensively.

With the dollar subsumed by the euro the European Union can enjoy the type of economic superiority Japan could have only dreamed of attaining during the 1980s, with even more considerable influence over US policy. Without deep deficit spending, the US cannot maintain its vast array of military forces, and thus cannot impress its will upon the world. The rather benign-sounding "soft balancing" becomes a euphemism for undermining the foundation upon which the instrument of American power-projection is built. No military confrontation is created as a result of such policies, and the EU can quietly exert pressure within the structures of the NATO alliance and within the UN, forcing the US to take both seriously as institutions which are the sole arbiters of the application abroad of its military might.

2003-05-06T21:43:00.000-04:00

Internationalism versus Interventionism

THE QUESTION of whether the United States should pursue a foreign policy based upon unilateral interventionism rather than one of consultation and internationalist concession continues to provide the backdrop for much debate in international affairs. Previously, I have discussed the need and methods by which the United Nations could be reformed and strengthened into a body embracing a multipolar balance and enforcing this equilibrium through an intolerance of aggression, a system I called the Concert of Earth. The likelihood of such a reform producing tangible results within the next few decades, however, are few. The concept requires much detailed refining, and most of all requires a model of international order not reflective of the current reality. The hegemonist-imperialists in the United States are correct to observe their country has a preponderance of military strength. Though that does not grant it the legitimacy to rule the planet via fiat, it does permit a certain freedom of action outside the international consensus.

Despite the protestations of billions worldwide and the concerted efforts of many world governments, the United States acted of its own volition against Iraq. The best hope, then, in the short term, is to convince the citizens of the United States that this latest affair with Pax Americana ideology is contrary to their nation's interests. Despite outward appearance of such, the people of the United States did not enthusiastically support such an impetuous military exploit. Opinion was divided until the moment of the war's inception, at which most of its citizens were implored to support their armed forces. The motivational impulses acting upon the American populace were multivariant, but both before, during, and after the war they amounted to one consistent theme: the suppression of dissent against the government through proxy verbal attacks and non sequitur invocations of the 11 September terrorist attacks as justification for any intrusion upon one's erstwhile respected liberties. Control of the American media by large corporations currying favours from the right-wing sector contributed to pro-war mindsets. Every attack on the opposition was cloaked in the archaic virtue of patriotism- a perverted form of which currently manifests itself as acrid jingoism. The fact that, through all such manipulations, roughly half the American population failed to support the idea of a war on Iraq.

Like the red scare stirred up by McCarthyist anti-communist witch-hunters in the 1950s, it would appear the new jingoist impulse is receding due to popular discontent with its unrelenting agenda and utter irreverance. Even the most old-line conservative American legislators are attacked as "unpatriotic." A kind of disillusionment is gradually setting in over the whole affair, leaving the surge of nationalist gloating to its traditional core constituency, the audience of radio talk show demagogues. Even the Bush administration's political advisers are convinced public opinion would not support another war so soon after the Iraq venture, and ergo ordered the cessation of plans to immediately assault Syria. Public support that was catalysed by a wounded public psyche, following the devastating attacks of 11 September, has waned the farther the United States moves from that tragedy. The great awakening that the US' national security policy is not designed to provide security, but to spread empire, may yet emerge.

Still, discontent with the current Bush foreign policy does not translate immediately into support for an international order centred on the United Nations. The neoimperialists are a relatively small faction of the American populace. The primary threat to the international order, in fact, comes from the liberal interventionists, who seek to identify, unilaterally, the abridgement of human rights and to utilise the savagery of military force to suppress it, whatever the consequences. The liberal interventionists are disciples of Clinton and Madeleine Albright; they point to Bosnia and Kosovo as primary examples of the "good" the United States has managed to do for the world, and to Rwanda not only as an example of the ineffectiveness of the UN, but of the results of inaction. Previously I expounded clearly on why the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions were failures and why Rwanda would have been colossally so.

To illustrate why this supposed great alternative to internationalism, arbitrarily dictated human rights abuses being suppressed by the full spectrum dominance of an American hyperpower, is fallacious, I will illustrate with a chronic human rights situation emerging in the heart of Africa. Peter Canellos, writing in his Boston Globe column, condemns the United States for acting against a weakened, contained, and stable Iraq while millions are being slaughtered in a brutal regional war in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today the question was posed to me: wouldn't I support immediate action being taken to end the quasi-genocidal horrors of this war? Isn't this Rwanda on a grand scale?

Let us examine, then, a hypothetical situation in which the American military intervenes in the Congo. The eastern Congo is essentially a power void, with no authority able to be imposed by the weak government in Kinshasa. Therefore, it has been the stage set for two regional rivals' ambitions: Uganda and Rwanda. This hotbed of ethnic fervent has acquired its own bizarre stew of ethnic loyalties, in some cases contradicting themselves and leading (due to poor communications, among other things) to confused slaughters. The few American media sources covering the Congo conflict cannot even begin to fathom how to translate the situation into the traditional good v. evil mantra of liberal interventionist wars. In other words, it makes the wildly misunderstood Balkan melee look like a simple arithmetic problem. It is inconceivable exactly how badly an American intervention would go there. The last time American troops engaged what they considered petty guerilla forces in a dense jungle, they began the long saga of the Vietnam War. In fact, it is a situation very much like Mogadishu with the setting of Vietnam and a panoply of combatants more diverse than those in the Balkans. Who would the US be fighting on the behalf of? Rwanda? Uganda? Congo? Hutu minorities? Tutsi minorities? The fact is that there are no innocents to protect in the eastern Congo bloodbath- there are no moral absolutes to uphold in this infinitely tragic anarchy.

Let us then say the US, hypothetically, succeeds in somehow "pacifying" the eastern Congo. How would it stabilise the situation and, more importantly, prevent it from coming about again? What region would it seek to administer? Would it attempt to restore power to Kinshasa, or create a new regional structure? Would it carve out an American pupil-state beneath the Congolese canopies and invite intrepid Ivy Leaguers to contribute their skills to "reconstruct" what was always a haphazard product of the last time Western powers attempted to intervene on the behalf of Africans? How would the United States handle the backlash to such attempts among those who feel it patronising to be occupied and condescended to by American "instructors" supported by bayonet tips? Would the American administrators prawl the Ubangi River like Conrad's characters in Heart of Darkness?

In situations in which the chaos seems constrained to one state, the liberal interventionists seem to provide more answers. The liberal interventionists look at failed, rather than powerful states as the chief problems posed to American security. Ergo, the United States, they conclude, was right to engage in Somalia, though such an operation was an ostensible failure. Such states, they believe, need to be overtaken and administered properly in order to form the basis of a stable nation whose citizenry would not be inclined to pose challenges to the United States. This process is referred to as "nation-building," and is not far from neoimperialism, though its distinguishing factors seem to be a willingness to tolerate governments with popular support, rather than those which would most readily supplicate themselves to the US, and that the nation-builders have a ready willingness to accept an international effort. Bill Clinton was intelligent enough to cover his mistakes in Bosnia with the UN and in Kosovo with NATO, though they have manage to bring about stabilisation only very slowly and cautiously in the wake of rash American wartime decisions. The infiltration of Macedonia by the US-backed Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, has posed peacekeeping challenges. American propaganda during the Kosovo War depicted the KLA as freedom-fighting guerillas heroically opposing Serbian "aggression." In reality they were far from such idealised rebels, clinging instead to the ideology of "Greater Albania" and perpetrating their own war crimes.

Such an effort would therefore be necessary in each situation in which human rights violations were being committed and sustained American troop presence was required in order to bring about stabilisation and reconstruction, not to mention the reorganisation of societies into entities incapable of committing atrocities. The liberal interventionists admit the United Nations and other international and nongovernmental organisations have central roles in such operations, and therefore the necessity of the UN as a political organisation is unearthed in one regard. Nevertheless, as the Americans would inevitably provide the majority of the military forces required, one can estimate this would require significant commitments on the part of the American military, going beyond mere imperial overreach, and such a maintenance of presence has always been anathema to Americans. Even if only one state is "liberated" at a time, it creates a significant drain on American forces. About half the US military's combat strength was engaged against Iraq- while being drained in other such crucial regions as Afghanistan. How is there any guarantee this doctrine of "flexible response," furthermore, will lend itself to patient and routine applications of intervention. Furthermore, one's motives are questionable when only "freeing" strategic, resource-rich, centralised states tailor-made for armoured combat.

What of the possibility of a combination of American forces providing the initial combat thrust, while international troops and agencies constitute the rebuilding effort? It would seem, at the outset, to be more effective. Nevertheless, the absence of international consensus in the decision-making by the United States will ultimately alienate members of the international community and make them less enthusiastic about supporting efforts by the United States to provoke some sort of global risorgimento. Furthermore, the very act of such warfare provokes untold consequences- inevitable terrorist responses against the United States being one, and complications for the reconstruction agencies, like those in the Balkans, being another. Moreover, it is always more preferable for a society to reorganise itself than to go under the receivership of the United Nations. Tutelage is patronising even under international organisations, and is often seen only a step above vigilante imperialism. The UN has its own limits of power, and cannot be managing trusteeships worldwide- it has expended significant resources alone on tiny Bosnia and East Timor. Such "nation-building" as a consequence of attack and occupation should be as last-resort an option as war itself.

To truly do justice to their cause, the liberal interventionists must recognise that intervention comes in many forms, and that military action is usually far from the preferable solution. The insurmountable infeasibility of applying the formula of aggressive warfare and neocolonialist nation-building operations is a necessary realisation. For the United States must recognise that the force which molds the world is not truly violent in nature- it is the force of ideas. By circumventing even a nominal representation of international opinion like the United Nations, the United States commits itself to turning thoughts- and ideas- against itself, and fomenting the type of instability and anti-American sentiment it claims only brute intervention can suppress. It also ruins any potential chance of true preventive action- changing the underlying socioeconomic currents upon which such strife-torn regions are agitated. If the United States was willing to work through international institutions to bring about a concerted solution to the poverty so chronically gripping places like central Africa, it will have taken a giant step forward toward global stability simply not being achieved through the application of its hegemonistic armed strength. It can start at once by recognising the economic vasselage by which it trammels the Third World with neoliberalism is untenable. Significant resources must be invested immediately- a palfry small amount has been pledged (and, ironically, with great fanfare) toward alleviating AIDS, which pales in comparison to the ludicrous percentage of the GDP (and substantial debt accumulated) by military expenditure. Most of all the US must realise that most human rights violations come about as an expression of popular sentiment and not as "evil" perpetrated by dictatorial cabals which can be paraded before the courts of victors' justice when most opportune. Curbing such abuses requires internal reform, an external tolerance and patience for such reform to take place. Such reform can only be facilitated, not imposed. This is why Iran, I believe, has been the most successful state in the Mideast in terms of moving gradually toward modernisation.

While the humanitarian interventionists must recognise the UN is an organisation designed to provide security, not a world coerced into accepting Western conceptions of morality, the internationalist camp must also recognise that some extreme situations do require the authorisation of military force, though these situations are far more rare than one is led to believe by the American media. In these cases, the system of international order must be allowed to study alternative means to addressing the crisis, provide a proper timeframe for their attempted implementation, and to work out a detailed means by which such action will be carried out and followed through with reconstruction efforts. Hopefully providing a global forum with such varied opinions would allow it to synthesise ideas, objections, facts, and analyses into strategies which are infinitely more successful than the intervention scenarios so far pursued by the United States.

The internationalist must acknowledge his system is imperfect. At the same time, however, the UN and internationalism, flawed as they may be in their current states, provide the most promising frameworks upon which to discuss policy. The dangers of an anarchic world dominated by the rule of might and characterised by preventive warfare and a race for the acquisition of deterrant materials is the reality otherwise. In short, internationalism is a terribly imperfect system, but reliance on hegemony has been a consistent failure throughout history. Those few necessary interventions have slight chance of even minimal success without international approval and support. Even if one cannot have a modicum of hope in an ideal international system, it is entirely evident the flaws of the current one surpass the disasters inherent in the alternative.

~

Notes on the Global Condition-

-THE OCCUPATION of Iraq continues to present the United States with unique and increasingly difficult problems. Australia's The Age reports on American failure to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq's population. The BBC alleges US troops were complicit in the looting of an Iraqi university, despite the pleas of its faculty. The Boston Globe discovers that the anarchy following the war has been a bonanza for weapons salesmen, and that the much-tooted return of Baghdad's police force has been marred by its officers skipping duty to loot. A Newsweek article on the US' lack of "nation-building" capabilities recounts techniques intended to subjugate Iraqi dissent. Not to mention, according to Russia's ITAR-TASS news agency, the US is hiring Ba'athist officials to suppress potential protests against its presence in Iraq.

-ISRAEL has rejected any potential peace talks with Syria, according to the Daily Telegraph. Israeli officials explained they were waiting to Syria's position to "become clear" in the fallout from the Iraq war. Coupled with the cool reception Syria gave the demands of US Secretary of State Colin Powell over ending its involvement with Palestinian militant groups, such developments do not auger well for the implementation of the heavily-promoted new Israeli-Palestinian peace plan.

-INDIA AND PAKISTAN are beginning to normalise relations following a long nuclear standoff which had provoked worldwide fear of potential nuclear war. Rather than jump directly into a summit, the two countries' leaders have decided to seek a more gradual process of easing tensions by opening borders and trade and engaging in other reciprocal actions. Pakistan has even proposed mutual denuclearisation. Many analysts see a US hand in this new détente, as both Islamabad and New Delhi are seen as critical US allies. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage will stop in both capitals after a trip to Afghanistan in order to exert pressure on their respective governments. The détente may be tenuous, however, as Pakistan has little control of militant groups operating in Kashmir, though it claims to be fighting them, and Pakistan's military government has a feeble hold on its restive population, which is gradually embracing Islamic fundamentalism.

2003-05-05T22:47:00.000-04:00

Concert of Earth
Reforming the United Nations

MUCH ado has been made about Michael Glennon's article in Foreign Affairs, "The UN vs. US Power: Why the Security Council Failed." One could go into exquisite detail refuting the arguments presented by Glennon, but it is sufficient to attack the premise entirely. Did the Security Council, per se, fail? Glennon is correct in essentially saying the Security Council is useless in the face of current US power. The council did manage to avoid granting the United States the international legitimacy of rubber-stamping its atrocious policy on Iraq. In this sense, it succeeded. But to the extent of upholding its charter, and other documents of international law? The UN has no means by which to effectively check US power, to contain the hegemon.

Perhaps, however, it would be a step to far to say the UN should be authorised to make law, or, in its case, resolutions, at all. It is ostensibly an agency of collective security, and gradually acquired the accoutrements, to many of the world's citizens, of a sort of government. One should, therefore, begin with the argument that while it is acknowledged the United Nations may be incapacitated as an instrument of lawmaking, it is infinitely necessary as a forum in which to attempt to forge consensus and compromise- a vital alternative to military posturing, ephemeral coalitions, and all the other odious features which characterised the pre-First World War era- such realities Woodrow Wilson sought to avoid in the future through his Fourteen Points.

With this in mind, one must concede the United Nations cannot be abandoned, wholesale, to the fate of an insignificant humanitarian aid agency or a symbolic "debating society," as its detractors wish to pigeonhole it. Nevertheless, the ideal of the United Nations is not merely one of providing a centre for diplomatic manoeuvre. The United Nations still requires a means by which to enforce its statutes- particularly on hegemons like the United States or the lackeys- like Israel- it habitually defends. Glennon characterises such laws, particularly the UN Charter, as a revived Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 1928 treaty purporting to outlaw war as an instrument of policy. He presents a non sequitur argument: that the United Nations is powerless in the face of American military strength and preponderance, and that therefore the world should rely solely on this Pax Americana to guarantee its security. Nevermind the fact that claiming the UN is ineffective because it cannot contain the US requires instead a reliance on America is entirely, inherently self contradictory. The fact of American military supremacy does not make it the premiere option for the enforcement of global security or the promotion of successful societies, even in the short term.

The typical arguments put forth by proponents of American hegemony and unilateral interventionism in this regard are that the United Nations is not fully representative nor is it effective. The representation argument is easily countered; the UN may not be perfectly accountable for the opinions of the world's citizens or of nations' statures as world powers or not, but it represents the only means to even a limited consensus. The choice is therefore between adequate representation and none whatsoever. World opinion, whether fully represented in the Security Council or not, is most usually more placated should the Council decide matters rather than one individual state. The very fact competing interests have reached a necessary compromise represents a progressive step on the road to a fully representative UN. Reform (discussed below) should bring this about to the greatest allowable extent.

The second argument promoted by anti-internationalist Americans is the United Nations' ineffectiveness. The primary flaw of the United Nations, this journal would observe, is its incapacity to enforce fundamental rules such as the nonagression clause of the UN Charter upon such indignant "participants" in the UN as the United States. Nevertheless, the neoconservatives and liberal interventionists argue the United Nations should do more to promote humanitarian goals- intervening where "crimes against humanity" take place. They point at situations in which the UN has failed to do so- in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. One might indeed conclude that UN "failure to intervene" caused a great deal of suffering in each of these locations. However, examining alternatives to the Rwanda situation, would the United States really be willing to deploy its military deep into the African jungle, following Vietnam and Mogadishu? American imperialism, potent as it could be, still has significant limits due to the diverging philosophical foundations of the American republic, not to mention the traditional hazards of empire- overreach, rebellion, etc. Ergo, one sees, the decision of Kofi Annan not to engage UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda was not necessarily far from that of American military commanders' judgments.

In the Balkans, where US intervention did take place, it was extraordinarily clumsy and eventually complicated the situation to an even greater degree. As the various ex-Yugoslav republics seceded, Slobodan Milosevic was in fact motivated at first to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia, and secondly by a desire to preserve the safety of ethnic Serbian minorities in the splinter states. However, the splinter states were almost all run by ethnic nationalist extremists. In each case Yugoslavia involved itself in a struggle for the preservation of Serb minorities, it is entirely unclear (due to the vast array of sources referencing the subject) from which side interethnic conflict originated, but due to the ferocity of the Balkan nationalist leaders' affinity for pure nation-states, the probability lies with their commitment of initial acts of ethnic cleansing, causing the Serbs to respond in turn. In Bosnia, especially, the case was far from clear. Assertions that a multiethnic state had flourished under President Izbegovic were self-refuting propaganda claims. Izbegovic was an avowed Islamic purist seeking to eradicate "foreign influences" from Bosnia, and received significant assistance from Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda. The United States waded into the situation blaming any and all "agression" and "genocide" on Yugoslavia and Milosevic. This is not to say Milosevic did not commit such crimes, but that in taking such an artificially imposed dualist overview of the Balkan situation, the United States managed to intervene in what was a conflict characterised by equally brutal tactics perpetrated by either side and propelled by centuries of ethnic tension and hatred. Its "timely intervention" has been nothing short of disastrous for its reputation in the Balkans, as especially evidenced by the assassination of the latest of its puppet prime ministers in Belgrade, a continuingly revolving regime set up after another disastrous action by the United States, intervention in Kosovo, which had the effect of supporting not the Islamic fundamentalist Izbegovicites, but the rabidly expansionist apostles of Greater Albania, the Kosovo Liberation Army, perpetrator of far worse crimes than ever dreamed of by the Yugoslav military. Nevertheless, the Balkans can rest calmly now, with Bosnia under tenuous UN administration, Kosovo the perpetual ward of NATO, Serbia an American puppet with a tentative lid on mounting dissent, and KLA troops infiltrating Macedonia. What a glorious victory for rapid intervention and flexibile response!

Americans point to the Kosovo incident and state that the Security Council was deliberately avoided for good reason; Russia would have vetoed action, being a historical ally of Serbia. But does not the argument that the UN is unrepresentative and ineffective contradict, if tthe interests of Serbia and Russia were dismissed as merely blocking the inevitable advance of "righteousness"? The American programme should be exposed for what it is: the attempt to force the rest of the world to fit a rigid mold: conformity with the United States. The opinions expressed so far have been those of the American left. On the right, Americans feel the United Nations is ineffective so long as it does not advance their agenda of promoting Western (read, American) civilisation worldwide through the application of punishing force to those who challenge it. The idea that all should be represented is anathema to them; they believe the UN should either become, itself, a "coalition" to fight for an Americanised globe or be consigned to oblivion.

The infinite dangers of unipolar hegemony, not reliance on internationalism, were exposed by the circumstances surrounding the Iraq war. It is evident, yes, that the United Nations could and should increase its legitimacy, but that is not a primary issue, as it provides an institution far more legitimate than any one in which a world accedes to one global hyperpuissance. What the United Nations really needs to do is formulate a way by which it can uphold its laws equally: to checkmate the hyperpower and regain its status as the preeminent global body. This will ultimately only be achieved through the reformation of its institutions and the subsequent reorganisation of the world into a multipolar balance of power state, a stabilisation essential for effective partnership and compromise rather than railroaded dissent giving way to unilateralist mantra.

The first aspect of this reform should allow the UN to become more legitimate via the creation of a tricameral decision-making apparatus. As it is previously, the General Assembly would represent each member state with one representative and one vote. However, a popularly-elected assembly would include representatives based upon population; guaranteeing China more leeway than tiny Luxembourg. Finally, a form of the Security Council is maintained, with much broader representation, a lack of veto power, and the ability to dissolve and regenerate in order to reflect the realities of global power. Some formula of economic, military, populational, and other strengths would endow a nation or supranational organisation the capacity for status within this council. With such a capacity for democratic representation, without the encumberment of veto power, the United States is arrayed against, theoretically, the five billion plus world citizens opposing its policies. The neoconservative factionaries, of course, would argue a significant number of the delegates were appointed by "undemocratic regimes." Nevertheless, a large majority would have to be legitimate in their eyes. Furthermore, that minority of appointees, one may argue, is necessary to maintain for the sake of representing states which would otherwise be isolated from the global governance system and could inevitably pose a threat to regional or world security.

Ultimately, however, the United States may choose to act even in contravention of the decisions of such a representative body. Though the world has self-correcting mechanisms for such action (such as the collapse of all empires, inevitably) one would not prefer to witness the cycle of violence preceeding the US' apogee and demarcating its decline. Once again the problem of containing the United States emerges, and once again the imperialists gloat ironically that the lack of such capability indicates the superiority of the American system. However, this journal most famously postulated the means by which the US could be contained solely by the influence of European balance. The US' concentration on the blunt power of military strength has led it to ignore the socioeconomic perils of such a decision. As such, Europe, and, indeed, the rest of the world in concert is in a position to engage in "soft balancing" against the United States. Consider- within the reformed UN described above, directly elected representatives from, say, Australia, would be able to oppose American action in contradiction to its government's position. The ability for such undermining undercuts the US ability to threaten governments, and extends the principle of more direct democracy to much of the earth. Hence, the sovereignty of the nation-state is obsolete- there is no "national interest," in the case of those participants which allow their citizens the privelege, but the "sovereignty of the individual" is upheld. Nevertheless, even at the level of national sovereignty, one cannot argue mere "national interest" keeps the UN ineffective. Parties and representatives in every legislature present differing interests. Even the most limited form of real action by the UN, remember, represents a truer form of global democracy than one in which the citizens of the United States form a sort of aristocracy, able to decide the world's fate by their votes alone. If such a system were to be hypothetically applied to the Iraq war, the tricameral United Nations would have decided overwhelmingly against action.

However, let us consider how the US and UK skirted around even seeking direct UN approval for the use of force- the invocation of another resolution, 1441, seemingly authorising "consequences," vaguely. This type of misapprehension cries out for a body to interpret international law. The world needs a sort of constitutional court, in which such application can be debated. Ergo, no nation would be able to seize upon a law and mold it to fit its explicit purposes.

This, moreover, is the most difficult point to make, the United Nations needs inevitably to back its voice with an enforcement mechanism. And, inevitably, this will mean military engagement to some degree. Shortly before the Second Gulf War, UN forces were stationed along the Iraq-Kuwait border, and were promptly removed by Kofi Annan, much to the consternation of some. In the future, in order to guard against such aggressive action, in order to ensure its will is heard, the UN will need to present a literal barrier to expansionism. One can only hope it is considered a deterrant to military action and not a component of national defence for an aggressor to annihalate. The UN must slowly apprehend the right to be the global policeman, in order to make more subtle reactions and more nuanced decisions to effectively improve situations rather than inflame them as in the US "shock and awe" methodological framework.

In the long term, containing the United States requires a balanced world. Though the US might inevitably realise that dangers are posed to it not merely out of irrational blind hatred, jealousy, or pure "evil," but rather thoughts, opinions, and ideas which result from its willingness to continually ignore the power of international popular conception of it, it will never fully engage such an international system without the pressure of influential nonmilitary rivals. It requires a strongly united Europe with an expanded sphere of interest encompassing Turkey, the southern Mediterranean, and Russia. It needs a pact of Latin American nations resisting attempts to be colonised by neoliberal economics. It needs unity among East Asian states sick of being pawns in a new strategic chess between the US, China, and North Korea. Such superblocs pave the way for subordination of the national interest, as the American hegemonists so smugly claim is impossible- the European Union is already the model of a future world system based upon such supranational-subsidiary relationships.

Finally, the revived United Nations should concentrate on regulating untrammeled global trade and thus thwarting the economic institutions like the IMF and World Bank which grant the US such economic supremacy. It can then assist in building the economies of beleaguered deveoping nations, whose deficiencies become assets for a hierarchical world in which the United States reigns with supreme potency and prejudice. Extending the principles of social justice to the international theatre makes the proto-slavery around which empires are constructed impossible. Not only, though, is the political balance corrected, but much of the unrest which contributes to global security concerns is alleviated. The United Nations would then become as Europe was after the 1815 Congress of Vienna- a guarantor of the peace by maintaining an equilibrium of interests, a harmonious Concert of Earth.

~

Notes on the Global Condition-

-FRANCE'S controversial Interior Minister, Nicholas Sarkozy, met with his equally controversial US counterpart, Attorney General John Ashcroft, to discuss a "thaw" on Franco-American relations regarding security and cooperation in fighting terrorism. Once again, France is being careful to make overtures on important issues, like Bush's war against terror and the ending of sanctions on Iraq, in order to not only rebuild ties with the US, but to make its principled stances on other affairs more acceptable.

-AL-QAEDA may be growing, with opinions in the Islamic world hardening against the United States in response to the war on Iraq. This represents one of the chief fears of war opponents, validated, in fact, by the Bush administration when it warns of terrorist retaliations. It is also a product of the revenge cycle, into which the United States may feel itself being sucked ala Israel due to its occupation of Iraq. Not to mention, the Boston Globe presents an interesting analysis of the concept of national revenge.

-COLOMBIAN military units, say the United States, have made gains against Colombia's three primary rebel factions, in the US' much touted failure, the war on drugs. Though this is ostensibly a success for US policy, the fact is that coca sales in Colombia cannot be halted through the simple application of swift force, nor can the popularly-supported leftist rebel groups be persuaded to quit their causes. The Colombian situation has always portended ominously as a new Vietnam, the US pursuing a vague and inscrutable goal in a jungle, and trying to suppress forces motivated by socioeconomic concerns with US-advised forces. The conflict only has potential to expand.

-ATTENDEZ, mes visiteurs francophones- Je voudrais exprimer ma gratitude pour votre appui. Je sais que les vues dans la France, le Québec, et d'autres pays de la francophonie soyez semblable à ceux exprimées sur ce journal, et j'attends avec intérêt d'augmenter le rapport de ce journal avec le lectorat du monde francophone.

2003-05-04T01:09:00.000-04:00

On the Coattails of Power
Surveying the Motives of "New Europe"

"Iraq est omnis divisa in partes tres..."

PERHAPS someday historians will pen this paraphrase of Caesar's famed opening line to De Bello Gallico. Der Spiegel reported yesterday that the United States plans to carve three occupation zones from the soils of conquered Iraq- one American, one British, and one Polish. Furthermore, a multinational "stabilisation force" composed of up to ten more participating states will be involved in the policing of Iraq. Lest one grow too excited that the United States is beginning to awaken to the idea of even nominal international cooperation, the United Nations has been specifically excluded from any activity other than the provision of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, while the Polish and British will merely be at the "spearhead" of a multinational force within their respective occupation zones, the Americans will have total control over theirs (most likely the resource-rich sectors and possibly Baghdad). Enthusiastic Poland announced its troops would be ready for deployment in Iraq by the end of this month- a nation constantly conquered had turned conqueror.

With Britain, it was difficult to see the benefits of action with the United States against Iraq. International relations experts called it bandwagoning, a process by which a country supplicates itself to the dominant superpower. It is beneficial, they note, when facing hostility from another superpower, but nonsensical when one power is able to claim global hegemony. For Britain, considered a world power, still, in its own right, the war against Iraq seemed to run contrary to the national interest. One would have to consign its reasons for joining such an adventure to Tony Blair's obsessions with the "special relationship" between the US and Britain (which, in all fairness, has haunted every Prime Minister since Sir Anthony Eden) as well as a group within Britain which has always wanted to see the return of the empire utilising American military strength and tempered British experience. For the nations of the "New Europe," (to use unfortunate Rumsfeldian newspeak) however, alignment with the United States is driven by a clear and principled objective: the rise to global prestige.

On 1 May US Secretary of State Colin Powell flew to Madrid to meet with Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. Spain has been a key ally for the Bush administration, representing the fact that obsequious gestures to the United States in Europe are alive and well. For the conservative government of José Maria Aznar, however, it has been a disaster. Spanish public opinion was wholeheartedly against the war. The situation was similar in Italy, where rainbow-coloured "Pace" signs covered every apartment house, and opposition to the war was so vocal that the corrupt, neo-fascist, pro-American Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi could only provide the most nominal material support for the United States, and could not openly announce support for the Iraq invasion. In Eastern and Central Europe support for the war was, in some cases, statistically lower than in Germany or France. However, the much-lauded spirit of Europe isn't necessarily enough to topple vehemently pro-American governments, when elections so often revolve around domestic economic issues. Of course, Gerhard Schroeder in Germany managed to be elected on a firm antiwar platform- but in the heat of the moment. When the anger simmers over the aggression in Iraq there's no reason to believe voters will turn against governments due to old foreign policy decisions. Even if the conservative governments of Rumsfeld's "New Europe" were to fall, however, there are forces propelling such nations toward the United States inherent in their respective characters which might manifest themselves in any administration.

Spain is the prime example. After joining the European Economic Community following the end of Francisco Franco's stranglehold of its politics, Spain's economy boomed wildly. Investment poured in from Brussels and the EEC capitals. Today, Spain has become a preeminent global economic power and one within Europe as well. It is the sixth largest investor in the world and the largest in Latin America. With a common linguistic and cultural community representing hundreds of millions, Spain is heavily influenced by centrifugal forces in its former colonial empire, which now promise more dazzling riches than conjoinment with a federalised Europe. Spain sees itself, like Britain, a beneficiary of both the open borders and cross-investment of Europe and the economic treasures it can cull from South and Central America. In this regard, it has been enormously successful- Madrid has become the de facto cultural capital of an emerging "Hispanosphere," and Spain has managed to both promote the virtues of and gain free trade with South America's MerCoSur trading bloc, a group the European Union hopes will be its Latin American equivalent. Nevertheless, Spain aspires to greater heights- it sees this level of economic and political power translating to world leadership, and saw close allegiance to the United States as a means of achieving these ends. Already, by aligning itself with American neoliberal trade practises, it has managed to gain its significant financial foothold in South America (much to the detriment of South Americans beset with the difficulties of uncontrolled globalisation, cf. Argentina).

One may wonder why Spain would pass up the opportunity to become part of a potential superpower like the European Union for a somewhat humbler, British-type position. The answer is twofold. One factor is that Spain feels it has the ability to achieve a significant proportion of global influence on its own, and that it does not need to become a part of Brussels. Second, and more importantly, Spain sees such a European superpower dominated by the Franco-German axis, which has been the engine for deeper European integration, historically. The worry that national sovreignty may be acceded to the Paris-Berlin consensus runs deep in Eurosceptic nations caught outside its embrace. For conservative governments especially within such states as Spain and Italy, the prospect of entrusting one's strength to a European power whose decisions are based primarily on the imput of two capitals is severely disconcerting. Moreso for Spain, which sees the achievement of "independent" global power, through the "assistance" of the United States, as entirely plausible.

Poland, too, feels it is capable of a more global role, and has therefore looked toward pairing with the United States to achieve projection of its influence. In an interview with Le Monde, President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that:

We made in all sovereignty the decision to support the United States. That was not an easy decision, but I was persuaded that it was suitable. The Poles are a nation which understand that certain moments in history it is better to be active than passive.

On the prewar diplomatic situation, Kwasniewksi said vaguely, "we thought the UN had a role to play. One knows what occurred." He is curt because he is stuck between his belief in the United Nations and multilateralism and the benefits Poland will reap from the operation in Iraq. He is unequivocal in stating:

As regards the rebuilding, it is an interesting market, with great projects which will be financed by international money. We want to take part in it.

The opportunity for Polish investments abroad is, indeed, one of Kwasniewski's goals. Like Spain, it seeks broader economic and political power, though its lack of an established cultural commonwealth leads it to try and ween these from an unprovokedly assaulted neo-colony. Furthermore, Poland's position as roughly equal in population and military size to other major European states drives it to seek a position of equal world influence. Nevertheless, Poland is driven by other concerns, as well. Its large agrarian constituency has been traditionally Eurosceptic and this sentiment, along with numerous ties with Polish relatives in the United States, leads Poland to gravitate toward Washington.

The United States, for its part, seemed to have discovered during its initiative to include the former Eastern Bloc countries in NATO that offering measurable influence to certain states in exchange for support on certain American positions was a valuable diplomatic tool. The US has similarly endeavoured to split Europe recently. Colin Powell visited Tirana Friday, where he signed the US-Adriatic Partnership Charter. Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia were all given assurances the US would assist them in their efforts to join the NATO alliance, as a seeming reward for supporting the war against Iraq. The setting of the summit in Albania was meant to indicate strong support for that country by the United States, as it pledged to not turn over any US citizens to the International Criminal Court. The US has also begun to work through disincentives. The American trade representative made threats against Germany yesterday, and multinational corporations are calling for a truce in the budding trade war with France.

Though the policies of the "New Europe" states seem poised to gain them more influence in the near future, prostrating one's nation before the United States lately is a bit like the proverbial making of a deal with the devil- one is granted untold benefits in the short-term, but in the long term, one's soul is condemned. How long are Spain, Poland, et al willing to pledge support for operations which will ultimately bring about backlash? Will angry protesters in Iraq really differentiate between a US occupation force and one composed of a small collection of its equally white, Christian "New Europe" allies? Even if a more united Europe was dominated to a significant extent by France and Germany, Spain and Poland would be accorded requisite legal representation in Brussels. Meanwhile, officials in Washington have no obligation to hear the entreaties of the Spanish or Polish ambassadors, let alone forced to consider their propositions. Washington's attitude toward the protestations of France and Germany, former close allies, were indications enough of this. Indeed, the "New European" states may gain influence over the world, but no influence over what direction that world goes in.

Le Monde also runs an interesting editorial on the influence of Europe over the next 50 years, which will apparently decline dramatically in the face of a stable United States and rapidly growing Asia. Its prescription is not only a far more closely united Europe, but a mass-immigration programme and inclusion of Russia and southern Mediterranean states within its bloc. This is, perhaps, a far-fetched solution, but the warnings over the slow disappearance of European power should disturb all European states. Even those, like Britain and Spain, staking out "cultural spheres" along the lines of their former empires will most likely be pulled into centres of gravity other than their own- Britain discovered this in its attempt to gain influence over the United States. Spain particularly should be aware the wealth which allowed it to become a leader in Latin America was provided solely by a united Europe. Certainly, representative and deep European unity remains the best option for the "New European" states.

In Europe's state of disarray, however, how could it be achieved? Though France and Germany retain their principled stances on the execution of the war, the remaining common positions of not only the European populace, but its government, is promising. The EU's pledge that the United Nations should have a "central role" in Iraq should be treated less like the tepid compromise it's been labeled as in the media and more like directed policy. Poland's president, in his Le Monde interview, stated that he does not support the neoconservative agenda, would like to see the return of UN weapons inspectors, will not stand for American energy interests raping Iraq dry of its oil, and that Poland is as interested in working with the "Berlin-Paris-Moscow line" as with the United States. Kwasniewski noted that France was the largest investor in Poland, its most ardent sponsor in its pursuit of NATO and EU membership, and that quips by Jacques Chirac would not serve as replacements for such facts in determining Poland's relationship with Paris. Poland, France, and Germany are to meet as the "Weimar Triangle" on May 9 to discuss enlargement issues. Other "New European" governments are similarly ambiguous on many issues, and in the postwar period their views are increasingly shifting toward the consensus of Paris and Berlin. Even the UK can't deny it wishes the significant presence of the UN in Iraq. Using its immense economic and diplomatic power, a united European front is capable of putting such demands before the US, and gaining significant victories against its New World Order.

2003-05-03T14:44:00.000-04:00

Roadmap Roundup

TODAY, US Secretary of State Colin Powell is in the Mideast attempting to gain Arab support for the new Israeli-Palestinian peace plan (the "Roadmap"). Integral to the plan, the State Department believes, is achieving the end to sponsorship of Palestinian insurgent groups by Syria and its client state, Lebanon. Unfortunately for Powell, this strategy of engaging the nations of the Arab world without first directly addressing the central players, Israel and the Palestinian organisations, has been tried and failed before. Henry Kissinger attempted it after the Yom Kippur War to no avail, and Jimmy Carter had hoped his Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt would lead to a "domino effect" of such peaces between Israel and its Arab neighbours, concluding with the Palestinians. The central problem with these approaches is, while they recognise the role played by Arab states in the conflict, they fail to comprehend that the Israel-Palestinian conflict is the engine driving antipathy between the Arab world and Israel, rather than outside influence manipulating the Palestinians against Israel.

The failures of the Roadmap are numerous, but generally, they are the failure to recognise the inability of the Palestinian Authority to control militant Islamist groups, the intransigence of Israel's equally militant Likud Party, the Likudnik influences upon the United States government, and the United States' arrogant declaration of its sole proprietorship over the Roadmap's implementation. Powell believes the Palestinian groups will fall in line once Syria and Lebanon end their support. Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas are known to train in Syria's Beka'a Valley, and the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) has been a constant thorn in Israel's side since the Lebanese civil war. The United States believes, furthermore, that its annihalation of the Iraqi government has proven a potent example to other Middle Eastern governments which dare stand in the way of American initiatives. Its influence over the government of Bashar Assad, ergo, would not be achieved through warfare (well, not just yet, at least) but via intimidation. Powell himself stated that the capitualation of Iraq's government to an American Raj represented a "new strategic situation" to which Syria had to respond. Assad knows the United States can claim potent casi bellorum against Syria- the stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, the harbouring of Iraqi Ba'athists, the aiding of terrorist organisations- and that its troops are poised to strike from Iraq. Speculation is rampant that the United States is planning a military assault on Syria, but the objectives of the neoconservatives (at least, those with influence over the administration) are compliance with the United States first, forced "democratisation" second. As long as Assad displays an acceptable level of sycophantry toward the US, his "régime" is guaranteed some momentum.

However, Assad does not have an entirely obsequious agenda. Having supported Iraq's Ba'athist government in its defence against the United States' assult on the country, Assad has the support of a significant cross-section of his population as well the role of symbolic leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. Furthermore, he realises the Bush administration may not have the support from its electoral constituency to carry out an attack on Syria, at least so soon after the Iraq war. He has already managed to outflank the United States within the United Nations, calling for a ban on weapons of mass destruction across the Middle East. This would have cleverly exposed Israel's WMD programme while simultaneously painting Syria in the light of a sponsor of peaceful détente. However, as Ha'aretz reports, Powell spurned the invitation to eradicate WMDs. Responding to the Syrian entreaties, he responded ambiguously that [Mideast disarmament] "is a goal that we have to pursue over time, and not... at the moment of any particular declaration that might be put forward for political purposes, or to highlight the issue." Assad has also tempered potential discordant issues with the US by turning over some members of the former Iraqi government and cooperating with the United States in its pursuit of al-Qaeda.

When Powell appeared at a conference in Beirut, the US agenda was rebuffed by Lebanese Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, who stated security requires peace and that "no global peace is stable without justice and equity," evidently a call for a more internationalist approach to US and Israeli foreign affairs. Syria's Al-Thawra agreed, noting that "peace and security are achieved by respecting laws and international resolutions and tackling all the causes that led to the new reality." Powell considers the meetings with Syria and Lebanon to produce no noticeable or tangible result within the next few days, but expects some form of agreement to emerge within the coming week. Nevertheless, indications are that there is little to agree upon. The Syrian state media stated that "the peace and security the hot-headed in the U.S. administration talk about will not be achieved by missiles and planes," while Powell demanded "the Lebanese army [essentially controlled by Syria] to deploy to the border and end the armed Hezbollah militia presence."

It's unclear what Syria or Assad achieve from such US diatribes other than an indication that noncompliance might result in Damascus' eventual cluster-bombing. Powell, besieged by a foreign policy programme increasingly influenced by the Pentagon, has been forced to take a hard line in his negotiations (many hawks did not even wish Powell to make such a visit to the "terrorist state" of Syria). Powell cannot even pursue the "land for peace" policies pursued by Kissinger and Carter- offering the Golan Heights to Syria would be an outrage to the Likudniks in both Israel and the US. The essential failures of the roadmap- the lack of pressure on Israel and the inability to control Palestinian violence- remain. Syria's influence over the groups is notable but not considerable; indeed, if Mahmoud Abbas, the new Palestinian prime minister, does not have significant influence, Assad certainly does not. The recognition that these are popular movements catalysed from a restive Palestinian population and not paramilitary adjuncts of the Syrian or Lebanese armies is crucial. If the United States is serious about peace, it would engage Syria in far more constructive negotiations, with the Golan and recognition of the Israeli states as bargaining chips, while pursuing a more realistic agenda in Palestine. Furthermore, it should entertain the Syrian proposal on Mideast WMDs. The removal of Israeli nuclear weapons would not seriously compromise Israeli security (is the US really prepared to defend the use of such weapons by Israel?) and would be a triumph for the Arab world. Remembering the role pride plays in such negotiations is critical. Providing the background of a triumph for the Arabs to the Roadmap's implementation could help paper over the wounds of the Iraq invasion (to a certain extent) and make certain organisations more cooperative.

Still, the primary recognition should be that the heart of the problem lies not with the peripheral states, but within Israel and Palestine themselves. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is quite peripheral to the tension between Israel and Arab states in the Mideast, it is highly symbolic, and therefore crucial it is solved forthwith. Ending Saddam Hussein's government, which provided nominal support for the Palestinian groups, or pressuring Assad's, which granted slightly more, is not a feasible means to a permanent solution. That will only occur if the US goes down a road its current presidential administration is entirely unwilling to engage in- the inclusion of Islamist groups in the Palestinian government, and manipulating Israel with its tremendous leverage. In short, toppling Saddam and threatening Assad will not end the violence in Israel- indeed, images of Iraqis at Fallujah throwing rocks at American occupation troops is evidence the Intifada has only spread.

~

Notes on the Global Condition-

-THE EUROPEAN UNION's Greek presidency is playing down tensions over Iraq within the organisation, noting that it must now work together in order to achieve effective Iraqi reconstruction. Under a multinational occupation force now proposed by the United States, Iraq may be divided into American, British, and Polish occupation zones, with other European troops involved. Opponents of the war would not be allowed to participate, the US has indicated. The US is clearly attempting to indicate its support for and to award those countries supporting its policies toward Iraq. Nevertheless, the idea of a Polish occupation zone (among other things) seems far-fetched. The legitimacy of any Iraqi occupation is questionable until the state is under the mandate or the direct administration of the United Nations. Not only would Iraqis be less hostile to occupation forces with Arab troops, under UN auspices, involved, but it would allow for officials with far more experience and success building genuinely representative states to head the country's reconstruction, and guard against a world order in which national influence is apportioned by the Pentagon rather than a worldwide body. Furthermore, the United States has made it eminently clear, via its promulgations vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian "Roadmap" and contempt for any constraints upon its will, that it will not tolerate dissension among its Allies on critical issues. How will UK tolerance for a Shi'ite Islamist government correspond to American plans for a puppet secular "democracy"?

-CUBA's crackdown on dissidents in the past few weeks (including the summary execution of some) has caused considerable consternation amongst those who considered the Cuban government to be less the monstrous affair American propaganda has painted it as over the last forty years. Nevertheless, Counterpunch asks critical questions about the flagrant violations of human rights in Cuba. One's intellectual curiosity is rather limited, indeed, if one accepts the fact that Castro executed the individuals in question out of sheer wickedness. Saul Landau asserts, instead, that Castro fears he may be next on the list of dictatorships targeted by bellicose neoconservatives, and in paranoia has attempted to eradicate any potential subversion, which he sees ultimately as attempts by the US at his undermining. He has credible reason to fear- the United States has been actively attempting everything short of direct, armed invasion (the Bay of Pigs operation was attempted via proxy forces) since the Revolution to overthrow Castro and return the island to the paradise of quasi-slavery it enjoyed under Fulgencio Batista. Add to this the Bush administration's desire to court the votes of wealthy Cuban exiles in Miami, and it would seem entirely plausible to Castro he is the next course on the Pentagon's colonial menu.

2003-05-01T17:44:00.000-04:00

Occupational Hazard

American officials have been mounting a campaign of doublespeak concerning their new colonies of Iraq and Afghanistan (though, honestly, Afghanistan was more of a smash-and-run job). Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, on his tour of the crown jewels of the New World Order, said of Afghanistan that merely "pockets of resistance" existed and that "[US forces] are at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilisation and reconstruction activities." However, Rumsfeld also admitted that US forces would remain in Afghanistan for "years" to provide security for Hamid Karzai's government.

Yet it is hard to justify Rumsfeld's claims that the security situation in Afghanistan is the best it has been in 25 years. Indeed, Afghanistan at its most stable was the unfortunate reign of the Taliban. Miserable as it was, it may have represented a forward step forward from the dregs warloard-feuds. Karzai's government lacks utterly the resources to provide a stable Afghanistan; indeed, his Afghan National Army cannot secure any regions outside a small radius from Kabul. The much vaunted "Marshall Plan for Afghanistan" has failed to materialise in any capacity. Indeed, a brief row between the State and Defence Departments a few weeks ago degenerated into a debate as to whether enough money was being provided even to build Afghan roads. Afghan citizens commonly complain the United States is spending overwhelming amounts on education for women and little on any immediate necessary improvements. The US has found itself in the same awkward position as in Iraq- engagement of the warlords would require large-scale troop mobilisation and a possible guerilla war including numerous casualties- not to mention a post-neutralisation troop-heavy policing of the country's rough, mountainous terrain. Failure to engage will result in, well, the current situation, hardly amenable to anyone with a sober and informed perspective. Add to this precarious catch-22 the fact that the understaffed US military presence there is constantly preoccupied with fighting what Rumsfeld calls "pockets of resistance"- regrouping Taliban leaders and al-Qaeda operatives in the mountains. A classic "invasion of Afghanistan" scenario has thus emerged, of the type which kept the British and Soviets at bay. The resistance has fled to the hills, strengthening its forces, marshalling its resources. The war in Afghanistan drags on as media attention shifts elsewhere- in the long term, the US may not be seen as successful as initially observed. Afghanistan is also a potent illustration of how international organisations, too, require requisite stability to operate. The UN invokes precedents of its operatives working in effective concert with US officials in Kabul as well as Hamid Karzai's government- but in addition to assassination attempts (and some successes) on the Karzai government, UN offices in Kabul have been targeted by warlords and NGO aid workers captured by the reemerging Taliban in the country's southeast. Meanwhile, civilians die by the dozens in factional skirmishes and the Taliban is once again on the offencive. The Asia Times reports an even more dire situation for the US in Afghanistan- an international coalition (a real one) composed of Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, not to mention Iranian intervention- all actively pledged to subvert American interests there.

The emerging failure of the American occupation of Iraq is being more openly exposed (as there were ultimately more sceptics of this latest war than of that in Afghanistan, and because of the latent media correspondants stationed there). Protests in Fallujah, a stronghold of Sunni Arab conservatism (and loyalty to Saddam Hussein) erupted in violence two days ago as US troops shot dead as many as fifteen protesters under suspect circumstances. The next day, the citizens of Fallujah protested again, and three more deaths resulted in the ensuing clash between the crowd and US troops. Most recently, seven American soldiers were injured by a grenade attack upon an American compound in Fallujah. This Israeli-Palestinian style cycle of retribution is the least of the United States' problems in its new arid lebensraum. American officials now must not only worry about the potent political force of Iraqi Shi'ites, but the antipathy of its Sunni population as well. In the north, it faces a growing hostility between Kurdish and Turkoman groups (the latter accuse the former of ethnic cleansing in its seizures of Mosul and Kirkuk in early April). Additionally, the two major Kurdish factions have seized leftover Iraqi armaments, in preparation either to fight American forces for an independent Kurdistan, a looming Turkish presence to the north, or, perhaps, each other.

Amongst these developments, President Bush is expected, in a carefully orchestrated photo-op aboard an American aircraft carrier, announce officially the end to hostilities in Iraq. The White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, announced rather glibly that "the Iraqi people have freedom," and that "the threat to the United States has been removed," neither of which, of course, is true. The Iraqi people will never be truly free, as, even if accorded the "government of their choice," by the United States, the interests of Kurdish independence, Shi'ite theocracy, or Sunni neo-Ba'athism are likely to propel a civil war with rapid intervention by Turkey and Iran. Iraq was never a threat to the United States by any stretch of the imagination; indeed, following the Gulf War and postwar sanctions, it was unlikely Iraq could pose a plausible threat to Kuwait again. Nevertheless, Defence Secretary Rumsfeld announced yesterday:

Let me be clear: Iraq belongs to you [Iraqis]. We do not want to run it. Our coalition came to Iraq for a purpose - to remove a regime that oppressed your people and threatened ours. Our goal is to restore stability and security so that you can form an interim government and eventually a free Iraqi government - a government of your choosing, a government that is of Iraqi design and Iraqi choice. We will stay as long as necessary to help you do that, and not a day longer.

One would be forgiven for thinking that when President Bush announced that the "one clear purpose" of military operations against Iraq was solely "disarmament" that he was articulating the primary, secondary, or even bottom-rung justification for the conflict. Nevertheless, Rumsfeld's remarks taken in context have been far more ambiguous. This statement reneges on several previous commitments of US troops for specific long durations of time, and more recent statements to equal effect. It is interesting that UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw noted on a BBC radio programme Sunday morning that a fundamentalist regime may be tolerated, even welcomed, by Britain as a sign of Mideastern progress, recognising the example of Iran. A member of the "axis of evil" a credible model for the future government of a state targeted for immediate Americanisation? The extent to which Britain has been included in decisions on Iraqi reconstruction is the most potent illustration in itself of how such remarks must have been received in the twin neoconservative citadels of the American Enterprise Institute and the Project for a New American Century. Rumsfeld has already declared a Shi'ite theocracy inexcusable.

Finally, Ole Woehler Olsen, of the Danish Foreign Service, has been selected to administer southern Iraq's Basra province. He is said to understand the Arab world "to its fingertips." If this is so, perhaps his first recommendation should be that the Arab world does not enjoy subordination to hegemonistic Western powers seeking to maintain their status and exploit local resources via coerced assimilation to their values.

~

Notes on the Global Condition-

When I wrote of strategies for the European containment of the US, I referenced the influence debts owed to Japan had on American policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Now Japan's Daily Yomiuri muses on how Japan, too, can use its economic power to right the United States. Though many of the ideas are radically militarist and/or economically libertarian, there are some less ideological, more considered designs for a rebuffing of American inlfuence over Japanese economic affairs and its foreign policy.

BBC reports concisely on the "new reality of American power." Most intriguing is former President Clinton's statement that "[America's] paradigm now seems to be: Something terrible happened to [it] on 11 September and that gives [it] the right to interpret all future events in a way that everyone else in the world must agree with. And if they don't, they can go straight to hell."

The Asia Times' Ahmad Faruqui provides an excellent analysis of the rise of neoconservatism and neoconservatism in his piece "Battle for the Soul of the American Republic." Particularly illuminating is the prospect that even Francis Fukuyama of "end of history" fame is arguing for imperial contraction and consolidation.

2003-04-30T18:32:00.000-04:00

Redressing the Atlantic Balance

Recent events indicate the pre-war European schism may have a longer duration than many initially anticipated. Snide American diplomats and their ilk in the British Foreign Service predicted both Schroeder and Chirac would be on their needs upon the successful completion of the war, begging to re-enter the superficial amity of the Atlantic system. Russia, too, would fall in, it was speculated. The "big three" European leaders (Chirac, Schroeder, and Putin), however, mounted this week an improbable rejection of the current Atlantic order. The troika would demand its loans to Iraq paid back in full, and Russia, during a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Tony Blair, went so far as to demand the entry of UN weapons inspectors for independent varification of alleged Iraqi weapons caches, in exhange for its lifting of sanctions on Iraq. The inception of a summit on unified European defence also caused considerable tensions between the Franco-German-Benelux "core Europe" and its peripheral fringes, which are traditionally opposed to attempts to "deepen" the European Union or move in a counterpolar direction, away from US policy dictations.

Traditionally, the European Union's strengthening has come from initiatives within the Franco-German axis, which, from the Elysée Treaty onward, has driven European integration. The idea of a central bank and unified currency had always been a German imperative; France sought expanded access to resources and markets. Together with Belgium and Luxembourg, they form the "Core Four" of the European Union represented at the defence summit. Once again, pragmatic reality dictates a European policy be tested in Europe's heart before its adoption by the remainder of the Union. A secret German document leaked to Sueddeutsche Zeitung contained plans for a Berlin-led effort to create a unified EU military by 2014, centrally commanded from Brussels and under a collective EU defence budget. In a way, this initial core commitment is greatly consistent with the EU's fundamental philosophies, that, especially, it is a consensual Union which entices prospective members (or, in this case, deepeners) with successful policies. More evident is the lack of coherent framework within the EU government in its pre-constitutional position to engage in such holistic debates. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the traditionally eurosceptical regions of the EU failed to represent themselves, especially after the row over Iraq. Nevertheless, the prospect of this "optional" summit on European defence drew fire from the Spanish Foreign Minister, Ana Palacio:

European security and defense policy cannot become an exclusive project. Any adventure [that sought to build a defence policy without the rest of the EU in agreement] would have no right to call itself European.

Despite widespread agreement on the need for a European defence framework, even by Britain, and the bolstering of a European Rapid Reaction Force to a size of 60,000, such initiatives were spurned by the pro-American governments of the UK and Italy as well. The defence guidelines drawn up between the UK and France at Le Touquet in January are seemingly scrapped. The perception is that the summit, including high profile members of the anti-war alliance, is meant to serve as a means to producing a counterpolar military force. This would not necessarily be a negative development, as discussed below, but those who interpret the summit in this way widely misinterpreted its intent. Indeed, American officials seemed to have little grasp of its intent (Colin Powell remarked that "four of the nations of the EU have come together and created some sort of a plan to develop some sort of a headquarters") to begin with. The heaviest criticism of the plan, that it was intended to create a force acting independently, rather than within NATO, should have been dampened by Franco-German efforts to curb Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt's enthusiasm for a totally independent force. They seem to have succeeded. Verhofstadt described the summit to the press as an attempt to strengthen NATO's "European pillar." Nevertheless Verhofstadt's longing for a non-allied counterpole seemed evident when he stated that:

If we want to count on the international scene, if we want to avoid division, which we experienced during the Iraq crisis, then it's absolutely necessary that we have European defence. Otherwise EU foreign policy is not credible.

However, Verhofstadt, Schroeder, Chirac, and Luxembourgeois Prime Minister Juncker issued a joint statement later during the summit stating that "the trans-Atlantic partnership remains an essential strategic priority for Europe." The essential disagreement, therefore, seemed to stem from the nature of that partnership. The statement seemed to highlight the "Core Four" perspective:

The time has come to take new steps in the construction of a Europe of security and defence based on strengthened European military capabilities, which will also give a new vitality to the Atlantic alliance.

Schroeder stated that what he "wanted to change" was that "In NATO, we do not have too much America, we have too little Europe." Charges that the proposed European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) was a redundant duplication of NATO were refuted by Chirac. "We have not decided to create a European SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. This is not about duplicating SHAPE, but eliminating duplication by national headquarters," he said. International organisations have been less sceptical of the summit. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana described the summit initiative as "positive." The EU It was received warmly but somewhat apprehensively at NATO itself. The recommendations of the summit, many agree, correspond to European defence initiatives enthusiastically supported by the abstaining states prior to the Iraqi divide.

More overtly, the Putin-Blair meeting highlighted Russian strategy in attempting to counterbalance US power, as it had during the Cold War. Putin is motivated somewhat by domestic political concerns, which make it necessary for him to appear in a nationalist position. Echoing the popular consensus, Moskovskiy Komsomolets reported, rather sardonically, that "Blair will try to convince Putin of the obviousness of the new law of physics by which the world must be ruled by one force, from one centre - and to explain where this centre is located." Moscow publically rebuffed Blairite attempts to "woo" it into the Anglo-American fold. Putin openly mocked the ostensible justification for the Iraq war- the weapons of mass destruction, which have heretofore been undiscovered. He declared that Russia would not even allow sanctions to be lifted without the return of UN weapons inspectors, and that Russia would only consent to loan restructuring rather than any repudiation of Iraq's debt. From his position of strength, Putin declared:

If the decision-making process in such a framework is democratic then that is something we could agree with, but if decisions are being made by just one member of the international community and all the others are required to support them that is something we could not find acceptable.

This statement is virtually a clarion call for an multipolar international community. Putin had expressed earlier views that the imposition of the American system on the entirety of the world was untenable. "We have no intention of dealing in the export of capitalist democratic revolution," he said at the 14 April St. Petersburg summit of anti-war leaders. "If we proceed to do that, the world will embark on a very dangerous, slippery path of an unending chain of military conflicts."

The dramatic combination of the Putin-Blair meeting and the European defence summit indicated the divisions within Europe, and, indeed, the Atlantic alliance, remained, and that the powers continued to actively seek a counterpole to impede American hegemony. Tony Blair was acutely aware of this phenomenon when he warned of the implications of a new "cold war" between Europe and the United States. Blair posed a question to Europe- whether it would develop in concert with American interests, or if it would "rapidly become rival centres of power." Warning of the latter phenomenon, Blair ruminated:

If we do not deal with the world on the basis of partnership between Europe and America, we will in a sense put back into the world divisions we wanted to get rid of when the cold war finished. I think that would be a disaster.

Blair, like the "Core Four" of the ESDU summit, invokes the term "partnership." And yet, what king of partnership is so lopsided as to grant the ability for one partner to command another? Europe is frozen out of the decision making process in the Atlantic Alliance. Britain and other pro-war European powers gained next to nothing from their support of American activities- they merely followed in expected, obsequious lockstep. During the Cold War, the United States saw the need to enlist the assistance of Europe by treating its states as partners in containing the Soviet Union. It puts on no such pretenses today. To the neoconservative faction, the finale of the Soviet threat has allotted an unprecedented preponderance of military power to the United States, to which there are relatively few deterrents. Indeed, the nature of American imperial history itself suggests that, without limits to its power, the US will seek to overspread the earth with its value system. In North Korea, American rejections of a North Korean offer to scrap its nuclear arms programme in return for oil shipments, food aid, security guarantees, energy assistance, and economic incentives confirmed that the United States no longer negotiates, it commands.

Eisenhower once said that the world must become "a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect...one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength." Hence the importance of a counterpole becomes apparent. The United States will not pay attention to Europe so long as it presents no apparent economic or imperial challenge to American hegemony (indeed, US policy is geared toward preventing this from happening). Tony Blair's warnings of a "new cold war" seem overblown, so long as Europe is careful to build its counterpole under the auspices of the Atlantic Alliance and not beyond it. In this, Schroeder and Chirac made a wise choice in not heeding Verhofstadt's fantasy of an independent EU military.

Europe, however, should be careful not to overplay the military nature of its counterpole. George Kennan was always right when he said the real challenge posed by the Soviet Union was political and economic, not military. This alone made the USSR a force to reckon with in Washington. Maintaining relatively flexible, small forces within NATO is key to preventing the balance of power from becoming a contest of might. Arms races are beneficial to no one, and the goal, ultimately, is not move Europe away from friendly relations with the US, but to make it more relevant within that framework. The most important component should always be Europe's diplomatic and financial powers. These goals can ultimately be achieved by the Franco-German core alone, if necessary, as these states are the primary creditors of both the US and Iraq as well as preeminently influential in Africa and the Middle East. The counterpolar powers can continue to implore Russia to act in concert with them as well. Europe should not seek total independence, but a manifestation of the realities of codependence in the policies of both sides of the pond. By softly and gently constraining US aggression, Europe will not abandon the Atlantic Alliance, but move it in a direction ultimately more representative of the interests of all, and not one, of its member states.

2003-04-30T00:13:00.000-04:00

The American Imperial Impulse

For all the talk of the United States' openly entering a phase of empire with its invasion and conquest of Iraq, the recent imperialist gestalt is no radical shift in the American political spirit. Originally citizens of the early British Empire, Americans inherited its expansionist spirit, its sense of divine inspiration, and its mercantilist philosophies. It was seen as pure and open ground for the expression of such an imperialist impulse, observed as early as 1725, when George Berkeley, disenchanted with the state of British society, undertook a "civilising" project in Bermuda, and upon his return enthusiastically penned the verse "America":

...In happy Climes, where from the genial Sun
And virgin Earth such Scenes ensue,
The Force of Art by Nature seems outdone,
And fancied Beauties by the true:

There shall be sung another golden Age,
The rise of Empire and of Arts,
The Good and Great inspiring epic Rage,
The wisest Heads and noblest Hearts.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heav'nly Flame did animate her Clay,
By future Poets shall be sung.

Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way;
The four first Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day;
Time's noblest Offspring is the last.

The poem is remarkable for its insight into themes which have characterised the imperial élan of the United States. The ironic strain of the glorification of its natural state as making it "pure," while celebrating the Westward expansion and resultant destruction of the natural world endemic of empire-building is to the present day a feature of American society, in which large vehicles of high fuel consumptions are consistently advertised with backdrops of spectacular natural scenery. Berkeley's pastoral reference, especially to that of the "Golden Age," the classical myth of a time before agriculture of trade, when the world was seemingly a paradise of bounty, is present. The mythology of pastoralism has shifted, however, with the advances of society. Today, the family farm and the values of the agrarian "heartland" are extolled; agriculture being seen as an archaic circumstance. Nevertheless, this period of unspoiled simplicity is characterised as containing "the Good and Great," as well as "the wisest Heads and noblest Hearts," metonymic expressions of the agents of imperialism; the "pure spirits" of rusticity so lauded by Horace which today are echoed by the intonations of Midwestern and Southern politicians who "talk straight," in the parlance of the American interior. Furthermore, the condemnation of Europe as decadent is a theme clearly evident in contemporary America, as the condemnations of the Continent's two greatest powers continue to be espoused by jingoists. The deeper meanings of "Old Europe" and "New Europe" are hence unearthed by the dichotomy between the Continent's decay and the "fresh and young," representative of the American entrepreneurial spirit.

Berkeley's last stanza, his most famous, of course the inexorable drive of Empire to the West, the greatest imperial theme of all in American history. The belief was that the Aryan race, to which innumerable ethnicities have laid claim, originated in Central Asia and migrated to Europe, from which, in Berkeley's age, they would reach America. Berkeley, among many others, imagined it was this race's destiny to encircle the globe, repopulating it with its stock. Ordinary Americans, with the foundation of the Republic, had more benign, if equally destructive, premonitions. Residual elements of early European imperialism clung to the pioneers who saw it as their birthright to push ever westward to the Pacific- the virtue of manly brawn was trumpeted above all, followed by a missionary zeal. When the British had issued the Proclamation of 1763, declaring a settlement boundary in order to appease native populations on the opposite side of the Appalachians, the Americans were apoplectic. Even more egregious, to them, was the passage of the Québec Act in Parliament, annexing much of what is now the Midwest to Québec and declaring Catholicism the official religion of the region. Anger at this concession to "the Popist French," the traditional enemies of New England and New York, and the prohibition on seeking new territory upon which to profit and Christianise were primary contributing factors in the rebellion against Britain. The end of the War of 1812 had brought an upsurge of nationalist sentiment which was further catalysed with the virtual eradication of land ownership priveleges in order to gain voting rights- the principles of Jacksonianism. Having decamped from Europe, in which many had been disdained minority elements of society, and subsequently gained a share of power through universal white male suffrage, they inferred the absolute superiority of their system, especially as evidenced by the "victories" of 1783 and 1814.

Advent of Manifest Destiny

The mélange of commercial and religious interests which drove American expansionism was compounded in the 1840s with the sense that Americanism was the destiny of the Western Hemisphere. As Native Americans were removed through either systematic genocide committed by military forces, biological warfare in the form of smallpox-covered blankets, or forcible transplantation to the tentative "Indian Territory" of Oklahoma, the cycle of success seemed to confirm God's blessing of the American nation. It was a cyclical prophecy, that American success confirmed the perfection of Americanism, but it continues to this day, in which the subjugation of Iraq is celebrated as if achieved by a divine miracle rather than superior technological and numerical force. John O'Sullivan proclaimed, in 1845:

Our manifest destiny is to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.

This was a testiment to the philosophy of Manifest Destiny, now in full swing, which embodied all the contributing factors of traditional aggressive American expansionism into one simple formula of jingoist fundamentalism. That the ideals of the American revolution would oversweep the Hemisphere was ordained by Providence itself. The country had taken its first step toward eliminating rivals by proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine, forbidding European imperial presence on the soils of the American half of the planet. The Monroe Doctrine had always been difficult to take seriously, however, as it was evident the United States did not have the power, until 1943 at least, to stave of an intervention in Central or South America by a major European empire. The doctrine was thus high on rhetoric and low on tangible enforcement capability. In 1845, with Texas having successfully revolted from Mexico and European forces capitualating to revolutions in South America, Manifest Destiny seemed assured. The tenuous nature of the new American republics, however, became clear when Britain seemed to have its sights on the potentially rich region of California. The President, James Polk, sent an envoy to Mexico to offer $25 million for all territory from California east. The Mexicans refused the offer. Polk then ordered a column of troops to the Rio Grande, then territory claimed jointly by the US and Mexico, anticipating a Mexican attack. When none came, citing unpaid debt claims and the snubbing of his envoy, Polk asked Congress for a declaration of war. Congress hesitated, but enthusiastically voted for war as soon as spurious reports came that the troops despatched had been attacked on American soil. Among the sceptics was a young congressman, Abraham Lincoln, incidentally, who believed the premises of the war false. Nevertheless, Mexican forces were routed by the US military, California was secured after an engineered rebellion among the territory's anglo-saxon population, and vast reaches of the continent were engulfed by the United States.

Limitations of Power

In Oregon, circumstances were different. A longstanding border dispute between the US and Britain would have erupted into war if not for the prudent observation that the US was best off not engaging powerful Britain, especially at the same time as it was fighting Mexico. A diplomatic settlement was reached. Henceforth, the United States would seek expansion only where it perceived imminent and obvious limits to its capacity for military victory. In 1821, John Quincy Adams, in what has onward been referred to as a polemic against expansion in the name of exporting the values of the American revolution, stated:

Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example.

She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force...She might become the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit...

[America's] glory is not dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of the mind. She has a spear and a shield: but the motto upon her shield is, Freedom, Independence, Peace. This has been her Declaration: this has been, as far as her necessary intercourse with the rest of mankind would permit, her practice.

However, one may sense the overtones of frustration in Adams' famous words. In them are a combination of several impulses running contrary to the expansionist spirit in American history, but, more importantly, the sense that involvement in imperial ventures in order to remake the world in America's image is not a matter of philosophy, but its inability to engage in affairs "beyond the power of extrication." The founding rathers routinely denounced intervention in outside conflicts; George Washington advising to not engage in "foreign entanglements." Prior to 1991, concerns about a lack of sufficient power overwhelmed attempts to involve the United States in any outside conflict in which it was equally matched. The American ideal of bringing the "light" of "freedom" to the entirety of the world was thus dampened by the pragmatic reason of the founders, whose philosophies extended from those of the Enlightenment.

Still, Adams' rhetoric intones several noteworthy principles as inherent to Americans as expansionism. The first is isolationism. The initial colonists came to the American continent seeking a seemingly paradoxical mixture of conquest and refuge. There has, therefore, always been a rather introspective aspect of the United States which has lent itself to some notable aspects of its imperial ventures, those being its inability to maintain a long presence in its newfound possessions and its lack of zeal for the acquisition of new cultural knowledge. Aspects of the British Empire which contributed to its success vis-a-vis American ventures were its educated incorporation of local customs and its determination to leave an imperial administration in place as long as necessary to produce (in theory) a self-governing state. Americans consistently shun the desire to understand the world outside their self-contained cultural apparatus, and its belovedness to them, being the only place they truly understand, belies their ability to venture abroad in order to seek the long-term project of nation-building in the imperial acquisitions. The second principle espoused by Adams was fear of militarism. The well-educated class of Americans at this time were schooled in Enlightenment principles derived from classical writings, and Adams was keenly aware of how imperial expansion had shaped Rome's transformation from republic to dictatorship and, finally, empire. He also felt jockeying for territory with the extant European powers, no matter the motive, would inevitably inspire the same greed-driven machinations as those formulated in contemporary European capitals, and hence the character of the Republic would be permutated. In short, Adams feared the values of the United States could not be sustained while simultaneously crusading for those same values abroad. Today we see this reflected in the erosion of civil liberties while the American military engages the fulfillment of neoconservative ideological dogma. The fear of the effects of military power on the republic retarded the growth of the nation's military for nearly a century- from Jefferson's refusal to build a strong navy to the lack of a standing army throughout most of the 19th century. The third and final principle expressed by Adams was the "City on a Hill" philosophy, first formulated by John Winthrop, the early Massachusetts Puritan, who decreed that his newfounded town, Boston, should become a "city on a hill, an example for all the world." This sentiment was one of "leading by example," whereby the United States concentrated all efforts on improving itself internally in the hope it would inspire others to emulate its achievements. These fundamentally anti-imperialist strains in American culture would manifest themselves continually whenever imperial exploits grew sour.

The Sectional Struggle Propels Imperialism

As the interior struggle over the character of the American republic grew more incisive in the years prior to the Civil War, Southern slaveholding interests propelled imperialist ambitions. Southern motivation for expansion was fueled by congressional representation. Barred by compromises from creating new slave-states in the territories seized in the Mexican War, they would need to look elsewhere in order to forge the new states needed to balance northern influence in the Senate. As commercial interests began to explore the possibilities of obtaining a Central American nation as a canal route to gold-rich California and the islands on its approaches, some Southerners seized the initiative, especially William Walker, an independent adventurer who seized power in Nicaragua, proposed site of a canal, and promptly legalised slavery. President Pierce refused to recognise this action, and Walker was deposed by a Central American alliance. The prospect of an inter-oceanic canal piqued British interests as well, and the potential canalhead at Greytown was seized by British troops, an apparent violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, without the means to fight a fullscale war with Britain, the US was forced to sign a treaty in which either side swore not to seize exclusive control of an isthmian canal. America's new Pacific coastline was now propelling its commercial interests in Asia, and in 1853 Commodore Matthew Perry was despatched to force Japan open to trade through gunboat diplomacy. The Pierce administration, acting for Southern interests, made several covert attempts to seize Cuba as slave territory, as well. Pierce theorised that the US could exploit European divisions during the Crimean War, and therefore posing a direct challenge to a European imperial interest would go relatively unnoticed. The exposure of his schemes in the anti-slavery north, however, put a temporary end to the coveting of Cuba.

Imperialist Interpretation of the Civil War

Seemingly an interior struggle, the Civil War which erupted in the United States in the 1860s became as much about the preservation of American unity, or societal absolutism. Lincoln was, professionally, quite pragmatic about the slavery issue, which he saw personally as a moral abomination. The secession of the majority of slave states, however, was seemingly intolerable. Lincoln moved to facilitate a war in which the North's industrial might would squash the agrarian slave system of the South and reimpose Northern hegemony. The fact was that the Civil War was an imperialist venture. The South was an economic colony of the North, its wageless labour earning huge dividends for the manufacturers in free states who capitalised on it. While aristocratic pretentions did dominate the South, the lethal addiction to a slave-based cotton economy could have been eased by economic diversification or at least the easing of tariff rates. Because of the implementation of protectionist policies for Northern industries, however, and the ideological conviction at the time that the government should not become involved in structuring any degree of economic planning, the South remained lashed to Northern manufacturing and this wreaked economic mayhem on the region- preventing the formation of competitive Northern industry as well as providing an impetus for secession. With the Civil War came the imposition, eventually, of Military Reconstruction, a crude system by which Southern states were ruled by the edicts of Northern generals. Eventually a slightly improved, yet still exploitative sharecropping regime emerged in the South, appeasing both Northern industrialists and moral absolutist abolitionists. Ostensibly, the slaves had been "freed," but they remained lashed to Northern capitalist imperialism until demographic shifts in the South made the sharecropping economy irrelevant and social programmes could bolster the economic fortunes of the region's blacks and poor whites. Prior to the boom of the "Sunbelt," efforts to improve the regional economy through government investment, notably with the Tennessee Valley Authority projects during the New Deal, were fought vigourously by business interests.

By No Other Name

Late 19th century European imperialism made a big mark on the United States. Among the Western powers and Japan was the suspicion each would overtake the other without the application of aggressive expansion to pre-empt seizure of territories and resources by rivals. At the same time, a wave of economic globalisation, propelled by major advances in communications and transport technology, was sweeping the industrial states, broadening the outside view of the United States. Suddenly, foreign markets and the competition for access to them was more important than ever before, especially considering the period of languid introspection which characterised the post-Civil War decades. Additionally, the "closing of the frontier," caused Americans to fear the degredation of their "national character," which some felt was shaped by the Western pioneer spirit. This required an outlet, which was, naturally, outside the realm of the current 48 states. These factors, combined with a sweeping pre-Progressivist religious revival, the growing acceptibility of the theory of Social Darwinism, and the rise of corporate-controlled media (with manipulated perspectives meant to skew inclinations toward the profit interests of the owners) fueled a period of unprecedented overseas imperial expansion.

This new period of imperialism would assert itself both militarily and economically. As the period opened, American war planners, as well as those in the ascendent imperial powers of Germany and Japan, eagerly consumed Alfred T. Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History, and the pre-First World War naval race ensued. Furthermore, the US pursued a "Big Sister" policy in Latin America, seeking to pry open markets which could thus be dominated by American industries (the policy continues to this day, with the advent of the Free Trade Area of the Americas). The national mood was such that the US risked wars with Germany, Italy, Chile, and Canada over extremely insigificant disputes, all within the span of a few years. The United States was able to extract dividends from the European arms race, however, by implicating Britain in violation of the Monroe Doctrine while the British Empire fretted over German naval expansion. The British, the limits of their own power having been reached, capitualated, and formed the basis for the current Anglo-American relationship, at first determined by the British need for an ally against Germany.

The first truly aggressive action of the overt period of late-19th century imperialism was the seizure of Hawai'i. This came about initially as a result of independent migration, as had many of the United States' imperial conquests. As in Texas and California, anglo-saxons poured into Hawai'i in order to proslityse its natives and harvest its sugar. In 1890 white planters grew displeased with both tarrif barriers to American markets and the increasing hostility of Queen Liliuokaliani to anglo-saxon designs on the Hawai'ian government. The whites staged a revolt and were promptly assisted by American marines under the illegal direction of the US ambassador. However, President Cleveland, elected on a platform of "national honesty," spurned desires to annex the islands. In this, Cleveland's policy harkened back to the position of John Quincy Adams and his promotion of an embettered America as "guiding light" and fear of a military influence on society. Nevertheless, the popular mood incanted imperialism as a great leap forward.

Stealing from Spain

The most important development of the new imperial era, however, was the Spanish-American War, remarkable in its similarities to the United States' most recently-fought conflict in Iraq. A revolt in Cuba, incited due to economic difficulties arising from recently-raised American tariffs, broke out in 1895. Cleveland, with his anti-imperialist tendencies, would not intervene to prevent the loss of American investments or to free the Cuban insurrectionists from Spain. Nevertheless, the public demanded action. They were manipulated by the machinations of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, influential media barons who were the Rupert Murdochs of their day. Hearst's New York Journal particularly resembled Fox News in its drummed up, wildly exaggerated claims in justification of jingoist adventurism. Hearst steered his papers in the direction of his investments, attempting (unsuccessfully) to instigate a war against Mexico in the late 19th century in order to incorporate Mexican territory into the US and cash in on his holdings with the coming of a new settlement drive. His attempts to justify American action against Cuba included the despatching of reporters to Cuba to report on committed Spanish atrocities. When the reporters told Hearst the conditions were nowhere near atrocious enough to warrant armed intervention, he famously replied "you furnish the pictures, and I'll furnish the war." Such campaigns of disinformation by the money-interest media added a new aspect to the American imperial character- controlled ignorance.

The United States sent the battleship Maine to Havana harbour in order to evacuate Americans, if necessary, as violence mounted in Cuba. The Maine exploded due to (as finally ascertained in the 1970s) a mechanical malfunction. At the time, however, this was seen as a provocative action undertaken by Spanish operatives. Spain was molded by the lurid, jingoistic "yellow press" of Hearst and Pulitzer into the "Spanish Brute," a repressive imperial power whose prerogatives were the oppression of Cubans and slaughter of Americans. Though, ironically, fearing a war with Spain would cause economic unrest, President McKinley acceded to popular demands. Congress simultaneously adopted a war declaration and the Teller Amendment, by which the United States promised to grant "freedom" to the Cuban populace.

The war was greeted in the press as "Uncle Sam's Latest, Greatest, Shortest War" and by future Secretary of State John Hay as "our splendid little war." The opening of the war came as a surprise to anyone who truly considered American motives were associated solely with freeing Cubans or even avenging the Maine incident. Admiral John Dewey of the US Asiatic fleet was wired, sans authorisation, by Assistant Naval Secretary Theodore Roosevelt to immediately attack Manila Bay. Dewey did so decisively, obliterating the Spanish fleet, staving off German attempts at intervention and securing the Philippines as an American possession. American troops stormed Manila's defences with the assistance of Filippino insurgents under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo. The United States, having taken charge of a Far Eastern possession, postulated that Hawai'i would need to be permanently lashed to the US in order to serve as a way station in resupplying the new eastern Empire, and it was promptly annexed. Berkeley's lines rang true- the Americans were expanding their Empire into the Pacific, and thus fulfilling his ambition for a return of the anglo-saxon "Aryans" to Central Asia. American power-projection into the Pacific, which now included Samoa as well, was motivated more by the commercial interests of the influential San Francisco financial community than any particular philosophy, however (see Gary Brechin's Imperial San Francisco).

The American invasion of Cuba was confused but nevertheless successful, due to overwhelming American numerical superiority. In an act lacking any military necessity, the antiquated, inferior Spanish fleet, cornered by American warships, was totally destroyed, and five hundred Spaniards died as a result. American captains actually had to restrain their men from cheering at the massacre. Cuba surrendered, and the Americans descended on Puerto Rico and Guam as quick land grabs before the war could officially end. Thousands of American troops perished as the result of insensitivity to the climate, compared to a relative few from combat wounds.

Aftermath of Conquest

The dilemma for the United States, in pursuit of its imperial ambitions, has always been administration. One of the primary anti-imperial impulses of the American character, as illustrated by John Quincy Adams' sentiments above, is that of isolation and introspection as a nation. The outward projection of the American character is held to be inevitable and, hence, a burden to be undertaken by the "liberated" peoples. Americans prefer clearcut conflicts to their uncertain and volatile aftermaths, prefer to return to the "core" US when the "job" is complete. With the finale of the Spanish-American War, Americans were for the first time confronted with an Empire of nonwhite colonies. Internal subversion had brought Hawai'i into the American fold; yet it remained majority nonwhite. Occupied Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were clearly dominated by non-anglo-saxons. Previously, American expansion had relied on genocide or transplantation to remove the Native Americans and restock their holdings with whites. However, this proved implausible in the new colonies, as they contained far larger populations inhabiting structured societies. Whereas prior colonisation would entail the eradication of a relatively uncared-for Native American tribe, such tactics would be indefensible in the recent acquisitions. Furthermore, the world was beginning to justify imperialism on the basis of beneficence- the bringing of "civilisation" to the aboriginals, rather than their replacement with "civilised" men.

The most decisive problem for the United States was the new colonial possession of the Philippines. McKinley felt his hands tied. Returning the islands to Spanish rule was not an option, nor was abandoning them, which, he feared, would lead to anarchy or seizure by another imperial power. As missionaries were waited eagerly for the opportunity to "Christianise" the Philippines, and financial interests initially sceptical to the war saw their opportunity to cash in, McKinley concluded American reign in Manila was the necessary policy. He embodied the traditional fusion of evangelism and commercialism inherent in the American imperial character when he expressed that "God directs us- perhaps it will pay."

The debate over imperialism commenced almost immediately after the islands had been seized. Rudyard Kipling, the unabashed champion of British imperial projects, quickly penned, in 1899, a verse to the United States, entitled "The White Man's Burden," which quickly became the defining poem on the imperial spirit. Kipling exhorted Americans to "civilise" the Philippines, as the European powers were doing elsewhere in the world. Kipling, however, appealed directly against natural American impulses. When he exhorted Americans to

Send forth the best ye breed-
Go send your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild

he ignored the historical inability of Americans to go forth as disciples of Americanism. Proconsulate positions were not sought in the United States as they were in Rome or Britain. Opponents of direct American administration of the Philippines were equally vocal. The Anti-Imperialist League, embodying the fear of militarist influence on the United States, promptly organised itself. William James, the philosophical father of the school of pragmatism, burst out that the US had "puke[d] up its ancient soul in five minutes without a wink of squeamishness." Indeed, the nature of the Filipino situation had propelled into the forefront an open debate on imperialism. Anti-imperialists saw the United States befallen to despotism at home and forced into confrontationism in the Far East.

The question of whether to grant the newly-conquered peoples of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba the rights guaranteed by the US Constitution was a contentions one. The US had already denied them their right to independence, as the anti-imperialists ardently affirmed. Would the possessions be incorporated into the American nation, as past territories had been, or governed in a new and different way. Divisions over the potential future independence of these lands, as well as a racist fear of millions of nonwhite American citizens fused to bring about the decisions of the Insular Cases, in which the Supreme Court ruled the conquests' fate was individually determinable by Congress.

With this newfound power, Congress decided to withdraw from Cuba, yet forced the Cubans to write the Platt Amendment into their constitution, ostensibly as a safeguard against European attempts at its conquest. The Platt Amendment allowed the US basing rights on the island, as well as forbidding Cuba to impair its independence by bilateral treaties or foreign debts. Most ominously, the Amendment allowed US troops to "intervene" in Cuba any time it deemed necessary.

In the Philippines, events were less auspicious. Frustration with the American occupation led Emilio Aguinaldo, the US' former ally, to turn his imsurrection against their forces. A protracted guerilla war ensued on the islands, and American frustration with the Filipinos' unconventional tactics led to the application of torture and the incarcertation in concentration camps of insurgents. Echoing the introspective American attitude, US soldiers spoke of the guerillas:

Civilise 'em with a Krag [rifle]
And return us to our beloved homes

The savagely-repressed rebellion against the US cost 600,000 lives. Aguinaldo was eventually captured and the war declared complete, though the fighting continued sporadically. In the intervening period McKinley appointed William Taft the administrator of the territory. Taft embraced the locals with a patronising Kiplingesque spirit, calling them his "little brown brothers" and declaring a policy of "benevolent assimilation." Though the economic, infrastructural, educational, and sanitation conditions in the Philippines improved dramatically, the population remained hostile to what was a foreign occupation, especially to assimilation policies designed to cram Americanism down their throats. Kipling seemed eerily prophetic, especially the stanza of his poem reading:

Take up the White Man’s burden-
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better
The hate of those ye guard

The election of 1900 is mythologised as the contest over imperialism. McKinley squared off against populist agrarian William Jennings Bryan, who espoused common and familiar principles on the future state of the republic should it continue to pursue an imperial stature. At a campaign stop in Kansas City he proclaimed:

Behold a republic standing erect while empires all around are bowed beneath the weight of their own armaments--a republic whose flag is loved while other flags are only feared.

Bryan thus openly espoused both the "City on a Hill" and "fear of militarism" arguments of traditional American anti-imperialism. Furthermore, the Democratic National Platform of 1900 embodied the fear of a despotic regime seizing power in an imperial state:

We assert that no nation can long endure half republic and half empire, and we warn the American people that imperialism abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at home.

McKinley's election victory, however, was no mandate for imperialist policies (elections, even landslides, are rarely mandates for any specific policy). American voters, clinging to their introspective tendencies, focused more on economic issues, for which Bryan lost in 1896 as well. Furthermore, most of Bryan's traditional constituency in the agrarian west was either apathetic or ignorant to imperialism. Many wondered what effect it could possibly have on the price of wheat.

The period of 1896-1901 propelled the US into an unprecedented extension of its imperial ambitions. Most remarkable, however, were the causes and effects of the Spanish Civil War and their relation to the latent occurrences in Iraq. The spurious nature of the Maine attack was for the America of 1898 much as 11 September was for the America of 2001- an open invitation to warfare. In both cases, the United States used the occurrences as justifications for attacks on nations which had nothing to do with them (though, admittedly, the true cause of the Maine incident was incognito in 1898). Both wars were fomented by a jingo-media, and both resulted in de facto occupations of foreign territory with no evident plan for its future. In Iraq, the Shi'ite population is nearing open rebellion- will it be a repeat of the bloody Philippines revolt? The histories of the three major territories grabbed by the US in the Spanish-American War going forward from 1900 do not bode well for optimists who believe Iraq has been delivered into the light of Truth, Freedom, and Democracy, especially considering the many greater variables the occupation of Iraq entails.

Big Stick and Progressive Imperialism

Theodore Roosevelt, propelled to the presidency in 1901 with the assassination of McKinley, was among the United States' most unabashed imperialists. He saw the supremacy of the state as paramount in maintaining what he saw as the supreme vitue- virility. His untrammeled sense of adventurism embodied this belief and dragged along with it the US. Shortly before his takeover of the presidency, however, the United States became involved in the imperial subjugation of China. John Hay, Secretary of State during the McKinley administration, wedged Chinese markets open through a series of circular "Open Door" notes, in the hope that such markets would not be closed to the US through competitive European imperial operations. In 1900, the Chinese Boxer Rebellion against imperial interests prompted a response among the imperial powers. A multinational coalition crushed the uprising, and American troops lent a contribution in order to gain concessions for the Open Door policy.

Roosevelt's mantra was to "speak softly and carry a big stick," by which was implied that American diplomatic demands had to be backed by force. This doctrine was first employed in Panama, where a conspiracy among canal speculators fomented a revolt against Colombian rule. American forces intervened in favour of the Panamanians and set up a puppet state in order to build a canal more cheaply than what would have been otherwise required to appease the Colombian senate. Roosevelt felt he had a "mandate from civilisation" -a term very much like Manifest Destiny- to build the canal, at any cost.

Rooseveltian policy toward Latin America was coherently expressed in what is called the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This stated that, if a Latin American republic was in a financially dire situation, the US would intervene in order to prevent a takeover from creditor nations (i.e., European empires). Ergo, Latin America would be, in the imperial race, the exclusive property of the United States. The doctrine was essentially a preemptive one, and further opened Central and South America to US exploitation.

Under President Taft the lockstep march of empire to commercial interests received a name: dollar diplomacy, the principle that US troops should follow its investments and its investments made to corollate to foreign policy. Dollar diplomacy was repudiated by the progressive President Wilson, who espoused an idealistic foreign policy stance. However, he was forced to re-invoke the Roosevelt Corollary when American property was at stake in Central America and the Caribbean. Between 1900 and 1925, US troops intervened thrice in Cuba, thrice in Nicaragua, once each in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Honduras. Additionally, the US placed the governments of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua under its control by announcing "financial supervision" and seizing control of their treasuries. Espousing a politics of fundamentalist Americanism for Latin America, Wilson declared "I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men," and took measures to support a rebellion against the revolutionary leader of Mexico, General Huerta. When his government was toppled, Pancho Villa emerged as a rival to the new government of Venustiano Carranza and menaced American territory. An expedition was sent into Mexican territory and essentially fought both sides. The implication was that Mexico would be kept under the American thumb.

When the First World War broke out, American commercial interests were immediately at stake. The US had become a major trading partner of Britain and France, and a German victory was seen as unaffordable, not to mention an affront to the balance of power which accorded America greater influence. The war, however, was sold, through various overt propaganda mechanisms like the Committee on Public Information, as a fight for democracy, a war against tyrrany, etc. Wilson needed to appeal to such a crusade to remake the world in order to invigourate the American imperial spirit- passions for war could be stirred up in the name of a such a grand, if ultimately apocryphal, cause. Wilson therefore devised the Fourteen Points, whereby he espoused the need, above all, for "self-determination" in Europe, the creation of democracies in the American image. Wilson's championing of collective security and international law was ultimately futile, however, as the American Congress, invoking imperial trappings, argued against the submission of the United States, with its uniquely "holy" message, to suspect international organisations. It was no accident that Henry Cabot Lodge, the primary opponent of the League of Nations, was an impassioned imperialist. By the 1920s, it was clear that the League had "redistributed" colonial territory into the hands of the victorious allies, that it would be ineffectual without the United States, which considered its imperial destiny above the shackles of law, that the Weimar Republic in Germany was considered a sham imposed by American demands, and that the "republics" carved out of Central and Eastern Europe were gradually becoming totalitarian states. In his 1921 inauguration speech, Warren Harding proclaimed a "return to normalcy," ending the interventionist/internationalist period with a reassuring resurgence of isolationism. Through the 1920s, American policy stressed an idealistic commitment against war, epitomised in the Kellogg-Briand Pact purportedly outlawing the institution. US policy also stressed a maintenance of its rising supremacy through the series of naval power treaties signed to fix naval ratios. A bit of the crusading spirit was evident in the expeditionary force sent to Russia to fight for the anti-communist Whites during its civil war, but antipathy with militarism following the First World War dampened the American commitment to this cause.

The Cold War: Jockeying for Power

Americans only support imperial ambitions when they lead to the spread of Americanism. Therefore, fascist and imperial Japanese aggression in the 1930s was seen as inimical to American interests. Anti-isolationists reviewing this period in American history often remark that there was an innate danger posed by the rise of new imperial rivals with ideologies contrasting that of the Anglo-French-American axis. Owing to the experience of the First World War, however, Americans were unwilling to engage in open warfare with these powers. To the isolationists, however, the US was dragged into the war by imperial overreach. Vast distances and long naval supply lined crippled American defences in the Philippines and Hawai'i. The British Empire suffered the same issues in its Asian colonies. Nevertheless, the Second World War for the United States had several imperial objectives: protecting its extant imperial holdings, especially the Philippines and Hawai'i, preventing the rise of competitive imperial powers, and maintaining is primary export markets (once again, the French and British Empires).

The end of the war put the United States in its greatest position of power, and yet it was challenged by an opposing superpower, the Soviet Union. While Soviet propaganda ranted about the nature of American imperialism, the USSR itself was undeniably an imperialist state, seeking the exportation of its revolution and believing in the inevitable victory of its cause much in the same way the United States had. The Cold War was essentially an imperial jockeying for power, much like the "Great Game" played in Central Asia for the mastery of Afghanistan between Britain and Russia throughout the 19th century. The two powers alternately sponsored various groups to fight revolutions and counterrevolutions against each other. The specifics are ultimately too various to be recounted here, but in almost every case proxy wars were fought between the American imperial vision of a world filled with liberal democracies quiescant to American economic systems, and the Soviet vision of a world united under its leadership and employing Soviet economic systems.

The United States began to realise its vision could not be achieved through coercion or intimidation alone. It required partnership, respect, and cooperation among its allies in pursuit of its dreamworld, one Americanised by consent. This led to the creation of such international organisations as the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation. However, the United States perceived a conjoined alliance against Soviet expansion as an affirmation of the inevitably supremacy of Americanism. The people, it was thought, would elect Manifest Destiny, unless somehow prevented by communist subversion. European agitation against continuing American troop presence and occasionally intemperate flare-ups provoked by the more adventurous presidential administrations went relatively unnoticed in terms of policy changes and even such dramatic events as DeGaulle's departure from NATO in 1966 were not seen as augering increased transatlantic tensions if the common cause of the Cold War were to end. Simply put, the US was blinded by its triumphalism in those regions which it did "control," as it perceived a dualist world with only relative variation.

The temptation during the Cold War was always to use American military strength to engage the Soviet Union and "roll it back," therefore "liberating" its citizenry and making the world safe for supreme Americanism. This, however, would have required military spending levels few were willing to bear. In 1961, when fantasies of a military victory over the Soviet Union still persisted, President Eisenhower delivered his famous farewell speech, in which he appealed to classic anti-imperialist themes in American history:

Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.

Eisenhower thus denounced militarism, as the anti-imperialists of the fin de sielce period and John Quincy Adams had, as being poison for the endurance of the values of the republic. Eisenhower phrased this, however, in more pragmatic terms; he saw the tremendous budgetary burden of a heavily-armed military as incompatible with American quality of life. It would require extreme rates of taxation, something his conservative administration was unwilling to allow, but also would contribute little in return to the economy. Ergo Eisenhower also recognised the power of the "City on a Hill" appeal.

However, Eisenhower refused to abide by the spirit of isolationism. Though his administration resembled Harding's in its pledge of "politics of tranquility," it was not one to enshrine isolationism, as Eisenhower was keenly aware of the lessons of the 1930s. He saw, however, the need for cooperation rather than imposition. It was therefore why he saw the importance of a "proud confederation of mutual trust and respect" in which "the weakest come with the same confidence as do we." Of warfare to achieve American interests, Eisenhower only predicted "certain agony." Observant of the natural limits of American power and therefore a champion of internationalist cooperation, Eisenhower was willing to condemn Britain and France for their actions in the Suez as unilateral power-mongering, and ended the improbable war in Korea with a victory only for its initial UN mandate. Eisenhower was not without his faults in this regard, however. The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine proclaimed the right to unilateral intervention to protect American interests in the Mideast, and was employed in Lebanon the following year.

Enforcing the End of History

With the end of the Cold War came what was perceived to be unchallenged American might. The few holdouts against the American official or unofficial empires were to be isolated or contained. When they had finally been defeated, neoconservative triumphalists gloated, it would constitute the "end of history," in which all ideologies- fascism, communism, socialism, would bow down to the supremacy of the American system. The empire will have conquered the earth.

The reality was far different. The end of the cold war has exposed innumerable divisions in the once unshakeable American alliance network. The imperial order has been defied by an increasingly powerful and unifying Continental Europe, especially its core states, France and Germany. China has emerged as a major competitor as it morphed from a Maoist to a simple totalitarian capitalist state. As has been especially evident, bands of individuals disenchanted with the emerging New World Order have formed international terrorist organisations. In more benign situations, disillusionment with the American-imposed neoliberal economic order has caused a resurgency in Leftist politics in Latin America and elsewhere. These groups prove especially frustrating to the American establishment, built as it is with "overwhelming power," but only truly overwhelming conventional military power, capable of engagement with nation-states and not highly manoeuvrable anti-imperial rebels.

The neoconservative faction, frustrated with the disappearance of the mirage of total imperial dominance, have now advocated armed intervention to remake the world in the image of America- nothing really new, as the above demonstrates, but a radical departure onto a traditional imperialist agenda from what was becoming a world emerging with diverse views but still willingness for partnership with the United States.

There are those who feel the instability and inequality of the world cry out for a Pax Americana of security and Americanisation. Yet they grossly ignore the factors which led to the current global order, namely, resistance to the imperial order itself. Furthermore, the traditional limitations on American imperial policy refute the arguments of Max Boot that the world needs "the enlightened administration of jodhpurs and pith helmets," provided by Americans. This is argued cogently by pro- (though, only of the Britannic persuasion) imperialist Niall Ferguson, in his New York Times Magazine article.

Still, Americans feel it is their special creed to bring the greatness of Americanism to the world, tolerating few deviations. They are driven by the same missionary zeal and commercialist philosophies, though today those assert that economic imperialism is just and benign "globalisation." It is not just the perceived gift of the principles of the Revolution to the world, but a measure of more archaic influences as well, relics of virtually prehistoric European ideas, and certainly what Nietzsche would call "the morality of power," though often with more conciliatory justifications. After periods of prolonged frustration Americans are usually ready to slink back into isolationism, and improving their own society as an example to others. When they emerge from these tranquil yet fatally withdrawn periods, it is often in the name of not only the security of that idyllic serenity, but the belief that by bringing its core values to the rest of the world, they, too, will desire nothing but peaceful conformity with the ways of America. For such sweeping philosophical conceptions of empire alone will Americans shed their blood.

2003-04-27T22:34:00.000-04:00

The Blood Orgasm of Peace
Reflections on the Condition of American Society

Cities and towns across the United States exulted. America had conquered Iraq, the perpetual thorn in the side of their triumphalist empire, one in a handful of states labelled, by the boy-emperor, the "axis of evil." With the Forces of Evil nearly vanquished, the Forces of Wholesome Goodness could thus stream forth, spilling organs spasming with latent nervous impulses onto streets flooded with bodily effluvia. The rigid stare of the contemporary Ozymandias was dragged eye to eye with the Tigris, running deep red. Days later the citizens of the United States proposed a day by which they would support their agents of imperial bile-lust by silently sporting red garments. Of the tricoloured American standard, one shade now ruled supreme. Old Glory's stripes pierced the restless Mideast sands and the scarlet stains gurgled past the shells of cluster-bombed mosques.

Wide-eyed with the visceral emotion of this transcendent moment the high priests pontificated from the pulpit of Fox News, aching for the demonstration of the latest ordinance on Mohammedan flesh. A nation so replete with historical ignorance and creative drought was bound, eventually, to abandon the intellectual and rhetorical difficulties of high diplomacy for the simple duality of war, bringing collective cause to a people whose groupthink would otherwise be engaged in the dangerous realisation that the underpinnings of their economy had become precariously loose. Only a war would fixate this hyper-assimilated mass of television-slaves on something other than their declining compensation for supplicating themselves before the high altar of laissez-faire power-mongering. Only a war would foster a new outlet for the preachers bearing both Holy Crosses and Golden Arches to go forth and quench the thirst of rapacious capitalism for the fuel of its incomparable excesses. Having deposed the CIA-installed turncoat Hussein, America's missionaries of mellifluous moral malapropisms reclined in the gilded seats of his most opulent residence, the new throne-masters. Add a mustachioed grimace and, like the pigs of Animal Farm, their laughter echoed their erstwhile enemy's, once again chilling the humid Mesopotamian air.

The bubbly was poured in the conference-rooms in Washington before the minarets of Baghdad were even consumed in the acrid pall of oil-fires, the most menacing defence of a state purportedly invaded for its threat to all human well-being. There, a band of Lionhearted Crusaders, whose brutal promulgations of "The Cross or the Sword" mirrored the archaic creed of their Saracen adversaries, extolled the news of conquests in the Near East. It was not long before they wondered whether their righteous acquisition could be used as a spring-board of rolling Godly thunder. Soon Assad of Damascus' head could be rammed through with a pike and paraded down the overwhelming thoroughfares of the War Capital, passing monuments to the massacres on which the blood-empire was built, passing columns raised by half-naked three-fifths men without three-fifths votes whose only sin was their skin colour. The fortresses of the Levant would once again bow to the true, venegeful God, the God of mercy and compassion to all wealthy white males. Soon the Parthians who for long and long-forgotten months brought as much shame to the American Empire as it had to the city by the Tiber would have the selfless gift of good old-fashioned Shah freedom rammed up their anuses before they could leapfrog into newly-Christianised Warlordistan.

The Left came up with a clever word for the spillage of brain-matter in puddles of stomach acid. They called it "liberation," and eagerly tuned into the propaganda feeds to await whether the skull-piles gathered by their Forces of Freedom would exceed those of their atrocious neo-Pol Pot, whether their aghast expressions during the looting of precious Iraqi antiquities would be vindicated by seen-and-be seen exposition of the very same artefacts the next spring at the British Museum or the Met. When the stylised iconography of Ba'athist stability came crashing down they lauded the coming of Liberty, Equality, and Freedom to the boiling cauldron of millenia-old ethnic scalp-famine to the excrement of the Versailles Treaty cartography project, in which the victorious allies of the war against the barbaric Hun celebrated their victory over the rapists of Belgium by carving the Ottoman Empire into pie-chart representations of their percentage of men dead in the war to "make the world safe for democracy" and their resulting share in the region's glistening black gold. The valiant Armada of Light has rescued Iraq from its odious dark cloud of totalitarian oppression, and delivered it into the odious dark cloud of open rebellion, internecine warfare, intra-ethnic factionism, regional power-struggle, anarchic chaos, and, eventually, the return of totalitarian oppression to put the lid back on Pandora's Box. None of this matters to the Left, however. CNN and the New York Times will be covering the next sequence in the Wars of Perfection and Happiness by the time any of this happens. Afghanistan? Where's that?

Leading the way were a pack of disillusioned Trotskyites, warrior social-democrats who cheerfully amputated the limbs of the freedom- baseball- apple pie- and America-loving peoples of Iraq in order to redistribute its nationalised-oil hoard to the fossil-barons of Texas, where the human rights record is nearly as bright and shiny as in slave-happy Mauritania. Nightly they their tirades about the need to look down at the inferior, backward, 12th-century culture of the Middle East through a gun turret and blast the Compassionately Conservative message of "democratise (our way) or die!" in the form of depleted-uranium shells inspired flag-clutching members of the Francophobe warrior caste to prance around their trailer parks with glee. They remarked with pride that the neon-illuminated board beneath the hundred-foot high Denny's sign along the interstate declared that they supported their troops in their fight for the freedom to brutalise, incinerate, maul, and plunder a sanctions-cripped Third-World nothing of a state with a force exceeding the might of the seventeen other largest militaries combined. If they didn't, apparently, the Saddamite gestapo would descend on the American heartland and brownskinned mongrels would impregnate the prettiest blonde on every cul-du-sac. Shifting justifications didn't matter, it was all fluff to explain the True Cause to the inexorably suspect intelligensia anyway. Real Americans knew that Saddam was a bad, bad, man, as had obviously been revealed to their Christ-like Commander in Chief by a divinely Burning Sagebush one night while wandering for forty minutes in the arid expanses of Crawford.

Just to remind anyone who dared deviate from the reverent, obsequious awe every American was required to display toward Reich, Volk, and Führer, the Imperial Ministry of Homeland Security was established to ensure that any potentially subversive Mohammedan was made an example of. An incessant flow of insults were broadcast over the propaganda webs. Flags appeared on every automobile, the sizes of which were proportionate to one's fear of being mislabeled an enemy of the state. Successive PATRIOT Acts gave a pinch of in-your-face irony to the total erosion of civil liberties. Those who failed to "love freedom" were pilloried. The forcible trying of civilians in military courts was the cherry-on-top of the coup d'etat of a presidential administration orchestrated into existence by a self-appointed Politburo of Supreme Court Justices. Congress abdictated all effective power, noting that a time of crisis for freedom required the absolute erasure of democratic representation. The entire country was overjoyed when reassured by the rhetoric of the boy-emperor, whose performances could easily be outshone by a seven-year-old school dropout. They had to be, lest the undercover squadron of counterrevolutionary operatives employed by the Office of Total Information Awareness snared them. Thousands of shoes were removed, lest more planes collide with skyscrapers. Mall security forces from Butte Flats, Idaho to Pithoe, Georgia clamped down, expelling such perilous elements as men wearing peace t-shirts and fearing a co-ordinated Islamic fundamentalist attack on puny Midwestern shopping centres. Americans were commanded to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting so they might suffocate in the event of a terrorist attack. Sometimes the only means to freedom is suicide. Failure to comply, of course, represented support for Saddam Noriega Milosevic Satan Hitler bin Laden.

Woe be unto he who was on the list of those in the State Department accused, in prime McCarthyist style by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, of undermining the president and carrying out such heinous crimes as diplomacy! Going forward, America's diplomacy shall be the cruise missile, its embassies supercarriers, its international organisations coalitions of those diamond-war torn, Third World starvation-zones which could not afford the loss of foreign aid. If the UN doesn't authorise the Glorious Blitzkrieg of Forced Americanisation it is irrelevant! If Europeans fail to roll over and accede to American might they're all noxious appeasers! Should France stand in the way, they're all Saddam-loving terrorists! Only through the application of genocidal force will the United States pursue its Manifest Destiny and erupt in ejaculatory elysium; a blood orgasm of peace.

2003-04-27T00:08:00.000-04:00

Roadmap to Nowhere
Notes on the Israel-Palestine Situation

The latest effort in untangling the imbroglio between the State of Israel and the embattled Palestinians has emerged as the ambitiously titled "Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," authored by the members of the international Quartet, composed of the United States, European Union, United Nations, and the Russian Federation. The plan's primary fault is the failure to recognise the internal divisions within Palestinian society and how they will affect any attempt to persuade Israel to abide by the recommendations of the Quartet. The current circumstances of the conflict are far more complex than the Roadmap's authors appear to realise.

The Road Ahead

A general overview of the Israel-Palestinian situation can be found here, along with a general outline of the Roadmap:

The first phase is expected to focus on engineering a lasting Palestinian ceasefire and reforming Palestinian Authority institutions, coupled with an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory.

In phase two, a provisional Palestinian state will be set up by the end of 2003.

Phase three will be geared towards striking a final agreement by the end of 2005 to resolve the long-standing issues of Jerusalem, borders, settlements and refugees.

A far more detailed explication of the plan is available here.

The opening stage has already been initiated, with considerable difficulty. The Bush administration has been forced to moderate its position on the reform of Palestinian leadership, indicating it was willing to acknowledge a reformist Prime Minister. The appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (or Abu Mazen, as he is also known) caused a considerable rift in the administration of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) over Abbas' choice for Interior Minister, Mohammed Dahlan, repaired only with significant international political pressure. The Quartet has indicated this is a positive move toward "reform," yet the real shift in power has been to PNA head Yasser Arafat, whom observers now see as having true power over the appointment of cabinet members within the Palestinian government, as well as having curried the favour of Fatah, the primary Palestinian movement.

The Abbas/Arafat rift is one of a series of serious issues afflicting Palestinian society, which is fraught with severe internal divisions. These issues are discussed in detail below. In essence, they seriously undermine the most critical point of the first phase of the Roadmap, which calls for a cessation of the Palestinian Intifada:

Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.

Yet, due to the fragmentation of Palestinian society and the lack of any real command-and-control structure, this measure is pure fantasy. Neither the Palestinian leadership, the PNA Parliament, or Fatah could ever issue an executive order to "end the violence." Ergo, Arafat and Abbas and their "government" have no real ability to influence Palestinian security.

Palestinian Disarray

The fractious nature of Palestinian society is illustrated cogently by the Guardian's Johnathan Freedland. He observes that a source in Washington has indicated the United States has decided to encumber the PNA with a new condition for US publication of the Roadmap- issuing an "unequivocal renunciation of terrorism and violence." Not only, as aforementioned, is this beyond the powers of both Arafat and Abbas, but it suggests a freezing out of any power those organisations and their members who have been actively involved in the armed insurrection against the Israeli occupation from the PNA government. Ultimately, the failure of the PNA to control Palestine, foster a Palestinian state, and to achieve peace will be a function of its disclusion of key segments of Palestinian society, including armed terrorist groups, as representatives in its government. Exclusion of such groups translates to no influence over them, and hence no ability to bring about peace- without a requisite central authority, submitted to by the majority of Palestinians, no consensus can be reached.

The fragmentations dividing Palestine are multifold. Arafat's fears of the diminution of his influence due to the appointment of Mohammed Dahlan were shared by the Fatah group, a mainstream Palestinian independence movement. Fatah is seriously divided itself, and infighting is a regular feature of the group. Freedland writes:

Much of this was little more than bureaucratic turf warfare, but it riddles and debilitates Fatah, the main Palestinian movement. "Fatah spends 99% of its time fighting each other and 1% dealing with Israel," says one European diplomat. This week's problem centred on older officials who resented Abu Mazen's promotion of younger men - like the proposed security chief Mohammed Dahlan - who, they felt, would be jumping the queue of seniority. Others feared the whole venture smacked of a foreign takeover, with the new PM installing the likes of Dahlan to curry favour with the US and Israel and to erode the influence of Arafat. These feelings still run high and it's possible that the Palestinian "parliament" will reject the new cabinet, despite Arafat's eleventh-hour blessing of it.

The United States has made approval of a reformist cabinet a "must" for the implementation of the Roadmap. And yet the "reformists," while ostensibly against the methodology of terrorist violence against Israel, may be less willing to compromise on crucial issues like the "right of return" for Palestinian refugees to homes seized in 1948. This places in question the Roadmap's ability to simultaneously end the violence of Intifada and implement a Palestinian state. The divisions within Fatah, however, are overshadowed overwhelmingly by the lack of control the organisation has over Palestinian Islamist movements and individual Palestinian citizens, often acting in the name of various groups and yet outside their auspices, an indication that Fatah has little to no ability to order an end to suicide bombings and other anti-Israeli operations:

There is another civil war, between the men who lead Fatah and those who should be following it. "There's a generation of kids out there who listen to nobody," Dahlan tells associates privately. According to one on-the-ground account, these "kids" are typically 18 to 22 years old, living desperate lives in, say, Jenin or the Balata refugee camp. "They can barely write their own name in Arabic. They watch al-Jazeera and decide their own policy. They think 'fuck Arafat, fuck Fatah' and stage their own actions."

The emergence of this wholly individualistic, unorganised resistance to both Israeli and Palestinian authority is perhaps the most troubling developement on the road to peace. However, creating a consensus-based government in which the majority of the population is represented, and thus allowing for the creation of a somewhat stable civic society with a functioning economic sector will allow for greater control of male Palestinian youths, drawing them into productive activities in the service sector, or into higher education, rather than the idle unemployment which now breeds anger, resentment, and violence. Freedland adds:

Israel's policy of "targeted killings" has removed the middle layer of Fatah leadership - the older, wiser heads who might have calmed down the young and angry. What might bring them back into the fold? Only a material change in their day-to-day lives, say those who know. If Israel withdrew from Palestinian cities and eased restrictions on movement, and if there was clear, diplomatic progress, then maybe this new generation would stop the terror. But an order from Abu Mazen? That won't do it.

The achievement of such a society is contingent upon both Israel's compliance with the Roadmap and upon the representation of the many factions of Palestinian society. Though neither the United States or Israel would enjoy such a prospect, the inclusion of militant Islamic groups is entirely necessary if a unified Palestinian government able to make an effective plea against violence is to be established. Freedland explains the influence of such groups and the influence of their exclusion from the PNA:

Even if the Fatah top brass stopped their infighting, and won the obedience of the street, that would still leave the most serious Palestinian civil war - the gap between mainly secular Fatah and militant Islam. Hamas and Islamic Jihad can claim popular support of between 20% and 25%, yet right now they are shut out of Palestinian decision-making. They have no place in the Palestine legislative council, the parliament, and no presence in the official security apparatus.

Freedland adds that these groups have never been represented at the peace conferences, either, even though they are primarily responsible for the injuries inflicted upon Israel. At least a quarter of Palestine's population would not be a party to a PNA peace agreement. The Roadmap fails to recognise the roots of the conflict coming not from a centralised Palestinian authority, but from a wide spectrum of independent movements, many of which are fundamentalist Islamic groups, with a wide base of popular support. Americans, suspicious of Arafat's PLO background, typically demonise him as a charlatan masquerading as a statesman while simultaneously manipulating such terrorist factions as the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade. In fact, even if Arafat has significant control of several of these organisations, most militant groups lie outside his effective authority. It is evident a genuine peace can only be fostered through a reform of Palestinian society from the bottom up, rather than the top down.

Rather than the inclusion of this great segment of the Palestinian populace in the decision making process, the Roadmap singles them out for destruction if they fail to comply with PLA demands. Uniting the Palestinian security agencies and using them to fight terrorist splinter groups like Hamas and Jihad would achieve an effect entirely contrasting Palestinian unity. Freedland writes that "even most secular Palestinians would not support" the rooting out of fundamentalist terror groups by force, especially if doing so with the cooperation of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), as the roadmap stipulates. Furthermore, attempting to eradicate groups enjoying such grassroots support on such a basis ignores the problem of the independent activists who strike without such organisations' authorisation.

Simply stated, on the Palestinian side, the Roadmap is a recipe for anarchy. The militant groups need to be invited to work in concert with the PNA, rather than be crushed viciously, or the Quartet runs the risk of fomenting an Intifada which will never trust or accept a Palestinian leadership with Quartet support, and aggravating the already dire issue of independent terrorists. Britain, especially, should advocate the inclusion of the militant groups in the Palestinian government, as negotiations with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, was key in achieving a framework for peace in Northern Ireland. The hardline Real IRA was significantly marginalised, akin to the effect inclusion of the political apparati of the Islamic militant groups in a Palestinian government could have on those whose stringent ideologies demand the extermination of the Jewish state. Freedland debunks fears that the militant groups are too extremist to be included in the government or the peace process:

Could the Islamists ever be won over, to support or even take part in the peace process? Most Israelis and Americans assume not; they regard Hamas and Jihad as beyond-the-pale fanatics, not susceptible to reason. But European officials with close knowledge of the movements are not so sure. They suggest that if Fatah agrees to some domestic power-sharing - perhaps through municipal elections - treating political Islam as a real movement with a genuine constituency, then the Islamists will play their part. Hamas's spiritual leader, Sheikh Yassin, has said that he would accept a "hudna", a truce, with an Israel withdrawn to its 1967 borders. So it's not impossible - but it is necessary. Says one secular Palestinian: "Whatever you think of them, they're not going away."

Forming a Palestinian government with true control of its people, through representation rather than coercion, is a vital first step in bringing about a lasting peace to the Israel-Palestine conflict. This will take time, however, the role outside players- namely the Quartet -would be able to play is questionable. Palestinians traditionally dislike intervention in their internal affairs by foreigners, probably a legacy of their history- occupied by the Ottomans, the British, the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, the subsequent ignominious retreat endured after the 1948 war, and the Israeli occupation of the Gaza and West Bank in 1967. The PNA has been relatively cooperative, but would a government including Islamist groups accede to Quartet demands? Would the Quartet be able to bring such a government into existence? The questions of how to remake Palestinian society run as deep as those inquiries as to how to modernise the Middle East. The historically informed Western observer must only conclude the role of the West, or in this case, the Quartet, is to recommend and allow such a transformation to take place with minimum facilitation and maximum trust in the formative abilities of individual societies. The Quartet can, in fact, move in this direction through two vital initiatives. The first would be to reconstruct the Roadmap to reflect the fact that the current PNA does not have the central authority to demand an end to violence, and to encourage the formation of a Palestinian government inclusive enough to effectively espouse nonviolence. The second is to lean hard on Israel to uphold its portion of the Roadmap.

Israeli Impediments

One critical miscalculation of the Roadmap was placing the initial pressure on the Palestinians. Before the State of Israel is obligated to make any concessions, the PNA is required to both formulate a reformist government acceptable to the Quartet and its own Parliament as well as officially renounce violence and engage in the forcible destruction of disobedient militant groups, in order to achieve a sort of consensus of coercion. The ineffectiveness of this policy is illustrated above. Rather than making progress on the Roadmap contingent upon the achievements of a broken Palestinian leadership, it would make more sense to first gain concessions from the side which does, indeed, have a high degree of centralised authority: Israel.

There are some who see Israel's mere existence as an obstruction to the peace process, or its supposed warrior culture. Like those who believe the Palestinian prerogative is the annihalation of Israel, these people view Israel's as a warrior culture intent on the aggressive expansion of the Jewish state through military occupation and ethnic cleansing. Indeed, an element of warrior élan exists in Israel, but only at the radical fringe. National Orthodox Party leader Affe Eitam does indeed make statements such as "there is nothing more thrilling than the sight of men going to war" (Ha'aretz, 22.3.02), but he represents a miniscule minority of the Israeli populace. The majority of Israelis and Palestinians alike espouse a sincere desire for peace, with the condition of, for Israelis, security, and, for Palestinians, independence.

Amending the Roadmap to require greater Israeli concessions while still providing for Israeli security is simpler than trying to reorganise the Palestinian Authority, but entails its own pragmatic concerns. The first Roadmap stipulation for Israel is the facilitation, sans restrictions, for Palestinian leadership travel. There is no reason why this cannot be implemented as soon as possible; it certainly represents some degree of a positive step toward PNA control of its territory and, hence, slightly more Israeli security. Israel should also be compelled to lift its confiscation of Palestinian funds. More importantly, Israel should meet this condition immediately:

[The Government of Israel] ends actions undermining trust, including attacks in civilian areas, and confiscation/demolition of Palestinian homes/property, deportations, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction.

Certainly Israeli security is not compromised to a significant degree, so long as the occupation continues, if the IDF cannot attack civilian neighbourhoods, demolish homes, or engage in other actions of questionable effectiveness or legitimacy, not to mention activities potentially categorised as war crimes. That the Roadmap recognises these actions undermine trust is a positive acknowledgement, but far more crucial is the immediate end to their occurrence. Other requirements, if pursued without Palestinian concessions, may be infeasible, especially that Israel lift curfews and abandon all settlements constructed since 2000. Much speculation has been made of what would occur if Israel were to attempt to dismantle the settlements and met resistance by their occupants, primarily Orthodox Jews, sometimes suspicious of the secular government. Nevertheless, the Roadmap calls for their abandonment anyway, and such contentious issues would occur whether the Palestinians met their conditions or not. Therefore, being that the general consensus is that such settlements cannot remain, and that their occupants would present the same challenges despite the fulfillment of certain Palestinian obligations on the Roadmap, the settlements could be dismantled immediately with the effect of a greater likelihood of Palestinian compliance with the Roadmap and no greater consternation on the part of the settlement inhabitants. As for the curfews, there is no reason why the humanitarian aspect of this condition cannot be pursued at the present time, given the provision of basic supplies to other human beings should not run contrary to Israeli state security. Israel's centralised government has far more capability to implement these stipulations, and at far less risk to itself, than the impotent Palestinian Authority does to pursue its end of the plan.

The question of compliance with the Roadmap, and not just the revised version version presented here, but in its official form, lies in the attitudes of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. On 13 April, Sharon presented to the White House 14 suggested amendments to the Roadmap. Among the more important objections Sharon had to the plan were that:

1. The roadmap contains a clause that Israel must withdraw to the 1967 borders, a point opposed by Sharon.

2. The second point is that Israel must discuss the future of Jerusalem at an early stage of the negotiations. Sharon had sought to delay such talks.

3. Prime Minister Sharon, the sources said, also wanted to remove a clause in the roadmap that called for an Israeli evacuation of Jewish settlements before the conflict is resolved. The United States rejected the request.

4. Israel was also rebuffed in efforts to base the roadmap on the principles espoused by President George Bush in June and ensure that the United States alone is deemed as the arbiter of Palestinian reforms and ceasefire. Bush had linked a Palestinian state with an end to the war against Israel as well as the removal of Palestinian Authority Chairman
Yasser Arafat. The latest draft of the roadmap does not contain such a link.

Other sources indicate that Sharon's 14 amendments were whittled down from a proposed over 100 changes in the document in February. Despite a show of force by White House advisers, some of whom among Israel's greatest allies within the administration, in making an emphatic demonstration rejecting Sharon's objections, Sharon still has considerable clout when dealing with the United States, in which he is admired greatly in some circles. While demonstrably for peace, Sharon has illustrated his antipathy for Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat quite clearly, especially while laying siege at one point to Arafat's offices at Ramallah. Furthermore, Sharon is a firm believer in the use of force to quell any outbreak of anti-Israeli unrest. His orchestration of the brutal slaughter of Palestinian refugees in two refugee camps outside Beirut during the 1982 Lebanese War more than earns him condemnation as a war criminal in the eyes of most of the international community. With the consistent support of the US Congress, Israel, under the leadership of Sharon, should have no trouble avoiding the conditions of the Roadmap if it so chooses. The likelihood that Sharon would accept the type of Palestinian government espoused above, composed of political representatives of the militant Islamist factions, is entirely negligable. Sharon believes Arafat to be a supreme purveyor of violence; what he must think of Hamas et al is certainly beyond his capacity to allow such groups to govern, let alone survive. Indeed, the current Intifada began shortly after Sharon's election to power, when Israeli police forces under his direction seized the heights in Jerusalem on which the Dome of the Rock, among the holiest sites in Islam, is situated.

The question for Israel, as it always has been, is the degree to which the United States is willing to pressure it to accept a peace. Sharon is no Menachem Begin; he is unlikely to predicate his policies upon teary-eyed appeals to his grandchildren (nor, obviously, is Bush a Jimmy Carter willing to initiate such a dialogue). If the US is serious about a peace plan, the first step is using its tremendous leverage to pry compliance from Sharon and his militarist Likud government.

Who's Running the Show?

American neoconservative ideologues have a long history of vehement support for Likudist policies in Israel. Some Likudniks like Richard Perle actually drafted defence recommendations for Israel which seem to conform to current US activity; recommending the map of the Mideast be "redrawn" in Israel's favour. Additionally, the American Enterprise Institute, a leading neoconservative thinktank, has close Israeli ties, and many of its members are closely associated also with the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), a heavily pro-Israel group. With neoconservative influence in the White House at its peak, the objectivity of the US stance is extremely questionable. Furthermore, there is a powerful Jewish vote influencing the United States Congress, and the evangelical Christian faction in the country sees the maintenance of the State of Israel as coterminous with scriptural recommendations for fostering the final judgment of God (among these, potentially, the President, who has a soft spot for Sharonism; on a helicopter trip through Israel he once observed with much anguished surprise that the nine miles between the West Bank and the Mediterranean at one point was "shorter than some driveways in Texas," and acknowledged Israeli security would be compromised by a return to the 1967 borders.)

The questionable ability of the United States to lead the peace process is what led to the creation of the Quartet. It was hoped a combination of interests- the pro-Israeli US, the pro-Palestinian EU, the UN, called ineffectual in the Israel-Palestine crisis, and Russia, from which many Israelis have emigrated and a longstanding Arab ally -would be able to provide the international legitimacy needed to foster productive results. Already, however, the United States has begun to attempt to sideline its supposed partners under the plan, Islam Online reports. They would be relegated to a "secondary" role, with US led committees deciding "all aspects of the implementation." The change came about as conservatives in the US Congress decided the other Quartet members were to be given "too great a role." One European official would be allowed to chair the humanitarian committee, while the only shared responsibility, it seems, will be expenses.

"It's not a collective knock at the Quartet. But there is growing disdain for those other parties based on Iraq," Gulf News reports one senior congressional aide saying. Indeed, the United States has been pursuing an effort to lock parties opposed to the Iraq War out of key decision-making processes. But having executed the Iraq War, opinion of the US in the Arab world is at all-time lows, especially among Palestinians for whom Saddam Hussein was always a great supporter. The European Union, however, is not content to let the cooperative nature of the Roadmap process slip away. EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana struck back at US plans for the political architecture of the peace process:

This is not a problem to be solved by only one country, it is a problem to be solved by the cooperation of...members of the international community that have been engaged in this peace process for a long time. The roadmap is not the property of one country, it is the property of the Quartet.

Indeed, a one-sided peace effort, chaired almost exclusively by the US, in the aftermath of its post- 11 September policy in the Middle East, is doomed to be condemned to what American television likes to call "the dust bin of history."